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Abstract 
This thesis is about institutions and their regimes.  It seeks to extend our 
understanding of how institutional environments (systems of formal rules and 
regulations and informal norms, conventions, customs and social routines) and 
institutional arrangements (specific organisational forms and structures) mould 
local economic outcomes in different places at different scales.  The basic stance 
of the thesis is that the analysis of institutional arrangements and their regimes 
provides an appropriate framework for understanding and explaining the 
trajectories of long historical processes of economic change.  The thesis is 
situated within the ontological institutional turn in economic geography discourse. 
The institutional perspective is used to shed light on five key questions 
about land transport policy in NSW and Queensland from 1850 to 2000.  What are 
the main themes of change in institutional arrangements in the management and 
delivery of land transport by government road and rail agencies?  What were the 
drivers of key changes?  How have the different politico-administrative settings of 
NSW and Queensland shaped similarities and difference?  What factors contribute 
to an understanding of these differences?  And, finally, what have been the 
outcomes for infrastructure governance, service delivery and spatial economic 
development in regions and cities? 
The interrogation of these questions through an institutional framework lent 
itself to exhaustive historical research coupled with in-depth qualitative interviews.   
Lengthy interviews were conducted with 37 senior policy makers and other key 
informants as a tool to understand the evolution of institutional regimes. Interviews 
were supplemented by less formally constituted discussions with industry 
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informants.   Two States were selected as case studies to enable the impact of 
different geographies to be considered.   
A lengthy, historically anchored institutional approach provides a framework 
to tease out and identify the similarities and differences between road and rail 
systems in the two states. The thesis finds that these similarities and differences 
are a result of the emergence of ideas that capture advocacy within policy 
networks which themselves are part of the institutional structure.  The speed and 
extent of the implementation of these ideas depends on the relative strength of 
individual actors as agents of policy change.  The actual nature of the 
implementation processes is modified by the relative strength of the policy arena 
and of the key institutions within it.  Hence, institutional architectures, even if they 
come from the wellspring of global trends, can differ markedly as they are modified 
by the “local” through the advocacy of interest groups.  The overwhelming 
evidence from the case studies is that geography in its historical context is the 
critical variable in explaining different responses and outcomes in the road and rail 
trajectories of NSW and Queensland. 
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Preface 
This thesis began as a search for knowledge based on the need to 
understand what was happening in a particular section of the economy – transport 
infrastructure.   In NSW, at the time (2004), many approaches to improving 
community outcomes from expenditure in transport had been tried and had been 
found wanting.  This experience was similar to that of many other jurisdictions in 
the English speaking Western World.   
A number of these experiences had been documented (especially those in 
Great Britain).  The focus of a large number of these studies was on the challenge 
of attempting to draw policy conclusions from the available empirical evidence.  
Over time the approach of these studies became increasingly preoccupied with 
relatively narrowly-constructed conceptions of governance.1  There was a general 
lack of an attempt to comprehensively interpret experienced reality in terms of 
broad theoretical approaches in the social sciences.  There were two major 
exceptions to this captivation with empiricism.   The first was a range of studies 
that related policy developments to the impact of a single philosophy - i.e. neo 
liberalism.  The second was a number of studies by economists and geographers2 
who attempted to explain policy development and outcomes in terms of the spatial 
allocation of development, the institutional governance of regions and industries, 
and the impact of networks. These limitations in the literature provided the context 
                                            
1 See for example Henshaw, 1991; Wolmar, 1998, 2001, 2002;  Murray, 2001; Watson, 2001.    
2 Especially prolific were the British Geographers for example Charlton, Gibb and Lowndes, 1995; Charlton, 
Gibb and Shaw, 1997; Nash 1993, Bradshaw 1997;  Docherty, 1999, 2000, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2004; 
Docherty, Shaw, Gather, 2004; Knowles, 1998, 2004; Haywood, 1999, 2003; Freeman and Shaw, 2000; 
Shaw, 2000a, 2001; Shaw, MacKinnon, Docherty, 2009; Shaw, Walton, Farrington, 2003; Cowie, 2002, 2009; 
Watson, 2001; Lodge, 2002, 2003; Shaoul, 2004, 2006; Tyrrall, 2003; Tyrrall and Parker, 2005; Smith 2006; 
Burnham, 2006. 
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and justification for the broadly conceived, institutional analysis of the evolution of 
NSW and Qld transport infrastructure undertaken in this thesis. 
In pursuit of this aspiration, the researcher was guided by a central belief 
that the employment of a geographical perspective was critical to the full inclusion 
and analysis of relevant variables.  Economic and transport geographers have 
always been interested in the links between transport, the spatial allocation of 
activities and institutional governance.  There is an established ability to explain 
outcomes in terms of a spatial analysis of the economic, environmental, social and 
political aspects of policy. 
This thesis found that large investments in transport infrastructure in both 
modes (road and rail) had significant implications for urban form, regional 
development and the performance of the economy more generally.   Most 
important large transport investments locked in a range of related industries at all 
levels of scale (local, regional and global).  This industrial lock-in included 
institutionalised path dependent processes which circumscribed and limited future 
investment, and urban and regional development decisions.    The embedded 
nature of the path dependent processes also acted as significant inhibitors to 
change.   The lock-in effect was most acute and lengthier for railway investments 
where the investments are more ‘lumpy’ and the life of the resulting asset can be 
extended for three generations.   
In the two jurisdictions (NSW and Qld) examined in this thesis, there was 
strong evidence of intergenerational learning and knowledge transfer within 
particular cultures (such as institutes of engineers) as described by North (1971, 
1974, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 1995, 1997).  
vii 
 
These mechanisms further embedded the impact of prior significant decisions.   
Major change occurred only at times of punctuated equilibrium created by a 
significant event (for example, a major innovation, a serious railway accident, a 
major shift in the political and / or economic landscape).   The change 
transmission mechanism was fuelled by ideas which took hold in policy 
communities and achieved legitimacy in political, industrial and financial networks.  
The hegemonic positioning of the associated discourse meant that in all instances 
of major policy change, the ideas which drove change were transmitted into 
Australia from broader themes implemented in the United Kingdom and United 
States, and modified by the activities and policy influence of local advocacy 
networks. 
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1. Introduction 
“We have come to appreciate - against the idea of the economy as 
mechanic order - that economic action is mediated by recurrent practices of varied 
constitution, from legal rules, state policies, and technological standards, to 
informal habits, codes of conduct, organisational cultures, and semantic or 
ideological conventions. Economic agents act through such institutions, rather 
than as blind followers of rules or as fully autonomous actors.”  (Amin, 2001: 1238)  
 
“The nature of the transport sector itself leads to a focus on the importance 
of institutions, key actors within them, policy discourses, policy communities, 
arenas for policy discussions, and the formal and informal networks that exist 
between institutions/key actors involved.  In addition, as many transport initiatives 
are being driven by central government, attention also needs to be placed upon 
the role of the state in deriving and implementing (transport) policy through 
particular institutions and individuals operating at a range of geographical scales. ” 
(Pemberton, 2000: 3) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis presents an analysis of land transport policy trends in road and 
rail modes in the Australian states of New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland 
(Qld) between 1850 and 2000.  It attempts to understand the nature of policy 
formulation and change, and to identify the extent to which these processes have 
resulted in meaningful outcomes for users of the services and the community more 
broadly.  The focus is on the key actors, their networks, the major transport 
initiatives, and the policy communities and related discourses within the frame of 
the institutions that contain and enable action. 
Pritchard (2005: 103) argues that, “For economic geographers, the 
documentation and interpretation of regional socio-economic outcomes is core 
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business.”  The thesis uses the two case studies to enable a comparative analysis 
of regions so that it is possible to examine the extent to which ‘geography matters’.  
In sectoral terms, the focus is on land transport.  This is analysed through the lens 
of the ontological institutional turn in human geography discourse (Jessop, 2001: 
1220).  The basic stance of the thesis is that institutional arrangements are 
important and can be analysed.  Institutional analysis is used to identify and 
unpack the differences in outcomes for regional economic development, city form, 
infrastructure governance and service delivery in NSW and Qld.  As Boschma and 
Frenken (2006: 277) note, 
 “One of the objectives of institutional analysis is to understand the effect of 
the local specificity of ‘real places’ on economic development, which is mainly 
attributed to place-specific institutions at different spatial scales. Thus, an 
institutional approach takes differences between localities as the starting point of 
the analysis and analyses how place-specific institutions affect local economic 
development “.   
Such a methodology enables regions and their economies to viewed and 
studied as ‘complex systems’ where ‘..complexity arises in large part precisely 
because it is spatially distributed and spatially embedded’ (Martin and Sunley, 
2007: 595). 
A critical question underpinning the thesis is to what extent is the economic 
history of regions (which itself is moulded by regional physical and cultural 
geography) an important determinant of current regional economic development 
prospects.  The critical significance of the major investments in transport 
infrastructure for environmental, social and economic outcomes is highlighted.  
This is especially important because in the case of transport, the associated 
embedded social relations of production are locked in for the life of the asset (in 
rail up to 100 years) and limit future decisions.  Hence, long run economic 
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evolution is crucially shaped by single, large and long-lasting decisions.  Viewed in 
these terms, transport investment can be understood as having critically important 
path-dependent implications for the spatial dynamics of economic growth and 
change.  Recent analysis of the impact of railway investments on global city 
positioning and competitiveness by Niedzielski and Malecki (2012) has shown how 
significant investments in urban railways provide global economic advantages to 
cities. Research by O’Çonnor (2010) highlights how cities with multiple transport 
facilities (specifically airports and seaports) capture lucrative shares of economic 
activity.  
The size, complexity, significance and global reach of land transport 
institutions combined with the historical framing of this research allow a multi-
faceted view of path dependent processes.  This provides an ability to identify 
critical investment decision points which have in turn ‘locked in’ a series of socio 
economic relations that both chart and constrain behaviour.  The concept of 
economy that emerges is one of a ‘...composition of collective influences which 
shape individual action and as a diversified and path dependent entity moulded by 
inherited cultural and socio-institutional influences’ (Amin, 1999: 367-8). 
These influences can be understood in terms of a complex array of social 
networks, work cultures and routines which act to reinforce and maintain specific 
institutional regimes that are embedded socially, politically cognitively and 
culturally (Mackinnon, 2009: 500). These processes of embeddedness manifest in 
complex networks. Recent research in economic geography has drawn attention 
to the increasingly networked forms of governance incorporating a variety of actors 
(Coe et al., 2010).   Local conditions in cities and regions represent the ‘intended 
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and unintended’ outcomes of a broad range of relational networks governed by 
many different actors and institutions: 
“We cannot understand how the global economy works without appreciating 
its complete embeddedness in, and shaping by, specific geographies. Equally, we 
cannot understand such geographies without appreciating how they are shaped by 
the complex interconnections within and between production networks organized 
at different spatial scales (often regional and global)’” (Coe et al., 2010: 138-9). 
Hence, in its broadest scope, this thesis is about institutions and their 
regimes.  It seeks to extend our understanding of how institutional environments 
(systems of formal rules and regulations and informal norms, conventions, 
customs and social routines) and institutional arrangements (specific 
organisational forms and structures) mould local economic outcomes in different 
local spaces at different scales through case studies of land transport.  
 
1.2. Background 
The idea that institutions and their interactions can be studied and 
understood is not new.  The classical sociologist Max Weber saw the importance 
of this idea in his focus on bureaucracy and the idea of the ‘iron cage’ of 
institutionalisation and its pervasive social impact.   However, traditional, Weberian 
approaches described specific governmental institutions - structures, organisation, 
functions – without broader, systematic analysis of the impact of institutional 
features on policy or outcomes (Dye, 1981: 21).  
These perspectives have been termed, “old institutionalism” and date from 
the 1930’s.  However, they did not clearly explain the processes through which 
institutions change.  To this, we must look at Arthur’s work within complexity 
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theory (1987, 1989 and 1994) which identifies economic path dependence as 
critical in understanding how institutions evolve.  His work suggests that path 
dependence is the result of increasing returns generated by large set up costs, 
learning effects and coordination effects and self-reinforcing expectations.    
“Complexity therefore portrays the economy not as deterministic, 
predictable and mechanistic but as process dependent, organic and always 
evolving” (Arthur, 1989: 109). 
The most important ideas that were contributed to institutional theory by an 
economist were arguably those of Douglass North.  Over a period of more than 40 
years from the mid 1950’s, North sought to reinterpret economic history through 
the application of rigorous economic theory (see for example North, 1971, 1974, 
1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 1997).   One of his 
goals was to develop an understanding of how economies evolve (North, 1994: 
359).   His major contribution was the development of an analytical framework that 
was a modification of neo-classical theory which could be used as a policy tool to 
improve the performance of economies.  
More recently the relational turn in economic geography has added a 
further dimension to these analyses.  This approach allows an analysis of the 
unevenness of production and consumption across space, the role of structural 
and economic conditions and the responses of individual firms and actors to shape 
eventual local outcomes (Hess and Yeung, 2006:1193).   The analysis of actors is 
anchored in different places and multiple scales.  It highlights the role of local 
governance structures including the role of state policies and institutional 
conditions in shaping outcomes.  Recent research draws attention to the 
increasingly networked forms of governance incorporating a variety of actors who 
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impact on the value chain (for example, state agencies, trade unions and NGOs) 
(Coe et al., 2010). 
The application of the institutional perspective – defined in terms of the 
broad agenda outlined above – to the specific question of transport policy has 
remained a partially-addressed research area, notwithstanding the obvious merit 
of this theoretical approach (Leinbach and Smith, 1997).  The multiplicity of social, 
political, cultural and economic interconnections that link transport to the wider 
context of social change and scale (Hoyle and Knowles, 1998) would seem to 
allow a fruitful basis for in-depth and thorough analysis of institutions and their 
articulation in a manner that is possible in few other industries.   With this in mind, 
this thesis uses transport policy and takes up the challenged suggested by 
Docherty (2003a) to use this sector as a laboratory in which to understand the 
ways in which institutions promote broad changes and have long-ranging 
implications. 
This focus, moreover, is in line with recent new approaches within the field 
of transport geography. For over a decade, this sub-discipline has been shifting 
from its former empiricist nature towards placing an emphasis on the application of 
wider policy.  This trend is clearly observed in the papers contained in the Journal 
of Transport Geography over time.  Transport geography is now more concerned 
with the spatial analysis of the economic, environmental, social and political 
aspects of transport policy (Charlton and Gibb, 1998).  This has led to work on 
privatisation, deregulation and sustainability.  There is renewed interest in 
difference in economy, culture and public policy shaping contrasting attitudes to 
the relationship between social change and mobility. Good examples of this are 
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Hoyle’s work on waterfront management and regeneration (Hoyle, 1989, 1999, 
2000 and 2002) and Knowles’ analysis of structural change, ownership and 
regulation in UK rail and bus industries (Knowles, 1998 and 2004; Davidson and 
Knowles, 2006).   
The focus is now on transport research that reinvigorates the study of urban 
transport systems and locates more precisely their roles in the wider process of 
spatial restructuring, within a broadly-based approach that is highly sensitive to 
history (Docherty, 2003a; Niedzielski and Malecki, 2012).  Hence, this thesis 
located as it is within the geographical perspective of policy determinant and 
impacts seek to extend the locus of enquiry in the field of transport geography.  
This is important because, “Policy making is the crucial factor in realising 
economic benefits from a transport investment” (Bannister and Berechman, 2001:  
216).   
1.3. The Context and Purpose of the Research Problem  
Australia's transport systems have undergone substantial reorganisation 
and restructuring over a number of decades.  They have at various times been 
private companies, wholly owned government entities (of various kinds), semi 
government agencies with significant elements of privatisation and even (it could 
be argued) key delivery arms of social policy.  There has been a constant theme of 
the need to search for a financially self-sustaining model that delivers wider 
economic and community benefits as well as direct services to customers.  The 
systems in all States remain financially dependent (for both recurrent and capital 
support) on governments.  The perceived burden goes beyond the financial to the 
8 
 
impact on the allocative efficiency of the national economy and entrenched 
investment decision making which has consequences for ecological sustainability. 
As a result, the transport systems that were developed to facilitate access 
and mobility and support the economic, social and cultural growth of cities and 
regions are increasingly being seen as not to be delivering these basic benefits.   
Many government inquiries have considered these issues (indeed it seems an 
entrenched problem3).  However, none have examined the problem in relation to a 
full consideration of the historical economic geography of the various transport 
systems in relation to the global movement of capital.   The thesis argues that it is 
only such a perspective that will enables us to understand the decisions that are 
necessary in order to move back to a situation where the transport sector delivers 
what it should to the national economy.   
This research documents a significant public policy story in land transport 
from the perspective of an extended historical account, the recent portions of 
which are informed by interviews with senior government decision makers and 
their advisers.  By telling the story of ‘the present’ in a way which begins more than 
a century ago, insight is given into embedded structural forces that are important 
variables in determining outcomes. Specifically, this leads to two key aims: 
 The empirical aims of the research are to add to our understanding 
of policy changes in land transport and the key impacts on the 
effectiveness of infrastructure governance arrangements, service 
                                            
3 For example Industry Commission Reports on Rail Transport (08/1991),  Intrastate Aviation 
(07/1992), Urban Transport (02/1994), Port Authority Services and Activities (05/1993),  and 
Productivity Commission Reports on Road and Rail Freight Infrastructure Pricing (4/2007), 
Progress in Rail Reform (4/2000), A Comparison of Institutional Arrangements for Road Provision 
(6/1998). 
9 
 
delivery, spatial form in cities and economic development in regions 
and cities.  
 The theoretical aims of the research are to apply an evolutionary 
perspective and to fill some gaps in our knowledge and add to our 
understanding of the relationship between ideas and policy changes; 
the role of individuals as agents of policy change; the role of 
separate policy arenas; the role of institutions with embedded and 
socialised norms; and the impact of the “local” (physical, economic 
and cultural) as a modifying variable. 
 
1.4. Significance of the Research 
A major goal of this research is to exemplify the validity of a contemporary 
economic geography perspective to the understanding of land transport policy. 
Results would lend support to the main theoretical constructs current in the 
approach of economic geographers to institutional analysis and change.   The 
thesis hopes to underline the importance of individuals and their networks as key 
actors and to policy streams, networks and communities as part of globally 
connected urban regimes.  This is especially apparent in the case of Qld which, as 
will be shown, illustrates the importance of not succumbing to fatalism associated 
with the dominance of global forces. (It suggests not that TINA [‘there is no 
alternative’] but that TIAA [‘there is an alternative’]). As the case study chapters of 
this thesis show, the arena of transport policy in Qld has gained a degree of 
agency and autonomy (or, what might be labelled, freedom from the captivity of 
market rationalism) precisely because of the ways that institutional environments 
have evolved over a long period of time. 
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Through these foci on the role of key individuals and their networks as 
variables in determining the nature of policy change, this thesis has similarities to 
the work of Dudley and Richardson4 (2000) in their review of British transport 
policy since 1945. They analysed the British case studies in terms of policy 
networks, multi arena games and urban regime theory.  They found that these 
concepts were important in explaining changes in British transport policy and that 
the strength of relationship between critical actors was important to outcomes.  
More recently Dudley (2013) found that the role of narrative was important in 
explaining the policy window and the associated opportunity for successful 
implementation of a policy change in relation to London congestion charging.  He 
noted impact on the duration of the policy window. At the same time, Marsden and 
Docherty (2013) argue that disruption is an important element in enabling policy 
change that the narrative about the past, present and future prospects associated 
with a particular policy is important to successful implementation because of its in 
transport because it provides an opportunity to intervene in an environment where 
large investments and high sunk costs lock-in prior decisions reinforcing ingrained 
institutional bias towards incremental change. 
The changing relationship between ideas as ‘structures of meaning’ 
(Radaelli, 1995) moulded and framed by critical actors (Campbell, 1998 and 2002) 
and policy in its broadest sense includes notions of ‘policy streams’, ‘policy soup’ 
and ‘policy viruses’ (Kingdom, 1984), policy networks and policy communities 
(Jordan, 1990: Atkinson and Coleman, 1992), issue networks (Heclo, 1978), 
                                            
4 Meijerink (2005) also analysed Dutch coastal flooding policy in terms of advocacy coalition, policy streams, 
punctuated equilibrium and epistemic communities and found that coastal flooding policy had been closely 
tied to an epistemic community of civil engineers and that they sustain a policy monopoly from 1945 – 2003 
that delivered a program of coastal works (Delta Works). 
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advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1993) and multi arena games (Hall, 1993) within the 
context of urban regime theory (Stone, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2005). 
In this thesis, these notions are examined with specific reference to the critical sets 
of ideas that impacted land transport policy in rail at different times:  the 
introduction of rail transport in NSW and Qld, the reforms to rail administration in 
the late1880s, the proliferation of rail branch lines from 1890 to 1930, 
modernisation reforms in rail in the mid 1950’s5, the reforms associated with 
Beeching6 in the early 1960’s and the reforms associated with neoliberalism7 from 
the late 1980’s8.    It is also reviewed in relation to the policy response in roads in 
relation to the early administration and development of roads by councils, the 
growth of private motorised transport, the extensions of the state road networks, 
the early development of freeways and motorways, the emergence of key 
partnerships in planning in the 1960’s, to the entry of the community as a ‘player’ 
in the 1980’s and the emergence of public private sector partnerships in the early 
1990’s. 
                                            
5 In response to massive debt, increasing costs and aged assets the British Transport Commission released a 
plan to modernise the railways and eliminate the deficit by 1962 in 1956.  The plan, “Modernisation and Re 
-Equipment of British Railways” was the result of six months’ work by senior officer of the railways.   
6 In the early 1960s the conservative Minister for Transport in England Ernest Marples believed that the 
railway was a relic of the past and the future would be car based.  He set up an advisory Committee headed 
by Sir Ivan Stedeford to review transport and provide recommendations for improvements. Richard 
Beeching was on the Committee and it was his first report “The Reshaping of British Rail” released on 27 
March 1963 that was adopted by government and would shape rail for more than two decades. Beeching’s 
second report “The Development of the Major Railway Trunk Routes” in 1965 extended the thinking in the 
first report with a focus on what lines should be developed.   These ideas are discussed in detail in Chapter 
4. 
7 For a discussion of the concept of neoliberalism and a suggested definition see Thorsen (2009). 
8 More recently ideas associated with neoliberalism have impacted government transport provision. In 
transport the key ideas have been reducing regulation, increasing competition, encouraging contestability 
(as defined by Baumol, 1982) and reducing public subsidies.  Neoliberal ideas as they apply to space, place 
and transport are discussed in Peck (2001 and 2004), Peck and Tickell (2002), O’Neill and Argent (2005), 
O’Neill and Fagan (2006), O’Neill and Moore (2005) and Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie (2005). 
12 
 
Actors are seen as behaving opportunistically in relation to the availability of 
‘policy windows’ (Kingdom, 1995) and enabled by moments of vacuum 
conceptualised as ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Kingdom, 1995) to facilitate change in 
dominant paradigms.  Equilibrium9 is conceptualised as a period of relative policy 
stability not as an abstract economic assumption.  The role of culture as defined 
by North is viewed as a key variable in explaining differing outcomes across 
space. 
 
1.5. Research Questions and Approach 
Five specific research questions are addressed in the context of land 
transport policy in NSW and Queensland.   
 What are the main themes of change in institutional arrangements in 
the management and delivery of land transport by government road 
and rail agencies in NSW and Queensland between 1850 and 2000?   
 What were the drivers of key changes between 1850 and 2000?   
 What are the similarities and difference in the policy response 
relating to institutional arrangements in land transport between NSW 
and Queensland between 1850 and 2000?   
 What factors contribute to an understanding of differences in policy 
response?   
                                            
9 See Martin (2010 and 2012) for a discussion path dependence, lock-in, equilibrium and stability. 
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 What have been the outcomes of these institutional changes in NSW 
and Queensland for spatial economic development in regions and 
cities? 
Examining these questions required the thesis to select a specific policy 
area, land transport, as already noted. 10  This sector was selected because of the 
range and magnitude of its unique and significant economic, social, cultural and 
ecological impacts on individuals, communities and states at all levels of 
geographical scale.  In addition, the detailed knowledge and experience of the 
researcher enabled access to key individuals to obtain their special individual 
stories as well as an ability to analyse and interpret the results from a perspective 
of a detailed understanding of the dynamics of policy development and 
implementation.  
The critical case study approach enabled a consideration of the impact of a 
wide range of variables.  These included different: geography (physical, economic, 
political, social and cultural); industries and industry life cycle phases; policy 
drivers and policy frames and influences; and institutional arrangements.  Most 
importantly, the historical frame of the thesis allowed a comparative empirical 
investigation of the evolution of the economic landscape and the role of social 
actors and how they are constrained and influenced by instructional factors 
                                            
10The style and composition of the methodology was heavily influenced by several seminal studies 
in transport and or governance including Amin and Thrift (1994, 1994a), Dudley and Richardson 
(1998, 2000), Docherty (2000a), Wolmar (2002), Murray (2001), Shaw (2000), MacLeod (1998), 
Meijerink (2005), Coulson and Ferrario (2007).  All had elements of multiple cross sectional data 
collection and attempts at longitudinal data collection to reveal longer term trends, with the 
objective of viewing underlying structures and developing more general models of institutional 
arrangements and change.  The key element in each of these studies, moreover, was a multi-
method approach developed through a number of stages. 
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emanating from different scales which are themselves contingent and bounded.  
As Pike et al., (2009: 180) argue, 
“As Boschma and Frenken (2009) and Essletzbichler (2009) agree, further 
increasing the body of empirical work on the evolution of the economic landscape 
is clearly a priority for all who are engaged in this research agenda. The 
contingency and openness of social outcomes that are suggested by our 
conception of the geographical political economy of evolution in economic 
geography—incorporating, for example, the aspirations and struggles of social 
actors who are constrained and structured in different ways and to various  
degrees over space and time—renders much of sociospatial reality an empirical 
question… 
In particular, comparative methodological frameworks are especially 
important to explain how and why places evolve in geographically differentiated 
and unequal ways—the heart of our concern in connecting evolutionary thinking 
with uneven development. Rigorous comparative research designs can offer a 
means systematically to compare and contrast such geographic differentiation 
over time and address Boschma and Frenken’s (2009, 156) desire for empirical 
studies in economic geography to be “more comparable, transparent, and 
cumulative”…” 
 
The analysis of the thesis hinges on an intricate research methodology 
which has owed much to the researcher’s positionality within professional 
networks in the transport sector.  To gather information on the institutional 
arrangements of NSW and Qld rail and road sectors required the negotiation of a 
multi-layered set of inter-personal and inter-agency relationships. 
The methodology had several critical components. A review of historical 
sources comprised the major technique for examining these sectors pre-1950. For 
analysis of events over recent decades, a more diverse set of techniques were 
used including participant observation, the review of documents, in-depth 
interviews with key informants, and informal discussions with a range of other 
actors.  Of these different techniques, the in-depth interviews with key informants 
can be considered the methodological foundation for this thesis. In order to 
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attempt to understand the role of key actors at different levels, a life history 
interview approach was used.  This is an important empirical contribution albeit it 
is noted that this method produces a very specific perspective on the events.   
The application of this approach and the position of the researcher as a 
double insider allowed a perspective and research approach which is rare to be 
tested.  Chapter 3 argues that this is in fact a key strength of the data collection 
and the analysis.  Chapter 3 also presents an argument that the in-depth nature of 
the interviews and the positionality of the respondents presents a unique view of 
the data and is itself a contribution to a body of knowledge.  In order to cover such 
a large research question the approach was to rely on archives, previous studies 
and published accounts for the period prior to 1950 and to restrict description to 
key salient events and to avoid lengthy detail where incidents (for example railway 
accidents) had been well documented elsewhere.  This has led to a heavy reliance 
on theory and a move away from the presentation of large amounts of data.  Again 
Chapter 3 argues that this is consistent with the increasingly sophisticated 
conceptual approach being ascendant in contemporary transport analysis.  
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the thesis, identifies the research 
problem, question and hypotheses, the theoretical and empirical context and the 
methodology.  It also discusses the significance and limitation of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 provides the detailed literature review.  The methodology and relevant 
ethical considerations are set out in Chapter 3.  Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 document 
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the case studies.  Chapter 8 summaries the thesis, presents the findings in relation 
to the research questions and the hypotheses, details the main conclusions and 
considers the wider significance and implications of the main findings.  Chapter 9 
restates several larger points which deserve reiteration.  
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2. Applying Institutional Approaches to Transport 
“... the economic landscape is not just the outcome or by-product of the 
process of economic evolution, but a determining influence on that process. 
Economic transformation proceeds differently in different places, and the 
mechanisms involved neither originate nor operate evenly across space. To adopt 
Schumpeter’s phrase, evolutionary economic geography focuses on the ‘creative 
destruction’ of economic landscapes”. (Boschma and Martin, 2007: 539) 
 
“…the evolution of places is conditioned by their positions within wider territorial 
divisions of labor, and path dependence can be seen as a product of the 
succession of roles that a place has played, evoking notions of historical 
“layering”…Places can become tied to particular roles, reflecting the spatial 
concentration of either high or low value-added activities…changes tend to be 
related to broader shifts in prevailing technologies and modes of organization…, 
lock-in can be seen as a contingent effect of broader processes of territorial 
development, rather than as representing a structural cause of regional decline” 
(MacKinnon, et.al., 2009: 139) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Institutions have been central to work in the social sciences for well over a 
century.  From the seminal thinking of Weber (institutions as ‘iron cages’ that set 
deterministic frameworks for action) to the ‘old institutionalism’ (concerned with 
organisations as slowly evolving systems) to the ‘new institutionalism’ (an explicit 
recognition of the importance of different possible paths, the role of actors and 
values) to the ‘institutional turn’ (which sees institutions in terms of social 
arrangements and structures) there has been a recognition that institutions matter.  
The geographical perspective on institutions has seen the explicit incorporation of 
spatial fixity and flexibility as a unit of analysis.  Most importantly geographers 
have adopted and adapted key conceptual developments, namely embeddedness 
and path dependency to explain economic and social development outcomes in 
places.  Taking that point as a start, this chapter outlines the key theoretical 
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developments and places the central concerns of the thesis and the research 
questions squarely at the centre of current debate in the social science.  
 
2.2. The Diversity of Institutional Approaches 
Since Weber, institutions have been a central topic of analysis in the social 
sciences.  There are two main periods of theoretical development that have been 
termed old and new institutionalism.  From the 1920s – 1950s in the era of what 
has been termed ‘old institutionalism’ the concern was with organisations as 
institutions and how they as systems slowly evolved over time.  The approach was 
normative and prescriptive.  Farashahi et al (2005: 3) note that Hughes (1936) saw 
institutions ‘...as stable and slowly changing social systems”.  A major 
development that heralded the dawn of new institutionalism was the incorporation 
of values as an important variable to explain behaviour in institutions. In the late 
1940s for example, Selznick11 (1949 and 1957) examined the values in 
organisations to explain institutionalism.  He saw institutionalisation as a process 
which embedded values beyond the demands of technical tasks.    
Over time, these approaches evolved into so-called ‘new institutionalism’. 
The defining feature of new institutionalism is the interest in the different paths that 
an idea or a reform can take given the range of ‘actors’ and groups that are 
involved and which influence outcomes.  It avoids the technological determinism of 
the old institutionalism and accepts that actors are both determined by and are 
                                            
11 Note that Sleznick (1996) disagrees with drawing a distinction between new and old institutionalism. 
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producers of history.  The genesis of these ideas was in the work of historical 
institutionalists for example Samuel Huntington (1957).   
The new view of institutionalism also incorporates the effect of macro 
influences on local phenomena.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) view institutions as 
socially constructed templates for actions generated and maintained through on-
going actions.   Institutions are seen as providing frameworks and rules that 
particular organisations follow.  More recently, the role of actors has been made 
explicit in institutional theory.  For example Burns and Flam (1987) ‘...define 
institutions as shared rules which categorise social actors, their activities and their 
relationships’ (Farashahi, et. al. 2005: 3).   
 Prior to the recent work by Economic Geographers on this theme, three 
major fields in the social sciences made important contributions to the 
development of institutional theory over the past 30 years: economics; political 
science and sociology.  These three interpretations by economists, political 
scientists and sociologists have been termed the rational choice, historical and 
sociological schools of new institutionalism (Campbell 1997).  More recently, 
researchers have used the term ‘constructivist institutionalism’ (Hay, 2006) or 
‘discursive institutionalism’ (Schmidt, 2008 and 2010) to identify a fourth 
perspective in the new institutionalism where the role of ideas and discourse is 
seen as important to understanding institutional change.   
Economists have viewed the existence of institutions as central to 
understanding the logic of transactions within organisations.  For example, 
Williamson (1993) defines the institutional environment as a set of political, social 
and legal rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and 
20 
 
distribution, while North (1990) views institutions as sets of repetitive interactions, 
customs and rules that incentivise behaviour.  Individuals are seen as rational 
actors who maximise their utility through organisations.   
Political scientists (for example Ostrom, 1986, 1990 and Keohane, 1988) 
have added the dimension of preferences and power in the ways that institutions 
are constituted.  A key foundation of this perspective is that ‘history matters’.  
Paths chosen will have an impact on the development of the organisation.  The 
concept of path dependency that past history will result in inevitable consequences 
is central to this view of institutions.   
Sociologists reject these rational-actor models of institutions and believe 
that ‘analysis cannot be reduced to aggregations of the direct consequences of 
individuals’ motives (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).   They stressed the importance 
of cognition where individuals act because they are unable to conceive of an 
alternative, ‘..the way we do these things’ (Scott, 2001: 57).  This includes 
consideration of cultural artefacts such as symbol systems and moral templates in 
the definition of institutions and sees the institutional environment as a set of social 
relations and embedded interpretations where accepted stories affirm 
organisations’ legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).   DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
built on these ideas to develop their concept of isomorphism which argues that 
organisations are similar because they want to attain legitimacy.  They identified 
three methods of institutional isomorphism:  coercive, mimetic and normative.   
A summary of the work from in the three earlier perspectives can be found 
in Farashahi et. al (2005).  They reviewed studies published between 1983 and 
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2002.  Their sample of 101 studies12 found that:  there is a growing tendency to 
use institutional theory; Sociology is the basic theoretical foundation of the majority 
of studies (96%); Isomorphism and institutional change are the central concerns; 
formal and well established institutions are seen as being the most influential; 
inclusion of at least two levels of institutions is a common approach;  and top-down 
directionality (i.e., institutions affecting organisations) was the main direction of 
effect (81% of studies). 
The work of Douglas North in economics deserves special mention 
because he used an historical perspective to reframed the conceptualisation of 
institutions and applied this to develop and better understand the implications for 
the economic performance of places.  North’s framework retained the concepts of 
competition and scarcity, modified the assumption of the rational human actor and 
added time as a critical dimension.  He argued that “...institutions form the 
incentive structure of society and the political and social institutions,..., [they] are 
the underlying determinant of economic performance.” (North, 1994: 359).  He 
conceptualised time as relating to the learning process of people which he argued 
in turn shaped the evolution of institutions.   
North saw beliefs held by individuals, groups and societies that determine 
choices as a consequence of learning over time. This learning is embedded and 
passed on intergenerationally.  North’s analysis dismantles the rationality 
assumption prevalent in neo classical economics and replaces it with a view of 
how learning occurs within societies.  He argues that mental models that result 
                                            
12 Most (76) were published in the second decade from 1993 and the vast majority 
focussed on institutions in the USA (77%) or other industrialised nations for example Canada, UK, 
Germany, Denmark, Norway and Australia (16%). 
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from experiences in the physical and socio-cultural environment must be 
incorporated into institutional theory. He argues that a common cultural heritage is 
the mechanism that enables the intergenerational transfer of mental models.  
North sees mental models and the associated belief structures as central to the 
nature of the social and economic institutions that are created within a society. 
North defines institutions as constraints that structure interaction, and 
mechanisms that provide the incentive structure of societies and economies.  
Hence, he argued that institutions and their attendant technologies determined the 
transaction and transformation costs that equated to an economy’s costs of 
production13.   He conceived of organisations as groups of individuals bound 
together to achieve a common purpose (councils, regulatory bodies, firms, trade 
unions, schools, churches, clubs etc).  He argues that it is the interactions 
between institutions and organisations that shape the institutional evolution of an 
economy and that the organisations that come into existence reflect the 
opportunities provided by the institutional framework. 
Thus, North sees economic change as a continuous and ubiquitous process 
which happens as choices and decisions are made. Some decisions can be made 
within the existing institutional framework (property rights and political rules) and 
others require recontracting resulting in significant modifications to institutions.   
North argues that the speed of economic change is a result of the rate of learning 
and the direction of the change is the result of the expected pay-offs to acquiring 
different kinds of knowledge. Hence, while this perspective of the new 
institutionalism is viewed differently in the various fields of the social sciences 
                                            
13 North drew heavily on the work of Ronald Coase (1960) to link transactions costs and neo-
classical economic theory. 
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there is general agreement about the existence of institutions and the importance 
of their impact.  Despite their differences all perspectives share the common base 
that institutions matter and have a significant impact on the behaviour of 
individuals and organisations.   
 
2.3. The Institutional Turn in Geography 
In economic geography institutions have been defined as both formal 
organisations and sets of norms, values and rules that govern behaviour.  
Traditionally, as Philo and Parr, (2001: 513 -14) note for geographers, institutions 
have meant the internal and external ‘material build’ environment of large 
organisations (for example prisons and asylums) and the interest was in 
understanding institutional space as a specific place with social connections to 
surrounding places.    
More recent research in economic geography first tended to focus on 
organisations, such as the role of local authorities, planning authorities and large 
organisations in industrial location and regional economic development.  A related 
second field of enquiry, sometimes within an empirical investigation of 
organisations such as local authorities, was a focus on the role of managers in 
shaping the urban landscape.  Geographers14 were interested in the role of 
institutions in structuring space and the levels of activity (scales) at which 
institutions operate (viewed as local, regional national and global).    
                                            
14 A review of the approach of economic geographers since the mid-1990s is contained in MacKinnon et.al. 
2009. 
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An early anthology on the geography of institutions by Flowerdew (1982) 
provides examples of these approaches.  The definition of institutions used in the 
introduction (‘an identifiable organisation’) is reflective of this paradigm,  
‘...an organisation considered in relation to the effects of its internal 
structure and operating constraints on how it acts. The organisation may be a 
private company, a nationalised industry, a non-profit organisation, a central or 
local government or one of its departments, or a quango...’ (cited in Philo and Parr, 
2001: 515).  
The more recent institutional turn in geography has seen the adoption of 
theoretical frameworks developed in sociology, economics and political science 
(outlined above) where institutions are seen as embedded dynamic systems of 
rules, norms and values that reflexively influence, constrain and shape actors’ 
choices and behaviours.  Hence, there has been a significant shift from a concern 
with individual organisations viewed within a specific spatial territory to a view of 
institutions as, 
 ‘...more complex institutional ensembles and regulatory networks...a 
spidery network of dispersed intentions, knowledges, resources and 
powers...coupled with a concern for questions of governance and the manner in 
which institutional ensembles regulate, order and steer economic practices and 
relations (Wood and Valler, 2001: 1140).   
The idea that, ‘institutions matter‘ (Jessop, 2001:1213) and that “...the form 
and evolution of the economic landscape cannot be fully understood without giving 
due attention to the various social institutions on which economic activity depends 
and through which it is shaped” (Martin, 2000: 77), has become a central area of 
enquiry in economic geography.   
Martin (2000) notes four reasons for the increased focus on institutions 
within economic geography:  the adoption by economic geographers of French 
regulation theory with its emphasis on the ‘mode of social regulation’ (the social 
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norms, rules and customs that support regimes of production, consumption and 
accumulation);  the growing recognition of the socio–cultural in economic 
geography and the recognition that the economic process is a socio-cultural 
process; the influence of the growing ‘institutionalism’ in the other social sciences, 
especially economics, political science and sociology; and the upheavals in 
institutional regimes with the decline of the Fordist regime and the implications of 
the shift to a new regime of Post-Fordist accumulation.   
Jessop (2001:  1214) has identified three different forms of institutional turn 
in economic geography:  thematic (the hypothesis that aspects of institutional life 
should be included social enquiry); methodological (institutions provide a useful 
entry point for exploring the social world); and ontological (the hypothesis that 
institutions are the foundations of social existence).  He argues that,  
‘...the likely returns from the institutional turn will depend largely on the 
proposed definition of institutions and the respects in which they are held to 
matter’ (Jessop, 2001: 1220).    
A more recent review of institutionalism in economic geography 
(Mackinnon, 2009: 499) reinforced Jessop’s (2001, 1220) view that there are two 
definitions of institutions still employed by geographers’.  Institutions as 
organisations that have important social and economic impacts and the view that 
institutions are a range of social practices that are based on norms, values and 
beliefs.   
Jessop states that taking an institutional turn requires that organisations be 
‘put in their place’.  He says there are several steps to do this:  first institutions 
must be defined, located and themed; second we must understand how they 
operate and are reproduced; third we can examine institutional emergence as a 
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‘complex evolutionary phenomenon that depends on specific mechanisms of 
variation, selection and retention in specific spatiotemporal contexts’; fourth we 
can understand embeddedness, institutional governance, inter-institutional 
relations and their systemic environments; and finally we can examine the 
intentions of institutional design and institutional outcomes (Jessop, 2001:1221). 
This institutional turn has been a significant augmentation to traditional 
models of economic geography where ‘economic action is atomistic, rational and 
maximising and the socio-political context is held constant’ to an acceptance that 
economic action is intricately linked to social and political action.  As Amin (1999: 
366) notes markets are ‘socially constructed’ and economic behaviour is 
‘embedded in networks of interpersonal relations’ and economic outcomes are 
influenced by network properties.   
Different types of networks have been associated with different types of 
behaviours.   The economy is seen as shaped by enduring collective forces that 
make it an instituted process (Polanyi, 1957) and it is not conceptualised 
mechanistically as a system.  Indeed, “...economic activity is socially and 
institutionally situated: it cannot be explained by reference to atomistic individual 
motives alone, but has to be understood as enmeshed in wider structures of 
social, economic, and political rules, procedures and conventions. It is the role of 
these systems of rules, procedures, and conventions, both of a formal and 
informal nature that is the focus of an institutionalist approach to economic 
geography” (Martin, 2000: 80).  The concept of economy that emerges is one of a’ 
 ‘...composition of collective influences which shape individual action and as 
a diversified and path dependent entity moulded by inherited cultural and socio-
institutional influences’ (Amin, 1999: 368). 
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  Martin (2000) has identified the major applications in economic geography 
of the three alternative approaches to institutional analysis discussed above.   First 
understanding how institutions generate particular organisational forms under 
capitalism resulting in a focus on spatial agglomeration and localisation of 
economic activity.  Second, understanding the economy as a socio-institutionally 
embedded system where the role of locally specific formal and informal networks 
is seen as important.  And third, understanding the role of institutional evolution in 
the historical dynamics of the capitalist economy where the nature and evolution of 
local institutional regimes and their role in the social regulation and governance of 
local economies is the focus. 
Hence the key themes of institutional research in economic geography have 
been: describing the role of institutions in shaping the economic landscape; 
understanding the evolution of economic landscapes; analysing the role of 
technological in shaping the changing outcomes for regional and local economies; 
considering of the cultural foundations of the space economy; and understanding 
the social regulation and governance of regional and local economies. 
For economic geographers the challenge is to describe and conceptualise 
the spatial dimensions of the processes associated with institutions and their 
workings to identify the different effects in difference places and to understand why 
the process of institutionalisation varies between places.  The approach of this 
thesis and its approach are at the centre of current debates in economic 
geography.   
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2.4. How a Geographical Perspective Contributes to 
Institutional Analysis 
Institutions can be formed at different spatial scales including global, 
national, regional, and local, (Meyer and Scott, 1983).   However, the way they are 
embedded at one scale reverberates onto other scales, creating mutually dynamic, 
relational geographies. At each level institutional norms define or bound 
interactions.  Effects are ongoing, complex and multi-dimensional and cannot be 
seen as simply responses to singular institutional forces at any particular level 
(Oliver, 1991; Mackinnon, 2008; Tonts, et. al., 2012). Organisational response 
results from the various strength of institutional factors from a variety of sources at 
all levels.   
Seen this way, Jessop (2003: 2) argues that scales can no longer be 
conceived as nested in a neat hierarchy but as highly interactive, 
‘...co-existing and interpenetrating in a tangled and confused manner, ’... 
within an overall dynamic of globalisation.  Globalisation, the process by which ‘the 
local’ or regions are becoming increasing economically, socially and culturally 
integrated into the international economy has both structural and strategic 
moments.  ‘Structurally, it involves the objective processes whereby increasing 
global interdependence is created among actions, organisations and 
institutions....These processes occur on various spatial scales, operate differently 
in each functional subsystem, involve complex and tangles casual hierarchies 
rather than a simple, unilinear, bottom-up or top-down movement, and often 
display an eccentric ‘nesting’ of the different scales of social organisation’ (Jessop, 
2007: 179).   
As Jessop (2001: 1231) notes institutions have micro foundations and 
macro contexts. They are perpetuated in individual and organisational activities as 
well as being embedded institutional rules and norms.   
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Jessop’s insights, however, deal with the geographical question of scale, 
but not place. Building on this latter concept, Boschma and Frenken (2006: 277) 
argue that a key objective of institutional analysis is to understand the effect of the 
local specificity of ‘real places’ on economic development, which they primarily 
ascribe to place-specific institutions at different spatial scales. Most importantly 
Pike et al., (2007) note that, 
 “Each scale and level is mutually constitutive: ‘localities cannot be 
understood as neatly bounded administrative territories, and places are 
intrinsically multi-scalar” (Pike, et al., 2007: 1259). 
 
Thus, an institutional approach takes differences between localities as the 
starting point and analyses how place-specific institutions affect local economic 
development.  Hence, they maintain that institutional analysis requires all 
antireductionist qualitative methodologies, in particular in-depth case-study 
research, to enable a complete understanding of the complex and multi-faceted 
nature of regional development (Boschma and Frenken, 2006: 277).   
Such methodologies enable regions and their economies to be viewed and 
studied as ‘complex systems’ (Martin and Sunley, 2007:595).  Using a relational 
view in which scales are conceived as being co-produced relative to one another, 
actors do not take on structurally predetermined roles but their interrelations and 
behaviour ‘carry explanatory weight’.  Actors however, are not viewed as free 
agents but are seen as constrained and shaped by a context of institutions, norms 
and rules i.e. the importance of path dependency, conceptuality and contingency 
(Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003).    
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This thinking has been bolstered at the level of the individual actor by the 
inclusion in geographical research of work by behavioural economists and 
cognitive scientists.  This research suggests the significance of social and cultural 
factors, the important role of intuition and imitation as well as the context of 
decision making (Strauss, 2008:142).  The second blade of Simon’s (1982) 
scissors analogy - the decision making environment – can be conceptualised as 
comprised of embedded networks of social relations plus the economic and 
physical factors that are present (Strauss, 2008:140).   
Methodologically the turn shifts the focus of analysis from the macro 
(institutions and regulatory frameworks) to the micro (agents and their 
relationships).  Actors are not viewed as independent subjects but as, 
‘...interdependent subjects whose identities and resource capabilities...are co-
constituted by their relations with other actors’ (Boggs and Rantisi, 2003: 112).   
This turns attention to ‘the socio-organisation of production’ (Yeung, 2002, 2004, 
2005) (i.e., actors networks and their relations), otherwise understood as the 
‘meso level’ (Storper and Salais, 1997) entry point for research.   
The relational turn views space not as an object of analysis but as a 
perspective for analysing and understanding social relations.  The local is 
examined in terms of the advantage conferred by proximity and the ‘micro-space’ 
(Ettlinger, 2003) conceptualisation of networks highlights the role of global 
networks in influencing place-bound economic practices.  The concept of 
‘relational proximity’ vis ‘spatial proximity’ allows an analysis of the advantage 
delivered by the multiple global networks of actors.  The literature on ‘communities 
of practice’ provides numerous examples of the importance of these networks.  
31 
 
The concept of ‘temporary constellations of goal directed social relations’ 
(Grabher, 2001, 2002)  recognises that members build social capital and relational 
strength and that success in an enterprise is likely to lie outside a single firm.   
Yeung (2005) reviews the key relational frameworks in relational geography 
which he sees as thematic and reworks three concepts – relationality, power and 
actors – to identify the underlying causal properties and build the theoretical base 
of relational economic geography.  He argues that it is necessary to unpack the 
‘conceptualisation of power as practised through relationality’ and to identify how 
different geometries of power create different effects and spatial outcomes 
(Yeung, 2005:43).  Relationality is seen as constituted through interactions and 
interconnections resulting in different configurations of relational geometries with 
different forms of power embedded in them.   
His approach is based on ‘..understanding the intentions and strategies of 
economic actors and ensembles of actors and the patterns of how they behave’ 
(Yeung, 2005:48).  Causal power is given to relational geometries.  Hence, ‘...a 
relational approach to regional development seeks to identify the complex 
relational geometry comprising local and non-local actors, tangible and intangible 
assets, formal and informal institutional structures, and their interactive power 
relations. ... In particular, the approach analyses the relational complementarity 
and specificity of these actors, assets and structures – not their mere presence or 
absence’ (Yeung, 2005: 48). 
In Economic Geography, the institutional turn has been used to address the 
question of how local and regional economies are shaped by particular, place 
specific and embedded institutional arrangements.    Under the banner of ‘new 
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regionalism’ geographers have examined the effects of social and cultural 
conditions in regions as assisting or hindering economic growth.  Regions can be 
conceived as spaces that relate to a constructed and instituted identity.    
“Region’ can be seen as a socially-produced spatial category, meaning that 
a region is a perceived demarcation of, among other things, social, political, 
economic, and cultural processes that change over time” (Frisvoll and Rye, 
2009:177).   
The work of Paasi (1986, 1991, 2001, 2002, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2009 and 
2013) provides an analytical framework that has been used by geographers (see 
for example MacLeod, 1998 for Scotland and Frisvoll and Rye, 2009 for the 
Mountain Region in Norway) to incorporate social, cultural, governance and 
institutional structures from the micro to the macro level into an understanding of 
economic outcomes in the local.  The framework explicitly incorporates the role of 
local actors and identity issues to enable a view of, ‘...how regions emerge, and 
are continually reproduced and transformed in and through the practices of 
individuals and institutions at a variety of spatial levels. This emphasis on the 
wider socio-spatial structure and collective consciousness of ‘society’ helps to 
foreground issues of spatial scale, boundaries, institutional formation and cultural 
identity’ (MacLeod, 1998: 834).   
Using a Paasian framework requires sensitivity to the particular social 
forces, interest group coalitions, institutional geometry and political discourse that 
constitutes regions (MacLeod, 1998: 835). Hence, ‘...a region is an explicit 
collective representation of institutional practices. It has thus a longer historical 
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duration and represents a ‘higher-scale history’ than place’ (Frisvoll and Rye, 
2009: 177) that results in a specific cultural image (MacLeod, 1998: 836). 
Regions can be advantaged and disadvantaged by their economic history 
and their embedded social relations.  These factors can be important in explaining 
the adaptability and resilience of regions.  Pike et al. (2010) argue that strong, 
tightly connected agents have an important role in framing disruptive change in 
regions.  They consider that their role is an important variable in determining the 
resilience of regions and therefore must be considered. 
Through these approaches, Geographers have spatialised the concept of 
embeddedness.  Particular forms of economic activity are seen as embedded in 
the social relations of a particular place.  The term ‘institutional space’ refers to a 
geographical area over which an institution is constituted and has influence.   As 
Amin (2001: 1241) notes,  
“This gives us a very different understanding from institutions seen as 
containers, structures, organisations, or contextual settings. The focus falls on the 
repeated/instituted practices enshrined in interpersonal relations, network 
enrolments, habits of thought, and laws of markets, state and other organisational 
practices, technological regimes that give rise to economic formations of varying 
organisation, geography, and vitality.”  
The Regulation Approach (RA) has also been incorporated into institutional 
studies by geographers who see regulation as an uneven process highlighting the 
role of local state agencies in mediating between local economies and national 
and global regulatory frameworks (Mackinnon, 2009: 500).  This work represents 
the efforts of a school of French political scientist and economists largely in the 
two decades from 1970.  RA views capitalist economies as a function of social and 
institutional systems.  Economic relations are seen as socially embedded;  
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economic development is path dependant and irreversible;  economic, political and 
social institutions matter and are endogenous and shape changes over time which 
can be identified in specific institutional frameworks and regimes (Jessop, 1997b: 
503-4).   RA emphasises the contingent relationship between a regime of 
accumulation (macroeconomic and reproducible relationship between production, 
distribution and consumption) and mode of regulation (the extra economic 
institutional and social norms that legitimise the accumulation regime) (MacLeod, 
2001: 1157).    
 
2.5. Geography, Institutions and the Transport Sector 
Geographical insights into institutions have relevance to geographies of 
transport via two key connections.  Firstly, they apply geographers’ insights on 
scale, embededdness and regions to transport networks discussed above. 
Secondly, they bring into focus the crucial importance of path dependence 
concepts for transport organisations and the resultant outcomes for local and 
regional economies.  The later concept has particular application in transport 
because of the size and lumpiness of the investments and the life of the resulting 
assets.  In this section, we focus specifically on this set of issues. 
Investment choices in transport lock in (and out) a complex array of 
institutional arrangements. MacKinnon (2008: 1455) notes that lock-in can be 
functional (relating to the nature of relations between firms), cognitive (reflecting 
world views) and political (relating to social relations and power).   Investment 
choices also produce and reproduce a set of spatial expressions (for example 
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development opportunities for regions and areas with high and effective 
connectivity due to good transport infrastructure).   Technology choice in railways 
can have lock-in effects that last for over 100 years.  Investment decisions can 
have long run effects on future technologies, organisations and systems.  Earlier 
decisions reverberate throughout history implying outcomes that result from the 
past and may not be optimal or rational; and technological lock-in can result from 
positive network externalities (that is technical interrelatedness, economies of 
scale and the inertia created by sunk costs).  An example of this is the narrow 
gauge choice made by Qld in the 1860’s which still dominates the investment 
choices available today. 
The concept of path dependency is where prior choices pre-determine and 
shape future choices, responses, decisions and or outcomes. That is, thinking and 
decisions are conceived as historically conditioned where the past is imprinted on 
present and future organisational behaviour (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011: 326-7) 
and is often associated with technology.  Amin (1999: 368) notes, ‘...a key 
institutional axiom is that solutions have to be context-specific and sensitive to 
local path dependencies’.  Jessop (2001:  1229) notes that, 
 ‘...Path dependency implies that the prior development of an institution 
shapes current and future trajectories. It suggests that institutional legacies limit 
current possibilities or options in institutional innovation.  History make(s) a 
difference. But this need not imply fatalism: social forces could intervene in current 
conjunctures and actively rearticulate them so that new trajectories become 
possible’.   
Martin and Sunley (2006: 398) note that three of the current key 
approaches to economic geography (evolutionary, institutional and relational) view 
path dependence as a ‘...fundamental feature of the economic landscape...there is 
an emphasis on the context-specific, locally contingent nature of self-reinforcing 
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economic development, particularly the ‘quasifixity’ of geographical patterns of 
technological change, economic structures and institutional forms across the 
economic landscape.’  They note three forms of economic path dependence: 
technological lock-in; dynamic increasing returns to scale; and institutional 
hysteresis. This builds on the highly influential work of David (1985; 1986) who 
used the example of the QWERTY keyboard as an example of technological lock-
in and the resilience of prior technologies, due to positive feedback mechanisms. 
Thus, the central feature of path dependence is that: 
 ‘... the economy inherits the legacy of its own past...the economy is an 
irreversible historical process in which future outcomes depend on past events and 
outcomes: at any point in time the state of the economy depends on the historical 
adjustment path taken to it’ (Martin and Sunley, 2006: 400).   
Arthur’s work within complexity theory (1988; 1989; 1994) also identifies 
economic path dependence.  His work suggests that path dependence is the result 
of increasing returns generated by large set up costs, learning effects and 
coordination effects and self-reinforcing expectations. While North’s work (1990) 
argues that all forms of path dependence associated with increasing returns 
applies to organisations.  His view reinforces David’s concept of ‘institutions as 
carries of history’.  None of this implies that path dependence suggests the future 
is preordained; it is, ‘...a probabilistic and contingent process’ (Martin and Sunley, 
2006: 402) where it narrows choices and links decision making through time 
(North, 1990: 99). 
Schreyögg and Sydow (2009 and 2011) have identified three phases in 
path dependent processes.  The Preformation Phase is a situation where the 
choice of decision making is broad and while being historically framed is unable to 
be predicted by prior events.  If this decision sets off a self-reinforcing process 
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then it can be conceived as a ‘critical juncture’.  During Phase II, The Formation 
Phase, the range of decision choices is narrowed by the prior decision and it is 
difficult to change the initial decision and a path begins to evolve.  A new regime 
emerges and positive feedback processes further reinforce the path.  In Phase III, 
Lock-in, the dominant pattern is fixed and all future processing is fully bound to a 
path and flexibility has been lost.  More efficient alternative processes will be 
unable to be adopted resulting in actual or potential inefficiency.  These phases 
are shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2.5.1 Phases of Path Dependency and Lock-in  
 
(Source:  Sydow, et.al. 2009: 692) 
Path dependence as a process is conceived as intertwined with geography.  
Scott (2006) argues that space plays an active role in economic outcomes.  
Essletzbichler and Rigby, (2007: 557) note that 
,  ‘...because different institutions operate over various spatial scales and 
tend to be geographically and temporally embedded, the influence of institutions 
on economic actors such as firms and workers will exert region-specific 
pressures’.   
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However, this is a complex process where the regional economic landscape 
is, ‘... simultaneously both an outcome of path-dependent processes of economic 
evolution, and a major determinant shaping many of those processes (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006: 410).  Most importantly, local organisations, industries and 
institutions are linked into a wide range of markets, regulatory systems, regions 
and institutions at all levels of spatial scale.  Path dependent evolution within any 
region is unlikely to be able to be explained or understood without reference to 
what is happening to processes, systems, industries, markets, technology and 
regulatory behaviour in places linked via complex social, political and economic 
networks that themselves are part of a much broader evolution of regimes of 
accumulation and modes of regulation. 
‘At the regional level, institutions, broadly defined as ‘settled habits of 
thought’ (Veblen, 1899, 1919), play a similar role to routines at the firm-level.  
Regional path dependence may arise from: a natural resource base; sunk costs 
associated with infrastructure assets; regional technologies; economies of 
agglomeration; region specific institutions, cultural forms and traditions; and 
interregional dependencies and linkages (Martin and Sunley, 2006: 412). The 
concept of ‘regional lock-in’ has been used to describe the observed pattern where 
regions tend to exhibit a tendency to particular economic specialisations and 
uneven development that seen self-reinforcing and self-reproducing over long 
periods of time.  Setterfield (1997) has described it as ‘conditional equilibrium’ that 
is difficult to escape while Arthur’s work focuses on the role of processes in 
producing gradual rigidity.   Martin and Sunley, (2006: 415) have noted three types 
of lock-in described by Grabher (1993), ‘functional’ (based on hierarchical firm 
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relations), ‘cognitive’ (consisting of a common world-view) and ‘political’ (a thick 
and dense institutional structure that hampers restructuring)’.  In his study Grabher 
found that lock-in led to rigidity, an inability to adopt new ideas and to respond to 
competition in a regional steel and coal industry complex in the Ruhr.     
Path dependency has particular application to transport.  Transport 
investment choices are sufficiently large, are linked to (and it can be argued are 
driven by) the dominant mode of accumulation and put in place economic 
relationships that create and then embed systems and sub systems of production 
at all levels of scale.  These economic relationships themselves have implications 
for the future possible behaviours of key actors as they open up networks which 
both enable and constrain the flow of ideas and policy choices.   The analysis of 
path dependence in transport also enables a consideration of the spatial impact of 
these decisions.  Transport investments provide channels of movement and 
development that have economic and social consequences for regions and local 
places.  The resulting economic paths link places globally and are specific to the 
institutional regime.  Hence, an analysis of path dependence is fundamental to 
understanding the impact of transport investment decisions.   
2.6. Conclusion: Making Sense of it all 
The themes addressed through this chapter signify a series of key insights 
which can guide the analysis of transport systems. Firstly, there is diversity in 
terms of how the concepts of ‘institutions’ and ‘institutional analysis’ have been 
developed and applied by leading theorists.  Secondly, perspectives focusing on 
institutions have been found to be extremely fruitful for geographical analysis - a 
process dubbed the ‘institutional turn’ in geography.  Thirdly, geographical 
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perspectives, in turn, have fed back into and enriched the broader field of 
institutional analysis through an understanding of spatially embedded institutional 
milieu. And fourthly, and most importantly, in the context of these considerations, 
the notion of path dependence has critical relevance, especially for geographers. 
Institutions are best defined as multi-scalar ensembles which produce and 
reproduce networks linking knowledge, resources, places and actors with 
implications for habits, norms, rules and values that structure behaviour. Transport 
geographers have an interest in the spatial dimensions of institutions and their 
outcomes at all levels of scale from the local to the global.   Institutional regimes 
(characterised by periods of relatively stable economic structures, technologies, 
organisations and relationships) create transport investment choices that lead to a 
complex array of economic, financial and trade arrangements for states.  The 
regional and local outcomes resulting from instituted processes associated with 
investment choice has the effect of embedding particular forms of economic 
activity in places, and has implications for development options.  The resulting 
local relationships between firms, government agencies and critical players (e.g. 
unions, trade and community associations) create networks of information and 
support which are also linked to extra regional and global networks.   A window of 
analysis is enabled by the institutional perspective into the policy choices available 
and legitimised within the context of the institutional regime which limit and 
perhaps predetermine the policy decisions that are available to key actors who 
themselves are constrained by the decisions of the past.   
The role of key individuals and their networks as agents of change can be 
examined as a key variable in determining the nature and possibility of policy 
41 
 
change.  The perspective is informed by the relational and cultural turn in 
economic geography recognising that individual actions can only be understood as 
part of embedded social relations. These key actors are seen as behaving 
opportunistically to facilitate change in dominant paradigms.  The role of culture in 
influencing the rate of change in norms and institutions and therefore enabling or 
constraining outcomes can be viewed as key variable explaining differing 
outcomes across space.  
These variables are not viewed as fixed but are seen within their historical 
context. In transport, especially, a long historical lens is necessary in order to 
identify the reasons why particular institutional arrangements exist. There is an 
implicit acceptance of the role of and the key characteristic of path-dependent 
processes and systems where the outcomes is seen to evolve as a ‘consequence 
of the process’s or system’s own history” (Martin and Sunley, 2006).  
With these points made, the next chapter provides an overview of the 
methodology used for this research, and then, a series of chapters apply the 
institutional approach outlined here to the history of road and rail systems in NSW 
and Qld. This extended historical understanding presented in these chapters 
provides insight into the importance of ideas, networks and policy development, as 
a back drop to major decisions.  The role of geography is highlighted as the central 
variable that explains how these outcomes were reached.   
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3. Methodology 
 
“...space and place as well as the practices and power relations of the 
involved actors are important when studying the production of geographical 
knowledge.”  (Adriansen and Madsen, 2009: 146)  
“...Judging an interviewer’s positionality is a slippery process and rather 
than focusing on dualism it is arguably more important to analyse the power 
relationships between the researcher and the elite subjects as a ‘sliding scale of 
intimacy.’...Positionality is not static.”  (Harvey, 2010:198 – 9)  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The analysis of this thesis hinges on an intricate research methodology 
which has owed much to the researcher’s positionality within professional 
networks in the transport sector.  To gather information on the institutional 
arrangements of NSW and Qld rail and road sectors required the negotiation of a 
multi-layered set of inter-personal and inter-agency relationships.  This chapter 
discusses the range of complex issues that arose during the development and 
execution of this methodology.   It is structured to align with the stages of the 
research process, as an explicit intention to reflect on the impact of the 
researcher’s positionality at each stage of the process, using the concept of the 
‘double insider’ articulated by Adriansen and Madsen (2009).   It addresses the 
benchmark question of insider/outsider status which defined the research 
approach.   The research as a result of the positionality of the researcher, the 
epistemological approach required by the theoretical constructs, the power of the 
comparative case study method and the nature of the interview respondents are 
all explicitly examined.   
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3.2. Identity and Positionality:  Defining Insiders, Outsiders 
and Double Insiders 
For much of the twentieth century, research in the social sciences was 
dominated by objectivist epistemologies associated with realist ontologies. These 
approaches viewed reality as, ‘...an external, objective phenomenon, existing 
independently of human consciousness’ (Rooney 2005:4).  Such a stance led to 
the situation where, “...the concepts of validity, reliability and generalisation have 
obtained the status of a scientific holy trinity.  They appear to belong to some 
abstract realm in a sanctuary of science, far removed from the interactions of the 
everyday world, to be worshipped with respect by all true believers in science’ 
(Kvale, 1995:19).   Validity, reliability and the ability to generalise research 
conclusions were held to be dependent upon the data on which they were based.  
Methodological procedures were held to, ‘transmit validity from premise to 
conclusion’ (Hammersley, 1977: 5).   
Such positivist perspectives based on technical approaches saw the 
researcher as, “...an outsider, an independent observer rigorously gathering data 
and reporting objectively.  The researcher’s subjectivities were not allowed to 
impact the research process as it was believed that this would lead to a distorted, 
invalid picture of reality” (Rooney, 2005:4).   However, as Hammersley (1993: 219) 
notes, 
 “...no position, not even a marginal one guarantees valid knowledge; and 
no position prevents it either. There are no overwhelming advantages to being an 
insider or an outsider. Each position has advantages and disadvantages, though 
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these will take on slightly different weights depending on the particular 
circumstances and purposes of the research.”    
Over time, research philosophies in the social sciences have moved from 
the positivist position where the validity of research is dependent on the 
researcher being objective, to the neo-positivist position of the non-existence of an 
objective reality and the impossibility of total objectivity, and thence, to the position 
where recognition of the researcher’s subjectivities are core to the research 
process and must be recognised (Rooney, 2005: 3).   More than this, “Postmodern 
critiques of qualitative interview research methods insist that the researcher’s 
multiple identities and their embedded social contexts influence the validity and 
reliability of ‘data’ collected and their interpretation” (Gunasekara 2007: 462). 
This process of active consideration of positionality during the research 
process has been termed ‘reflexivity’ (Ryan 2005: 2).  The importance of the 
researcher making transparent and reflecting on the nature of the connections with 
the research and the nature of changing ‘identities’ throughout the research has 
been noted by numerous researchers including Cassell, (2005); Denzin (2001); 
Holstein and Gubrium (1997) and May (1998).  Nightingale and Cromby (1999: 
228) suggest that, reflexivity requires an awareness of the researchers’ 
contribution to the construction of meaning and urge an exploration of the ways 
researchers’ involvement influences the research. 
This makes visible, “the backstage reality of research life” (Gunasekara, 
2007: 462) and in so doing, increases the rigour of the research (May, 1998).  The 
multiple, dynamic identities of the researcher have been described as a ‘constantly 
pivoting centre’ (Walters, 1996) and this is reflective of the research reality where 
relational connectedness varies with individual participants and will be impacted by 
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location, context and time.  Hence the process of reflexivity is complex and multi-
dimensional and must be considered for each part of the research process and for 
each interaction with all sources and in relation to the relational, spatial and 
temporal contexts.  There is a need to allow for and analyse social and personal 
change in the research process (Lewis 2003: 231). 
It is through the process of making the research process transparent that, 
‘readers can construct their own perspectives and in so doing are able to use the 
information provided about the methodological process to address a range of 
various concerns about positionality.  For example, Will the researcher's 
relationships with subjects have a negative impact on the subject's behaviour such 
that they behave in a way that they would not normally?   Will the researcher's tacit 
knowledge lead them to misinterpret data or make false assumptions?  Will the 
researcher's insider knowledge lead them to make assumptions and miss 
potentially important information?   Will the researcher's politics, loyalties, or 
hidden agendas lead to misrepresentations?   Will the researcher's 
moral/political/cultural standpoints lead them to subconsciously distort data 
Rooney (2005: 6) 
These points bring us to the vexed concept of the positionality of the 
‘insider’.   The term insider in its more limited sense was seminally defined by 
Merton (1972) as “..an individual who processes a priori intimate knowledge of the 
community and its members..” (cited by Roland and Wicks, 2009: 253).   Over 
time, however, usage of the term has become increasingly tightened.   The more 
demanding definition employed by Adriansen and Madsen (2009: 147) is: 
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”To us, an insider is someone who is considered an insider by the other 
members of a given community and/or participates on par with the other members 
of that given community.”   
The use of the term ‘community’ is important because as Hellawell (2006: 
485) notes “possessing intimate knowledge of it doesn’t necessarily mean being a 
member of it yourself.  So being an insider researcher is not necessarily the same 
as being currently a member of the organization being researched.”  However, this 
usage of the term is also slippery.   It is different from the definition of insider by 
Robson (2002) where he notes that insiders have a direct involvement or 
connection with the research setting.  Community is less direct but is cognisant of 
the role of networks and the potential impact they have on how the ‘knower 
impacts the known’.   By extension, an outsider then is a researcher who is not a 
priori familiar with the setting or the people and is unconnected with the community 
of the research setting. 
Further to these debates is the concept of a ‘double insider’. This construct 
was seminally discussed by Adriansen and Madsen (2009) in the context of 
interview-based research with decision-making elites and professionals. The 
concept of the double insider implies that the researcher has detailed knowledge 
not only of the research matter (in the present case, the transport sector and its 
institutions) but also of the participants.  The distinction between being and insider 
and a double insider is important because the two roles are different and have 
different implications for the research.   As Adriansen and Madsen (2009: 146) 
note, 
 “...the insider role is most explicit during the interview situation itself, but it 
also affects how the interviews are planned, located and analysed.  By analysing 
the whole process, we illustrate our double insider role and the contested nature of 
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our position as well as the multitudes of power relations and tacit negotiations 
taking place when conducting insider interviews.” 
This framework has vital significance in situations where the intention of 
research is to understand the social, relation and economic structures, and the 
individuals’ experiences of them.  Crucial, in these contexts, is a high level, in-
depth knowledge of the economic sector and an ability to access key decision 
makers and gain their confidence and trust to discuss complex, sensitive and 
confidential information.   The ability to access, understand, analyse and interpret 
the range of institutional linkages and embedded rules at all levels from the macro 
to the micro equally requires a detailed knowledge of the possible array of 
institutional nodes and entry at all levels into institutional confidence.  As Hellawell 
(2006: 486) notes, “... some of the nuances of the relationships known to the 
insiders, and often going back generations, may forever be withheld from the 
outside observer.”  He quotes Schultz (1964: 34) (apologies for gendered text),  
“At best he may be willing and able to share the present and the future with 
the approached group in vivid and immediate experience; under all circumstances, 
however, he remains excluded from such experiences of its past. Seen from the 
point of view of the approached group, he is a man without a history.“   
Thus, the advantages of double insider research are the ability to obtain 
knowledge which an outsider is unable to access, and the ability to enter into 
complex dialogue with respondents. At the same time, however, this positionality 
carries certain presumptions to which the researcher must be on guard. 
Importantly, there is the potential for misconception arising from ascribed 
knowledge, established ways of looking at reality, and an inability to ‘see’ what is 
there because it is familiar.  Being alert to such potentialities is a central issue that 
becomes a key requirement of research praxis. 
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Applied to the current project, the double insider status of the researcher 
was expressed through an extensive personal history of engagement with this 
sector. Identities which defined the double insider status of the researcher 
included former senior public service executive, consultant on management reform 
issues, and member of a community of interest around transport reform issues. 
Taken together, the researcher was colloquially known by participants in terms of 
being part of ‘the transport family’ (and therefore, a very close double insider within 
intimate knowledge of individuals’ roles in professional duties and networks). 
3.3. Selection of Sector of Focus and Case Studies  
The selection of the land transport as the sector of focus and of the case 
studies of NSW and Queensland for the research was directly related to the 
background and experience of the researcher.  At the time of commencing this 
thesis, the researcher had over 20 years of experience working as either a senior 
government official or a consultant to senior government officials in land transport 
in both the case study jurisdictions of NSW and Qld.  Unusually, the researcher 
had experience working directly as a senior employee for the road agency in NSW 
from 1987 to 1992, as a consultant to the various rail agencies in NSW from 2000 
to the present, as a consultant to the main road agency in Qld from 1999 to 2008 
and a consultant who completed one small project for the rail agency in Qld in 
2004.  The researcher often worked closely with CEO’s, their direct reporting 
teams, the related government agencies and key stakeholders on complex, 
sensitive and critical directional organisational issues and projects.   
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The topic lent itself to in-depth qualitative research as its focus was social, 
relation and economic structures and individuals experiences of them.  It 
demanded a high level, in-depth knowledge of a large economic sector and the 
ability to access key decision makers and gain their confidence and trust to 
discuss complex, sensitive and confidential information.  The ability to access, 
understand, analyse and interpret the range of institutional linkages and 
embedded rules at all levels from the macro to the micro equally required a 
detailed knowledge of the possible array of institutional nodes and entry at all 
levels into institutional confidence.  .  As Hellawell (2006: 486) notes, “... some of 
the nuances of the relationships known to the insiders, and often going back 
generations, may forever be withheld from the outside observer.”  This double 
insider positionality crucially shaped the qualitative research methodology in terms 
of access to informants, conduct of interviews, and interpretation of interview 
materials. To explore these issues, the detail of the project methodology is now 
addressed. 
 
3.4. Research Methods 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this aim of the thesis was to develop and apply an 
institutional approach to the study of decision makers as actors within a set of 
embedded social relations, anchored in a global political economic order to add to 
the understanding of the structures which impede or enable the dynamics of 
change and adaptation in important socio-economic sectors; thus, determining the 
allocation of resources, access to economic power and wealth across space.   To 
recap, this was achieved through exploring: 
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 The application of institutional theories to explain the evolved history 
of land transport (road and rail) in NSW and Qld between 1850 and 
2000; 
 The themes of change in institutional arrangements; 
 The drivers of the key changes; 
 The similarities and difference in policy response between the two 
case study jurisdictions; and 
 The outcomes in terms of service delivery, infrastructure governance 
and spatial economic development in regions and cities.  
 
The style and composition of the methodology was heavily influenced by 
several seminal studies in transport including Dudley and Richardson (2000), 
Docherty (2000a), Wolmar (2002), Murray (2001), Shaw (2000), Bennett (2004), 
and Coulson and Ferrario (2007).  All had elements of multiple cross sectional 
data collection and attempts at longitudinal data collection to reveal longer term 
trends, with the objective of viewing underlying structures and developing more 
general models of institutional arrangements and change in the transport sector.  
The key element in each of these studies, moreover, was a multi-method 
approach developed through a number of stages. 
For the present research, the insights from these earlier studies in 
combination with the double insider positionality of the researcher structured the 
order in which various components of the methodology took place. The 
methodology had several critical components: literature review, participant 
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observation, in-depth interviews and informal discussions (Figure 3.4.1).  The data 
collected using the techniques are set out in Table 3.4.1. 
The literature review provided a core entry point for the methodology. The 
importance of institutional evolution and path-dependence, discussed in the 
previous chapter, implied that this study take history seriously. As a result, the 
analysis of road and rail organisations in contemporary NSW and Qld are framed 
by way of extensive documentation of how they have come to exist the way they 
do. This involved lengthy data collection exercises in various archives, and 
consultation of a wide range of published historical sources. The importance of 
these activities is underlined by the comprehensive treatment of institutional 
histories in each of the case study chapters later in this thesis. 
The participant observation phases were to become particularly important in 
terms of being able to understand the nuances within the institutional milieu and 
significantly increased the credibility of the researcher enabling access to key 
informants for extended interviews allowing  sensitive and insightful narrative and 
discussions that enabled the creation of an arena where the interviewer and the 
interviewee together made sense of the bare facts to uncover meaning and at 
times implications that were generalised beyond transport.  This phase also 
significantly extended the researcher’s view of what constituted the institutional 
arena to include aspects of community, stakeholders, bankers and universities that 
had not in the initial research proposal been considered.  The in-depth interviews, 
which are discussed in detail below, provided the bulk of the original data for the 
thesis and together with the informal discussions enabled a detailed analysis of 
outcomes in the case studies. 
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Figure 3.4.1 Research Methodology Overview 
 
  
 
53 
 
 
Table 3.4.1 Methodological Techniques and Data Collected 
Technique Focus/Respondents Information 
6.2,1Literature review 
2004 – 2006 (initial) 
then on-going 
 
Geographical literature Theoretical constructs, methodological 
approaches, previous studies 
Government reports, transport 
commentaries 
Overview of trend and issues in the transport 
sector, history, industry data, policy stances 
Institutional histories Critical case study data and information 
including legislative changes and critical 
historical periods 
Archives Key documents relating to critical policy pivot 
points 
Participant Observation 
2004 – Present 
Transport Sector Institutions 
 
Key players, critical institutions,  policy arenas, 
decision making apparatus, linkages, networks, 
communication channels, language, embedded 
norms and values, methods of reproduction, 
supply chains, labour relations, geography of 
the regime, sources and methods of 
maintaining and transmitting power 
In-depth Interviews 
2009 -10 
Critical decision makers in road and 
rail transport in NSW and Qld in 
State and Local Government from 
1952 - 2000 
In-depth individual perspectives on key 
players, ideas, policy changes, institutional 
change, embedded norms and behaviours, 
decision making, impacts on service delivery, 
development in cities and regions and 
infrastructure governance 
Informal discussions 
2004 - 11 
Senior commentators in the 
transport sector in NSW and Qld 
Confirmation of ideas and concepts 
Testing of views 
Triangulation of data 
 
Participant Observation 
The participant observation phase involving participation within a transport 
lobby group (10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney) which arose out of an impromptu 
opportunity presented to the researcher. Although not originally planned for, it 
allowed the development of a differently-positioned understanding of the inner 
workings of the key institutions that are critical to the transport sector.  Although 
the researcher’s history working as an executive and consultant to transport 
agencies provided an insider perspective on the sector, participating with others in 
a multi-stakeholder advocacy coalition provided an important new lens from which 
to observe and consider the institutional arrangements in transport. These 
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activities included wide-ranging discussions with all the key stakeholder groups, 
the relevant State Ministers and Shadow Ministers, numerous local government 
leaders and officials, and the key public officials from all the relevant agencies 
within the jurisdiction of the NSW case study. The outcome was a vantage from 
which to think critically about the multitude and complexity of the various 
relationships between key players which underpins the decision making process in 
transport.   
Most importantly, participant observation period occurred at a time of key 
change in transport in very much the terms that had been theorised by the 
researcher in the very first year of study when the initial theoretical premise was 
constructed.  It was to prove invaluable in providing insight into how the top level 
of the regime organises itself to make and consolidate decisions and critical 
actions.   
Initial participation was in the role of a founding Director of the 10,000 
Friends of Greater Sydney.  The organisation was established by the Warren 
Centre at Sydney University to bring to fruition the ideas developed in an earlier 
study “Sustainable Transport in Sustainable Cities” that had been developed by 
over 250 professionals as a blueprint for the future of Sydney.  Further activities 
included Project Management of the development and public launch of a land use 
and transport plan for Sydney;  assistance with the development of a rail plan for 
the existing rail network in Sydney;  assistance with the development of a transport 
and land use plan for the Central Coast of NSW;  participation in public forums and 
discussions, contributions to government submission, hearings and meetings; 
numerous meetings with government ministers, officials and shadow ministers; 
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and involvement as a participant at numerous international industry conferences 
that were held in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane from 2005 – 2011.  Full details 
of all activities can be found in the various annual reports of 10,000 Friends of 
Greater Sydney which are publicly available. 
Initially, this involvement was considered a cognate but functionally 
separate area to this PhD. However, after two years, a conscious connection to 
the research became apparent. The group accorded a deep penetration into the 
top level of decision making in the transport sector, providing a unique view of the 
institutional arrangements at work.  The timing here was crucial. Participation in 
the Think Tank occurred at a moment when thesis research required a reading of 
the theory of decision making in transport.  
Participant observation through the group enabled insights from this 
literature to seep slowly into my consciousness.  The researcher’s stance became 
very much the same as that taken in the seminal study of Negro Streetcorner Men, 
“Tally’s Corner” (Liebow, 1967) where the many conversations in small rooms, 
coffee shops, ministerial and officials offices, over the internet in email became the 
field site.  As Liebow (1967:256) observed,  
“In retrospect, it seems as if the degree to which one becomes a participant 
is as much a matter of perceiving oneself as a participant as it is of being accepted 
as a participant by others.”  
 The researcher is accepted as a participant in the transport sector in NSW 
by many senior players and interest groups including unions, ministers, shadow 
ministers, stakeholder groups, media and senior bureaucrats.  My fellow Directors 
in the Think Tank knew of my PhD study (as did many in the industry generally) 
and in such circumstances, as a double insider, it can be difficult to draw clear 
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lines in terms of the ethics of reporting information drawn from participant 
observation. For this reason, any specifics of ‘who said what’ that were revealed 
during the participant observation phase of research are not reported in this thesis. 
Rather, participation observation formed an overall arena for developing ideas 
about the nature of institutional relationships in the sector. These are reported in 
general, not specific, form in this thesis. Specific details are revealed through a 
formal interview process, as now detailed. 
In-depth Interviews 
The membership of the Think Tank also provided the vehicle that allowed 
the researcher to access in an ‘arm’s length fashion’ the critical decision makers 
who formed the bulk of the interviews for the research.  An ethics application was 
submitted and approved in 2005.  A requirement of the university ethics approval 
was that the recruitment of interviewees for the research could not be done directly 
as the researcher may have a direct or indirect relationship with a potential 
participant which could be constructed in some way to impact the decision to 
participate in the research.  This requirement was met by having the CEO and 
several of the Directors of the Think Tank recruiting interview participants on 
behalf of the researcher.  The status of the CEO and the Director’s was such that it 
had the additional positive benefit of conferring a ‘halo effect’ on the researcher 
providing a high level of trust and resulting in extensive and extended contact with 
participants who were themselves in close professional networks with the CEO 
and / or Directors.   
The CEO and Directors all hold global senior, respected elder statesman 
(they are all men) status within what is a very hierarchical industry.  Their 
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participation in the role of introduction agent was critical in bestowing a level of 
legitimacy and credibility to the research that went beyond that bestowed by the 
affiliation with the university.   Snowball interviews suggested by participants were 
set up through the initial interviewees who could make the decision if they chose to 
disclose their own participation which had the same ‘halo effect’ and also resulted 
in similar detailed and extensive interviews.  In each case the researcher was 
aided by ‘association’ with long time colleagues who had extensive trust 
relationships which were enlarged for a time to include the researcher. 
A related impact of the use of such senior and respected introduction 
agents was that it limited the impact of the personal characteristics of the 
researcher.  The researcher is female, 40 something and could be considered a 
career change professional with a background in transport.  The result of the 
impact of using very powerful and connected introduction agents was that the 
participants were influenced to participate by the support of these agents and 
seemed to make judgements as the interview progressed about the quality of the 
researcher based on the conduct of the interview.  The personal characteristics of 
the researcher were removed by the use of intermediaries.  This impact was 
greatest for participants who were not personally known to the researcher and 
least for close colleagues and participants who had worked directly with the 
researcher and who were likely to comment, “Why didn’t you just call me for an 
interview?”   
Participants were initially selected who met the following criteria: 
 Senior decision makers in road or rail transport in NSW or Qld from 
1952 – 2000 
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 Advisers to senior decision makers in road or rail transport in NSW or 
Qld from 1952 – 2000 (this later group included academic, 
consultants and second level officials who provided advice) 
 Sources of specialist information for example institutional history 
 Each participant was asked to nominate other individuals for 
interview.  If the referral met the criteria the interview was followed 
up. 
A second set of interviews was conducted after the initial draft of the 
analysis to fill in gaps identified in the material.  The criteria were the same as for 
the initial set of interviews.  It was a deliberate strategy and half of the most senior 
interviews were reserved for this purpose.  All respondents approached by the 
introduction agents responded positively.  All were provided with a participant 
information and consent form and signed consent was obtained prior to interview. 
In all 37 interviews were conducted. 
A pre-test of the interviews was planned and conducted.  It proved to be 
one of the most important interviews as it was with a key introduction agent who 
became a most critical informant.  This interview was very extended, and was so 
valuable that it is included fully in the study.  All interviews were the subject of 
detailed notes and the majority were recorded, with full consent from interviewees.  
All were on the basis of full confidentiality.  The majority of interviews were 
conducted face to face with only a small number conducted by phone.  The length 
and depth of the interviews and the need to establish rapport meant that face to 
face interviews resulted in more detail.  
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Initially, the researcher was going to transcribe in full all of the recordings 
and return them so that they could be quoted and sources named.  Due to the 
length of the interviews this became unwieldy and in place of this strategy, draft 
chapters for review were circulated to key participants for confirmation. 
 Interviews were conducted in locations selected by participants.  In almost 
all cases participants chose locations away from their current place of work for 
example, clubs, coffee chops, neutral meeting rooms, or their own homes.  
Interviews were conducted using a list of topics and open ended questions that 
had been provided prior to the interview.  A life history approach was taken that 
related critical events in the participant’s personal life to work events to aid 
memory.  This proved useful especially at the beginning of the interview and 
enabled participants to easily and readily go back in time.  Interview times 
extended over several sessions in many cases and exceeded 4 hours.  In some 
cases interviews lasted up to 12 hours and took place over a series of days. 
The researcher’s knowledge and background in transport was critical to the 
interview process and to the conduct of the interview.  It added credibility and 
allowed a level of rapport building that enabled the creation of a shared arena of 
knowledge creation.  In the absence of this the interviews would have been more 
shallow, shorter and lacking in depth.  Areas of assumed knowledge were raised if 
the researcher was unfamiliar with the issue, event or terminology. 
Informal Discussions 
Throughout the research project the researcher was guided and assisted by 
key industry players.  They provided access to the industry, to key informants and 
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to interviewees. They were a critical sounding board and reviewer of ideas and 
intellectual support.  They were high level informants in transport and urban 
planning and had experience as government officials, consultants and business 
people.  The depth of thought, the originality of ideas and the scope of the 
research would have been impossible without them.  In true ethnographic style 
they provided a window into critical aspects of the culture of the sector and the 
institutions. 
Given an identity of the researcher as an ‘academic outsider’ i.e. a very 
non-traditional PhD older student who did not easily fit into traditional expectations 
of PhD students, these informal discussions became very important and provided 
an opportunity for multi-disciplinary professional discourse which obviated the 
need for discourse within the confines of an academic department.  As these 
discussions were supplemented by regular conference attendance where the 
participants were global industry leaders (Agency CEOs, Consultants, Academics, 
Interest Group Leaders) the researcher was able to gain current international 
knowledge in all areas of land transport.   
  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to describe the research methodology in sufficient 
detail so that the reader can made judgements about the validity and application of 
the research.  It has set out strengths, contexts and character of the methodology 
used in this thesis as well as the limitations.  The approach of the methodology 
has been linked to the theoretical intentions set out in Chapter 2.  Particular 
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attention has been paid to the positionality of the researcher and the potential 
impact on the research approach and the conclusions of the research.  
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Part B – Case Studies 
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The Creation of the Present:  Critical ‘turns’ and Embedded 
Processes  
 “More than any other colony, Queensland had a deliberate policy of 
decentralised railway construction.  All its railways were built to rather low 
engineering standards and to the same narrow gauge of 3ft 6 in.  This pattern of 
railway development was the result of its enormously long coastline and the 
political significance of its provincial port cities.”  (Lee, 2010:146) 
 
“Railways have played an immense part in the history of New South Wales.  
The parallel lines extended as the population grew and themselves made possible 
the new settlement and new industries....It is easy to see railway history as a 
record of stormy public controversy.  From the beginning, when the question was 
whether there should be railways at all, through the controversies over state 
versus private ownership, the notorious gauge question, the often bitter disputes 
as rival districts competed for the privilege of railway services, the problems of 
labour relationships and staffing, the promises of politicians and the endless 
complexities of railway technology, the public has always been involved.  
Governments have fallen over their handling of railway policy.  A recurring theme 
has been political control ...as opposed to control through independent 
commissioners...An even more constant theme has been whether railways should 
earn an adequate commercial return...or whether their undoubted contribution to 
economic growth and prosperity should be allowed to outweigh every other 
consideration.” (Ward in Gunn,1989: V) 
 
“Queensland faced particular difficulties in building and maintaining a road 
network.  In a large state, with a small and scattered population, the cost of road 
construction was always a particular concern, for the tax base was small, and the 
distances to be covered very great.  Only Queensland, too, had such extremes of 
climate to contend with.  In the summer rain, roads and bridges along the coastal 
strip would be washed away by flooding, while the black soil plains were turned to 
a quagmire.  Roads through the channel country would disappear under sheets of 
water, while at the other extreme, in a drought, water supplies along stock routes 
dried up, making the routes impassable to livestock.” (QDMR, 1994: 6) 
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The quotes on the previous page identify the enduring economic, social and 
political importance of roads and railways and NSW and Qld.  The major themes 
highlighted remain the central themes in all discussions of roads and railways in 
both states.  These are: the key role they have played in social and economic 
policy; major impact of economic, cultural and physical geography on key 
investment decisions; pivotal role of labour (and its institutionalised representative 
– unions); regional and suburban rivalry for investment; the competition between 
the modes for funds; heavy established involvement of the public and the media; 
vexed question of finance; and the related question of ownership and control.  
Transport decisions have defined governments in both states and have ended 
governments in both states.  The size of the investments, the impact on land use 
and the environment, the reliance of commerce and industry, and the implications 
for ordinary Australians are such that decisions in these policy arenas are viewed 
as among the most important that government can make. 
The case studies will demonstrate that it is necessary to view the history of 
rail and road together if the long term trends in transport and mode share are to be 
understood.  The decline of rail from the 1930’s but especially after 1950’s (refer to 
Cosgrove, 2011 for detailed statistics) can only be understood in relation to the 
increasing use of motorised transport (especially personal car use) from after the 
First World War. 
It is not the intention that the following chapters should present a detailed 
history of road and rail development in NSW and Qld or of the government 
agencies involved.  These histories have been exhaustively documented 
elsewhere (see for example, Broomham, 2001; Burke, 1991, 2009; Colwell, 1972; 
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Fraser, 1989; Gunn, 1989; Kerr, 1998; QDMR, 1994; Lay, 1984; Lee, 1988, 2000, 
2003, 2010; Hulscher, 1994; Kass, 2006; ARRB, 2011; NAASRA, 1984; 2009; 
McKillop, 2009, Spearritt, 1978, 2000; Wotherspoon, 1983).  The chapters in this 
section seek to give an overview of the major phases in road and rail development 
in NSW and Qld drawing out the key ideas that generated policy changes, noting 
the important investment decisions that directed and constrained future decisions 
and identifying the implications for cities and regions.  Extensive use has been 
made of archival material, legislation and secondary sources to provide 
information on the early period prior to 1950 and to situate and relate the 
commentary of interviewees in the later period of 1950 - 2000. 
The stance of the section is threefold: that geography can be seen to be a 
key determining factor in shaping the nature of roads and railways in the two 
states; that past policies and investment decisions related to specific global 
regimes of accumulation acted to set boundaries for future decisions;  that 
investment decisions related to technology choices locked in sets of capital, 
industrial and labour processes that were reflective of the timing of the decisions; 
and that these major transport investments had significant implications for 
settlement patterns regional economic development and city form.  The section 
deliberately takes an historical perspective because the nature of the path 
dependant processes can only be understood when situated in their historical 
context.   
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4. NSW Railways 
4.1. Introduction  
“In New South Wales, as in other Australian colonies, economic wealth was 
generated from the inland by the 1820s, initially from pastoralism and, following 
the goldrushes of the 1850s, mining, which brought a rapid influx of migrants to the 
colony. Thus railways were constructed to serve pastoral interests and, as 
migrants drifted from the goldfields in search of new opportunities from the mid-
1860s, to promote settlement. In so doing, the railway network served to funnel 
commodities into the port of Sydney (and Newcastle in the case of coal). While a 
policy was adopted to construct truck lines to the Victorian border, the Darling 
River at Bourke and the Queensland border as the first priority, their primary 
purpose was to capture trade for Sydney, not to facilitate inter-colonial trade.” 
(McKillop, 2009:3) 
 
Railway development in NSW commenced less than three decades after 
the innovation was tested in Great Britain.  The railway age that gripped the globe 
from the 1850s to 1920s played out in NSW as it did elsewhere.  This innovation 
was the technological poster child of the hegemonic institutional regime of that era.  
The ideas prominent in the discourse of the intellectual, industrial and policy 
networks of Great Britain and Europe were trialled in a commercial environment, 
deemed profitable and then transferred swiftly through established political and 
administrative networks support by an availability of capital that was a feature of 
this phase of colonialism.   
Investment in railway development allowed a profitable and secure outlet 
for the imperial capital accumulated in European cities from the exploits of 
successful colonial ventures.  The railways themselves reinforced the spread, 
reach and profitability of these ventures improving transport links that enabled the 
more efficient flow of goods to markets.  At the same time they generated a whole 
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range of linked new industries to support the technological and industrial 
requirements of the railways as institutions in themselves.   The railway age 
launched a new institutional environment that was itself mobile, adaptive, fluid and 
globally connected but put in place at regional and local scales a high level of 
spatial fixity that would essentially predetermine future institutional arrangements.  
The nature of the investment decisions locked-in a broad range of path dependent 
processes related to railway investment that themselves moulded the development 
options and timings available in these places.   In this way the economy of NSW 
inherited the history of its own past. 
This spatial fixity can be seen in the economic landscape of sunk 
investments in transport (in this case railway lines, stations, yards, rolling stock) 
the built environment, (whole regions and cities developing and then decaying 
around the activity generated by the railway investment), the network of local 
institutions (schools, technical colleges, universities, trade associations, trade 
unions, government agencies) and the embedded industrial base which is itself 
globally connected.   The physical geography of NSW also influenced the 
deployment of railway investment and the resulting spatial development.  The size 
and shape of the state, the terrain of particular places, and possible location of 
coastal ports were important considerations in the design of the railway network.  
This design had to fit the institutional arrangements that were in place in related 
transport modes (especially shipping and roads).  Indeed the nature of railway 
investments in NSW can be seen to have transformed over time in response to 
changes in the institutional arrangements in other transport modes.  
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The central contradiction of capital can be seen to be playing out in relation 
to railway investment in NSW; that is,  initial investment requires spatial fixes for 
innovations hegemonic at particular times to flourish, but then must destroy that fix 
to make way for a new spatial fix associated with a later innovation. In this sense, 
periods of institutional stability (equilibrium) in NSW railway transport policy were 
interrupted by events or crises that punctuated that equilibrium and provided the 
opportunity for policy changes that enabled a closer alignment with the dominant 
mode of accumulation and regulation.   The policy changes emerged from ideas 
dominating the discourse in policy networks; themselves part of the institutional 
structure.   The speed and extent of the implementation of these ideas can be 
seen to be related to the strength of the individual actors and their networks as 
agents of policy change.  The final nature of the implementation as it played out in 
NSW at various times is related to the relative strength of the policy arena and the 
key institutional nodes within it.  In NSW railway policy was driven by global trends 
but the spatial allocation of capital was a result of local interest groups forming 
advocacy coalitions brokering policy through a series of multi arena (commercial, 
political, social) games and the prevailing economic and political culture which had 
a specific geographic focal intent.   Local actors became policy entrepreneurs and 
thus built or reinforced power positions linked to ideas that drove policy changes. 
The driver for railway development in the colony of NSW was economic 
development.  The goal was to enable development based on agriculture and 
mining.  The idea that railways enabled economic development was hegemonic at 
this time. The early focus of effort was the construction of the main lines to the 
south, west and north of Sydney (see Figure 4.2.2 below) which was consistent 
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with the economic goal of the dominant colonial institutional regime – i.e. to 
achieve efficient access to the productive capacity of remote regions.  There was 
no explicit goal to develop short haul passenger traffic although the railway did 
connect the main inner administrative centres of the colony (Sydney, Parramatta, 
Liverpool and Penrith).  The real aim was to access and develop the hinterlands 
beyond the mountain range that surrounded Sydney and ensure the movement of 
goods through the Port of Sydney, and later the Ports of Newcastle and 
Wollongong and to limit the exit of goods via ports in other colonies.   
The development of the railway system was centred on Sydney.  The 
capital centric railway policies reflected the political power of the powerful urban 
mercantile class who did not want to lose any revenue or business to ports in the 
neighbouring colonies of Victoria and Qld.  At that time, “...politics were dominated 
by a prosperous urban mercantile class and, railway policy reflected that reality” 
(Lee, 2010: 133).   This class controlled the various power networks and their 
discourse dominated thinking.  These advocacy coalitions controlled the policy 
debate and supported critical actors (politicians and senior bureaucrats) who were 
charged with implementing the ideas.   
Suburban railway development did not become the focal point until the 
1880s when the fourth mainline to the south coast was underway.  The boom in 
suburban construction in the 1880s mirrored developments in railways overseas 
where metros were redistributing large city populations in much of Europe and 
America.   These changes were themselves a response to changes in the spatial 
articulation and expression of the dominant institutional regime of capitalism that 
saw rural populations move into cities to support economies associated with urban 
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industrial development.  Hence, the transition in the regime saw the emergence of 
a new spatial fix which had implications for railway policy and investment 
decisions.  These decisions in turn conferred advantage and opportunity at lower 
spatial scales where particular regions and suburbs could leverage benefits 
associated with local railway investment.   
Of crucial significance to an institutional analysis of the NSW rail system is 
recognition of how the institutional regime, described above, co-evolved with the 
technologies and strategies of railway administration. In NSW, railway 
development was initially in private hands15 (refer to Figure 4.1.1) but was brought 
into government in 1855 because of the inability to raise sufficient capital to fund 
construction and development.  The financial institutional arrangements were 
altered to accommodate the need to raise and secure capital.  The management 
and construction of railways in NSW has remained in largely government control 
since that time due to the size of the investment and the on-going capital 
contribution relative to the size of the local economy and its ability to support the 
industry from direct traffic.   
The various structural relationships that have been established by 
government to manage the railways documented in Figure 4.1.1 can be divided 
into five main phases:  early development and construction as the Railway Branch 
                                            
15 The Great Southern and Western Railway Company was formed in August 1846 to develop railways in the 
colony.  In 1848 a survey report was ...”presented to a Select Committee of the Legislative Council enquiring 
into "the practicability and expediency of introducing Railways into the Colony...On the 15 June 1848 a 
series of resolutions supporting railway development was carried unanimously by the Legislative Council. 
Their acceptance meant that private enterprise was unable or unwilling to begin the task without 
Government aid. The support of the Crown involved land grants to the Railway Company in "fee simple", 
guarantee of a 6% rate of interest on the first £100,000 of subscribed capital, and investment a of £30,000 
(maximum) of Savings Bank funds in the project.... The Sydney Railway Company was incorporated in 
October 1849 by a private Act of the Colonial Legislature, royal assent, however, was not received until 
January 1851.” (State Archives, Investigator Agency 1159).   
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of the Department of Public works (1855-87)16; significant investment and 
completion of the main lines and creation of the monolith under the Railway 
Commissioners17 (1887-1932); Ministerial18 control 1932 – 72; modernisation and 
rationalisation first under the Public Transport Commission of NSW19 and 
Transport Ministers (1972-96); and  the introduction of competition and open 
access from 1996 under with the influence of the Federal government.     
These phases themselves can be seen to be responses to changes in the 
institutional regime that necessitated changes in supporting institutional 
arrangements.   The nature of the policy changes was the result of the 
transmission of ideas from connected policy networks that had gained hegemony 
and legitimacy as part of the new fix required to sustain the regime.   Crises and 
events (financial, technological, safety) can be seen in every instance to have 
created policy windows by punctuating the institutional equilibrium thereby 
allowing and enabling change.  In every instance the institutional environment can 
be seen to have adapted to the new institutional requirements.  
This chapter will treat the history of railway administration in the phases 
identified while recognising that there are significant periods of change within 
each.  The contention is that the change within the periods while important did not 
result in a transformation of the dominant institutional arrangements or of the 
regime.
                                            
16 Refer to Railway Branch - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1524. 
17 Refer to Office of the Railway Commissioners of New South Wales - State Archives, Investigator Agency 
1186. 
18 Refer Ministry of Transport [I] (1932-1975) Ministry of Transport and Highways (1975-1978) Ministry of 
Transport [II] (1978-1990) - State Archives, Investigator Agency 3819. 
19 Refer Public Transport Commission of New South Wales - State Archives, Investigator Agency 539 
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Figure 4.1.1 NSW Railway Administration 
(Source: McKillop, 2009: 11) 
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4.2. Early Railway Development and Construction 1855 - 
1887 
The early policy that drove the development of the railways was primarily 
economic.  It was about constructing main lines into the hinterland to capture the 
produce for the Sydney commercial market as the trading entrepot.  This led to an 
early focus on the construction of the main south,   and western lines (refer to Figure 
4.2.1).  The Sydney mercantilists were powerful and were keen to exploit the 
advantage construed by railway development to ensure that NSW trade went out 
through the port of Sydney and was not ‘lost’ to Victorian ports.  This dominance of 
Sydney was to be crucial in relation to other location decisions such as the location 
of railway workshops which tended to reinforce the economic position of Sydney.   
This culture of Sydney centric commercial dominance was created by a range of 
factors including:  geography; political and economic history; and the early 
settlement pattern.  All conspired to locate decision making, early industry and 
political power in Sydney.   Hence, Sydney was the centre of political, social, 
commercial and economic networks that linked the colony with productive supply 
chains of the global regime. 
 While there was a concurrent policy of constructing connections to the 
Victorian and Qld borders and to the Darling River at Bourke to make inter colony 
connections, the primary purpose was to capture trade for Sydney.  In fact, even 
after Federation in 1901 various legislative means have been used to restrict trade 
between the States.  Decisions made about fixed investment that were to inhibit inter 
colonial trade for well over a century. 
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The size of the construction activity at this time was immense.  The railway 
forged out into the colonial hinterland at considerable pace.  Finance for rail 
development dominated political considerations and colonial budgets.  Loans from 
England provided capital and English migrants provided the skilled workforce.  The 
scale can be gauged from the pace of rail line openings on the main south, north and 
western lines.  Main south reached:  Granville 1855; Campbelltown 1858; Picton 
1863; Mittagong 1867; Marulan 1868; Goulburn 1869; Yass 1876; Cootamundra 
1877; Junee 1878; and Albury 1881. The main north line began in Newcastle from 
the Port and reached:  Maitland 1857; Singleton 1863; Murrurundi 1872; Werris 
Creek 1878; Armidale 1883; and Wallangarra in Qld in 1888.  The Sydney to 
Newcastle section had difficult terrain to overcome and began later with a connection 
to Hornsby in 1886 which was extended to Gosford in 1887.  Progress on the main 
western line was equally swift.  The main west reached:  Blacktown 1860; Penrith 
1863; Glenbrook 1867; Mt Victoria 1868; Lithgow 1869; Bathurst 1876; Orange 
1877; Wellington 1880; and Bourke 1885. 
It was during this early era of railway activity that the major connections with 
suppliers were formed setting in place commercial and industrial processes that 
linked railway development in Sydney with production networks primarily in Britain.   
During this time also the major investment decisions were made that resulted in the 
spatial fixes associated with the innovation of the railway being put in place in 
regions and towns across NSW.  The technology choice locked in associated 
processes (skills, guilds, values, norms, behaviours, regulations, administrative 
structures) for three generations.  Whole communities and regions became 
dependent on railway activity locking into this institutional structure and the 
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associated global networks.  Regional identity and the economic base were formed 
by the presence or absence of railway activity, its level and nature.  The initial high 
level of innovation and change had positive economic and social spin offs and these 
hid the later impact of such singular dependence for communities and regions. 
 
Figure 4.2.1 Major Railway Construction NSW 1855 – 1885 
 
(Source: www.nswrail.net) 
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Construction of Railway Branch Lines, 1855 – 87 
The early private companies formed to construct railways in the colony did not 
last long.  The Sydney Railway Company20 (formed 1849) and The Hunter River 
Railway Company21 (formed 1853) were purchased and transferred to government in 
1854 with the three NSW Railway Commissioners22 (one being named Chief 
Commissioner) being appointed under the Railway Act 185423 in 1855 reporting to 
the Governor.  The quote below from the legislation explains that the government 
intervened because the private sector was unable to find the necessary large sums 
of capital or to expedite building to meet the demands of the community at the time.  
Hence, the institutional arrangements were adjusted to meet the needs of the 
institutional regime.  
...the large amounts of capital required for that purpose and from other causes 
to complete their respective undertakings or to proceed with the same as 
expeditiously as the interests of the public require and it is expedient that the said 
works and all other Railways to be constructed throughout the Colony should be 
carried on and completed by Commissioners for Railways to be appointed by the 
Governor and that Her Majesty's Government should be empowered for and on 
behalf of Her Majesty to purchase from the said Companies their respective interests 
in the lines of Railway and other works commenced or made and executed and 
vested in the said Companies it has been found that they are unable by reason of 
the difficulty of raising respectively under and by virtue of the said recited Acts ...(An 
Act to make provision for the construction by the Government of Railways in the 
Colony of New South Wales. 2nd December, 1854: page 1) 
 
Self-government in 1856 eventually led to the formation of the Department of 
Public Works in 185924 and the Under-Secretary, Captain B.H. Martindale, became 
                                            
20 Refer Sydney Railway Company - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1159. 
21 Refer Hunter River Railway Company - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1160. 
22 Refer Commissioners of Sydney, and Hunter River Railways - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1161. 
23 An Act to make provision for the construction by the Government of Railways in the Colony of New South 
Wales", 1854 (18 Vic., No.40) 
24 Refer Department of (Secretary of) Public Works - State Archives, Investigator Agency 45. 
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the first Commissioner for Railways on 21 October 185925.  In 1861 John Rae 
became Commissioner for Railways.  Rae was succeeded by Charles Goodchap in 
1878.   
Rail operations were organised into a triad relating to Construction (the 
Railway Branch) and Operation (the Traffic Departments of the Great Southern and 
the Great Northern Railways).   The Railway Branch26 included Offices of the Chief 
Inspector, Engineer in Chief, the Engineer and Locomotive Superintendents, the 
Inspector Permanent Way Great Northern Railway, and the Ticket Printer plus 
clerks, draftsmen, inspectors, and surveyors. The Traffic Departments of the Great 
Southern Railway and the Great Northern Railway were sub-branches staffed by a 
Traffic Manager and Traffic Inspector who supervised and monitored station masters 
and goods clerks throughout the rail system.  A Land Valuator was added to the 
Railway Branch in 1860, a Railway Stores Branch was established in 1872, a 
Locomotive Engineers Branch in 1878, and a Tramways Branch in 1880 (outside the 
scope of this Thesis). 
Administration was fully government owned and fully government controlled 
with Acts to support loan raising being hotly debated in and out of the legislature.   
                                            
25 “The Government Railways Act, (22 Vic., Act No. 19) came into force on 1 December 1858 authorising the 
appointment of a Commissioner for Railways. The Commissioner was subject to regulations made by the 
Governor in Council who was also authorised to appoint (and remove) the "Secretary Solicitor, engineers, 
surveyor, and other officers". The Commissioner for Railways could appoint only minor officers under the 
delegated authority of the Governor in Council. (1) The status of the Commissioner for Railways was to be a 
corporation sole with the name having perpetual succession and an official seal. (2) The Government Railways 
Act (22 Vic., No. 19 ) provided for the acquisition of land, removal of materials from acquired land, 
construction of inclined planes and tunnels, the alteration of the course of rivers or streams, the changing of 
water levels in rivers or streams, introduction of conduits and drains, the felling and removal of any trees in 
forests or woodlands, plus the erection of toll-houses and warehouses. (3)” (State Records, Archives, Agency 
1162) 
26 Refer Railway Branch - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1524. 
78 
 
By 1877 railways were the most influential industry in the colony as the quote from 
the Sydney Morning Herald below illustrates. 
“The railways of New South Wales,...,are gradually becoming one of the most 
extensive departments of Government, one of the best investments of public money, 
and one of the most effectual means of opening up the interior.  They represent two 
thirds of the public debt of the colony.  They involve one fifth of the whole annual 
expenditure, and return to the revenue one third of its whole amount, exclusive of the 
proceeds of land sales.  Their maintenance and management furnish subsistence to 
hundreds of families and their extension to hundreds more...All classes of people 
therefore are most intimately concerned in the railway policy of the colony.” 
(SMH,30/7/1877 in Gunn, 1989:149). 
Communities formed advocacy groups and advocacy coalitions with local 
pastoral, agricultural and industrial interests to lobby politicians for railway 
investment in their area.  The discourse in the press at the time was dominated by 
railway achievements, railway demands and railway debt.  During this time the 
Railway Commissioners were subject to lobbying and political pressure to build lines 
to particular settlements and railway management became increasingly politicised.  
Public pressure and dissatisfaction eventually led to legislative action to transform 
railway administration.  The politicisation produced sufficient turmoil to cause 
punctuation in the equilibrium surrounding railway administration allowing a change 
in policy to be implemented. 
 
4.3. Completion of the Main Lines 1878 - 1900 
The main line (or trunk) rail policy was overturned in April of 1877 when 
powerful politicians (starting with Thomas G Dangar who won a Parliamentary 
motion to build a branch line from Werris Creek to Gunnedah) effectively lobbied for 
the building of branch lines through their electorates.  This expansion of services to 
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meet public demand was supported by the creation of ‘railway leagues’ in 
settlements across NSW that acted as advocacy groups and lobbied effectively for 
the railway to come to their ‘town’.  The growth of the rail network in the boom era 
1860-90 created political pressure for the construction of rail lines to every 
settlement (Stevenson, 1987).  This policy of ‘connection’ remained in place until it 
was halted abruptly by the recession of the 1890s.  It lasted long enough however to 
have a permanent impact on the size and distribution of the rail network in NSW.  
The extension of the lines can be seen in Figure 4.3.1 below.   The 1890s recession 
was an event significant enough to generate crises which punctuated the policy 
equilibrium leading to a significant change.   
It is during this era of major railway building that the power of the railway to 
shape settlement in NSW was demonstrated.  The railway had three major impacts 
on settlement:  the wealth of inland settlements and towns depended on whether the 
railway linked them to external markets or bypassed them; for established coastal 
towns it enabled them to consolidate as entrepots of trade and commerce; and for 
settlements and administrative centres that were bypassed, the outcome was severe 
and at times sudden as population and the economy declined in favour of locations 
near the railway.  The settlements that were remnants of the prior spatial fix (the 
closely spaced small settlements that had supported horse drawn transport) declined 
while those located in sync with the railway grew.27  The needs of the railway led to 
the creation of rail depots (to service steam locomotives, to house crew, to stable 
                                            
27 McKillop (2002; 2009) provides case studies from the development of the western line to illustrate the 
power of the railway over settlement.  For example, Carcoar which was established in 1839 as the main 
administrative centre for the area west of Bathurst suffered a decline in favour of Orange and Blayney when it 
was bypassed by the main rail line.   Whole settlements that had sprung up every 10 – 15 miles along water 
courses (for example, Minors Falls, Timbrebongie, Warren, Canonbar and Gongolgon) to support coaching 
stations were abandoned in favour of larger (for example Nyngan on the Bogan River) more widely spaced 
centres (the steam trains needed water only every 100 miles).   
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trains) at these key centres that became known as railway towns such was the 
employment creation ability for the railway in regional NSW.  Examples of railway 
towns are, Goulburn, Tenterfield, Junee, Werris Creek, and Murrumbarruh.  From 
the 1870s the NSW railways were the largest employer in the colony.  This continued 
to be the case well into the next century. 
Figure 4.3.1 Major Railway Construction NSW 1855 – 1900
 
(Source:  www.nswrail.net) 
Railway development went hand in hand with the manufacturing development 
of the colony.  Railways needed iron, water and gas (later electricity).  This led 
directly to the establishment of the first industrial base beginning with the 
establishment of the Government Railway workshops in Redfern in 1855, the Fit Roy 
Ironworks Company in 1862 and Denison Foundry (manufacture of goods wagons) 
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at Bathurst in 1865 and later Mort’s Dock and Engineering Company in Balmain for 
the assembly of English locomotives.  The advent of refrigeration added to this 
manufacturing base with the ability to move meat products over long distances.  All 
through the 1870s and 1880s the story of the railway in economic terms for regions 
and for the colony of NSW generally is one of stimulus for a large range of related 
industries.  These included industries related to station building, construction of 
accommodation for railway workers, production of ballast, iron, rail carriages and 
wagons and their fit out.(See McKillop, 2009 and Gunn 1989 for extensive detail). 
This era, which has been termed the ‘railway age’, was a global phenomena.  
From their beginnings in England in the 1830s railways spread around the world 
“London’s Metropolitan Railway was an immediate commercial success,4 as 
people had been starved for a fast means of transport, and the idea spread quickly, 
first to the United States—the first elevated system in New York (1870) was followed 
by the first subway in Boston (1901)—and then to continental Europe (Budapest in 
1896, Paris in 1900, Berlin in 1902), South America (Buenos Aires in 1913), and 
Asia (Tokyo in 1927, Osaka in 1933)” (Niedzielski and Malecki, 2012: 1412) 
Three factors have been identified to explain their rapid spread.  First, British 
enterprise and engineering skills; second, American enthusiasm for a new idea; and 
third, and perhaps most importantly, the development and exploitation of the colonial 
possessions during the last and most aggressive phase of colonial imperialism 
(Westwood, 2009: 12).  
 This latter point was crucial in the development of railways in NSW.  Almost 
all the capital to develop the railways was sourced from England.  Investments that 
were secure and profitable and had colonial government guarantees were sought by 
capital rich English investors.  Railway development presented an ideal vehicle.  The 
bulk of the finance was raised using government bonds sold in London with 
82 
 
government guarantees predicated on anticipated profits and colonial land sales 
(Lee, 2010: 132- 5).  The colonial networks created the conduits which enabled the 
flow of capital to the railway to further advantage the prevailing global regime.   This 
in turned reinforced the locked in and path dependent processes associated with 
colonial commerce. 
The size of the investment in the railways at this time was considerable.  The 
budgets of the colonial governments were dominated by rail expenditure and rail 
loans.  The Treasury focus we see today on urban rail budgets is not new and dates 
from the 1880s.  As Blainey (1983: 253) notes: “In Victoria and New South Wales the 
steam monster threatened to swallow its masters.” 
The railway network structure in NSW was largely determined by the interplay 
of geography, technology with the settlement pattern both a constraint and an 
outcome.  The geography was dominated by the scale of the distances, the ring of 
mountains, the location of rivers for water for the steam trains, and the low 
population densities which limited the tax base to support development.  The 
settlement pattern was a mix of early colonial administrative centres and centres of 
pastoral and or mining development.   The interplay of limited finance (related to the 
low population base and the large distances) and the large scale and difficult terrain 
of the physical geography meant that the resulting track alignment was often at steep 
grades with sharper curves then desirable.  These alignment issues have plagued 
the efficient operation of railways in NSW.  There has been a lasting legacy of slow 
speeds, constant upgrades and limited loading due to the standards having to fit the 
budget that was available.  Some would argue that these problems continue today 
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and they can be traced to the decisions in the late 1870s not to provide the budgets 
that railway administrators requested (Gunn, 1989: 94-234). 
The technologies employed on the early railway were largely influenced by 
the cultural background experience of the migrants who managed the construction 
and influenced the early decisions on engineering approach.  These decisions had 
major impacts on future operating efficiency.  For example, the first engineer with the 
Sydney Railway Company was Irish (Francis Shields) and he recommended the use 
of the Irish gauge (5ft 3in).  This was also adopted by Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania.  The next engineer was English (James Wallace) and he convinced 
authorities to use the Standard English gauge (4ft 8.5in) but the other colonies 
remained on the Irish gauge.   
John Whitton, the most powerful and influential figure during the entire railway 
golden age. As Engineer-in-Charge from 1856 to 1899, the decisions he made paid 
down the parameters that would shape the state’s railways into the following century. 
This included the: use of steel rather than wooden rails; use of steam engines rather 
than horses; and the extension of all the main lines using standard gauge over 
narrow gauge (see McKillop, 2009; Wettenhall, 1960; and Laszlo, 1956).  His faith in 
British railway standards (over American) and the dominance of British expatriates 
on his staff was to have lasting impact on the railway in NSW. Whitton’s staff brought 
with them relational networks that reinforced their own influence on technology and 
formal and informal institutional structures. 
To sum up, the colonial imperatives of connecting product to market created 
the situation where, by the close of the century, the railway had become one of the 
most powerful institutions in NSW.  It was the major employer, it was the largest 
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government budget item, and it represented the largest capital investments.   This 
was the hegemonic period of rail power.  Rail was closely tied to the global 
organisation of trade and markets; it functioned to efficiently support the economic 
exploitation of the hinterlands, provided a profitable outlet for colonial capital and 
spurred the development of a range of related supply industries that would in turn 
function as advocates for further rail development.   
 Spatial fixes associated with railway development transformed the settlement 
pattern, the built environment and the skill base of colonial NSW.    Strong advocacy 
coalitions with global networks grew up around the railway industry to broker policy 
choices that favoured further rail development.   Within the railway the institutional 
arrangements that were established set in place rules, norms and behaviours that 
would become embedded and resistant to change.  The industrial guilds that were 
associated with the railway developed institutional structures around path dependent 
processes that were locked-in with technological choices further reinforcing rigidity 
and industrial fixity. 
 
4.4. Suburban and Branch Line Rail Growth 1900 - 1930 
The recession of the 1890s punctuated the stable economic equilibrium of the 
railway age in two ways. First, it encouraged a shift to cheaper modes of railway 
construction, which took off in earnest following the death of John Whitton in 1899. 
Second, it marked a reorientation of the focus of railway investment from rural to 
suburban development. Both these transformations reflected the fact that the 1890s 
recession created economic and financial crises that allowed changes in the 
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institutional arrangements to adapt to the changing needs of the institutional regime. 
The rural sector experienced significant economic difficulties during the recession in 
the 1890s.   
The economic recession led to the Engineer in Chief for Railway Construction 
Henry Deane travelling to American to investigate cheaper methods of construction 
which had been successfully employed.  He noticed that American practices 
included initial construction without ballast (this was added when the profits of the 
line warranted it), limited earthworks, less sleepers and lower speed limits.  The first 
line developed under the influence of the American model was from Berrigan to 
Finley (the first part opened in 1896) funded by a special Act of the NSW Parliament 
(The “Berrigan to Finley Railway Act” (No 26)).  The location in the Riverina is 
important because it reflects the concern at the time with Victorian competition for 
produce in this region (See McKillop, 2009).  The activity in the building of the 
Branch Lines is shown in the Figure 4.4.1 below in the years 1895 – 1920 where the 
bulk of activity was the construction of the so-called ‘pioneer lines’, which 
represented the last surge of railway investment in rural NSW. 
At the same time NSW had been experiencing increasing urbanisation 
associated with increasing industrialisation.  By 1900 the population of Sydney was 
500,000.  Suburban growth was assisted by the rail lines that forged out into the 
country and suburbs developed in a ribbon fashion along the rail lines to Parramatta 
and Liverpool.   This growth was assisted by new lines to Newcastle and Wollongong 
with additional suburban stations and later the opening of the first purely suburban 
passenger line, the North Shore Line. 
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Figure 4.4.1 Rate of Opening/Closing of Railway Track NSW 
`
 (Source: www. NSWRail.net) 
 
Proposals for a city railway had been considered since 1857.   They reached 
a peak in the mid-1880s with a proposal in October 1884 for an extension of the 
railway from Redfern through Hyde Park to a station between Park St and St James 
Road, with a branch line along Macquarie St.  Public agitation led to the 
establishment of a Royal Commission in 1890.  The Chief Commissioner (Mr EMG 
Eddy) submitted a proposal for an extensive city railway to this Commission.  Mr 
Eddy’s proposals were accepted by the Commission, but were not implemented by 
the Government. It was only six years later, in 1896, that a second Royal 
Commission was established and a latter set of recommendations gained the 
support of Government. The detail on this debate is contained in Appendix A. 
Rail was not alone in supporting the development of the Sydney suburbs.  
Arguably trams were as, if not, more important but an examination of their role is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  However, trams were instrumental in leading to the 
electrification of the Sydney suburban network.   The major transport issue in Sydney 
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in the early part of the 20th century was tram congestion.  The city was at gridlock 
every morning peak.  Over 75 % of journeys were on trams.  The government in 
response to the problem appointed two Royal Commissions in 1908 to develop 
solutions – Commissions on “Communication between Sydney and North Sydney” 
and “Improvement of the City of Sydney and its Suburbs”.   
It is important to understand that the electrification of the suburban railway 
(see Figure 4.4.2 for Bradfield’s Plan) in Sydney was completed in the context of a 
social and political move to improve the amenity of the city and create the city of the 
future.  It was not merely a transport decision but was interlinked with the future plan 
for the city.  The electrification of the suburban railway and the related infrastructure 
investment was central to the creation of the global city of Sydney as we know it 
today.  The importance of suburban rail to the development of global cities and to 
their competitive positioning has been well documented by Niedzielski and Malecki 
(2012).  The railway signalling system that remains in place in Sydney today dates 
from this early period of modern railway development (a cabinet decision in 1913 
allocated the funds).  The investment decision was so large that it has locked out 
alternative operating options. It also locked-in the technology, the associated skills 
and the supporting industries.  Advocates from all form powerful globally connected 
interest coalitions that act to reinforce the technology choice. 
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Figure 4.4.2 Bradfield’s Plan for the City of Sydney Underground 
 
(Source:  Bradfield, 1916: Plate 69) 
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It was also during this time with the First World War followed by a period of 
isolationism in the 1920s that NSW Railways became an enormous vertically 
integrated monolith producing almost all its requirements internally and amassing a 
large permanent workforce that was to remain in place until the 1970s.  This 
structure also served to reinforce the dominance of the railway as whole towns and 
regions were economically depended on it. These characteristics of internal 
organisation mirrored the logics of Fordism as the dominant techno-economic 
paradigm of the first half of the twentieth century. 
This linking of the city by the Harbour Bridge facilitated the development of 
suburbs along the rail line on the north of the harbour.  However, the rise of the 
motor vehicle, the transition from rail transport to heavy vehicle transport and the 
transition to bus from tram had major implications for the railway.  The story of 
railway network development across the State from the 1930s to 2000 is really one 
of decline.  Figure 4.4.3 below shows the extent of line closures that have 
characterised rail rationalisation and consolidation in the latter part of the 20th 
century.   The annual Reports of the Railway Commissioners in the 1930’s are full of 
references to the loss of business (passenger and freight) to motorised transport.  
For example, 
 “...the prospects of revenue have diminished owing to the improvement in 
roads or other causes, while the costs of construction and operation have greatly 
increased”, and 
 “The loss of passenger business and high grade freight traffic to motor 
competition is a serious matter to the Railways because the industry is one in which 
overhead costs bear a very high proportion of the total costs of transport.”   (Quoted 
in Gunn, 1989:331) 
The First World War served to create another policy window as it punctuated 
the equilibrium that was re-establishing in the recovery from the recession of the 
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1890s.  The War indirectly supported the spread of motorised transport in direct 
competition to railways.  Vehicle innovations in the war and experience of driving 
gained during war service were some of the preconditions for growth in the demand 
for motorised transport.  This early demand was fanned by the motor vehicle 
industrialists and the experience of railway development after 1920 can only be 
understood in relation to the emergence of a competing technology which was in fact 
associated with a new global institutional regime.   Social and cultural habits and 
practices associated with railway era were to decline in favour of the increased social 
flexibility provided by the increased personal mobility made possible with motorised 
transport.  The decline of the railway had implications for the towns and industries 
that had grown up to support it.  Entrenched advocacy groups lobbied to keep lines 
open and local industries in place. 
Figure 4.4.3 Major Rail Lines in NSW in 2000 Showing, Closed and Lifted 
 
Lines   Open    Closed    Tourist    Lifted    Uncompleted    
 (Source:  www.NSWrail.net)  
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The story of these shifts in the operational activities of railways from their 
golden age in the nineteenth century to the period of decline starting in the twentieth 
century can also be told by way of focusing on the administrative reforms that 
accompanied this period. By the late 1880s political interference in the railway 
management and administration was common.  Rail rates and timetables were 
altered on political grounds rather than to meet legitimate traffic demands.  For 
example railway rates and fares were highly politicised in the 1880s with favourable 
rates for the transport of wool, special rates for establishments with political 
connections, and differential freight rates that benefited city based manufacturers.  
The later was so strong that it effectively closed regional industrial development and 
centralised activity in Sydney.  In response, in 1888 two Acts separated the planning 
and construction of new railways (doing away with backroom land deals).  The 
Government Railways Act (51 Vic. No. 35) 1888 established a corporate body “The 
Railway Commissioners of NSW29” appointed for seven years.  The commissioners 
were responsible for the appointment of staff and all administration.  The Public 
Works Act, 1888 (51 Vic., No. 37) required all new railway proposals to be referred to 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works.  This separated the functions of 
constructing new lines and operating completed lines.   These broad arrangements 
were then continued on in new legislation in 1907, 1912 and 1916 (State Archives, 
Investigator Agency 1163).  
Railway finances again became a point of contention in the 1920s and again 
were the subject of a Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1924 by Sir S.J. Fay and Sir 
Vincent Raven.  They found that there was a need for a significant overhaul of 
                                            
29 Refer Railway Commissioners of New South Wales - State Archives, Investigator Agency 1163. 
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railway finances and management.   They made the point that railway finances 
should be taken out of the control of Treasury and given to the Railway 
Commissioners who should also be given the power to raise loans.  The 
Commissioners also found that if commercial rates had been applied to all lines and 
all operations then the railway would have been profitable in all years except 1914, 
1923 and 1924.  Major structural change was recommended with a focus on financial 
management and performance as well as recommendations relating to provisions for 
future renewal of assets30.  The changes that followed the Royal Commission report 
were minimal and did not affect the changes recommended.  Hence, the financial 
position of the railways continued to deteriorate. 
 
4.5. Competition and Decline 
Electrification of the suburban railway did provide an increase in passenger 
numbers however not at the rate experienced previously.  For example, the annual 
growth rate was less (4.7%) in the five years after electrification then in the 
preceding five years (7.62%) (For a detailed discussion see Gibbons, 1983:160).   
Patronage peaked in 1955 (260 million passenger journeys) and did not recover to 
these levels until the next century (Figure 4.5.1). 
                                            
30 For detail refer to Report of Royal Commission on Railways and Tramways, NSW Parliamentary Papers (1924) 
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Figure 4.5.1 Annual City Rail Passenger Journeys Since 1855/56 
 
(Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics, 2012: 15) 
From the 1930s road transport posed serious competition to rail transport.  
This competition impacted the profitability of the railways and state budgets.  The 
initial response of state governments was to regulate the industry especially in 
relation to freight traffic.   The regulations fell into three categories:  geographical 
restrictions on the distance goods could be carried by road transport; commodity 
based restrictions on the goods that could be carried by road transport; and taxes in 
proportion to the volume of traffic and the distance travelled (Productivity 
Commission, 2000: C3).    
The Second World War made heavy demands on the railways with the result 
that at the end of the War there was a substantial back log of maintenance and a 
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need for significant reinvestment in rolling stock (Gunn, 1989:377). This deterioration 
was to continue to have impacts into the early 1950s where there were numerous 
instances of rail not being able to carry traffic due to shortages of staff, rolling stock 
or coal.  Unmet demand was taken up by road transport.  At this time the railway 
experienced significant losses due to competition, high maintenance costs and loss 
of revenue due to strikes (either on the railway or in the coal mines).  Post war 
investment did eventuate and occurred at a time of technological change which saw 
the introduction of diesel locomotives to handle the freight task (a recommendation 
that diesel replace steam was made in 1957 by Neal McCusker) and the extension of 
the electric passenger fleet outside the city (to Lithgow in 1957 and Gosford in 1960).   
From the late 1950s, through the 1960s and in to the 1970s the freight business was 
supported by the boom in mining traffic and the introduction of diesel unit trains  that 
excelled at the haulage of long distance bulk commodities.  Table 4.5.1 below shows 
the growth in rail freight in minerals and the relative decline in agricultural traffic. 
  
Table 4.5.1 Rail Freight and Annual Production for Selected 
Commodities 1960 - 1995 
(Source: Productivity Commission, 2000: C4)   
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Despite the investment in rail and the increase in mining traffic the increased 
competition from road and air transport and the relative under investment in rail 
meant a decline in traffic and a worsening of the railway financial problem.  By 1972 
the annual rail debt in NSW was in excess of $32 million.  This financial problem led 
directly to radical structural changes in railway administration (discussed below) and 
to the closing of branch lines across the state (discussed earlier).  The remainder of 
the period from 1970 – 2000 is one characterised by three major activities:  
continued rationalisation of Branch lines with a focus on the streamlining of services 
to regional centres; maintenance activity in the suburban areas with peaks following 
serious accidents (these basically created crises that punctuated the policy stability 
and required a higher level of investment then would have occurred); and 
standardisation on the main interstate lines following heavy federal government 
intervention. 
The rationalisation of Branch lines has been discussed above.  Broadly, rail 
lines faced significant competition from road transport in an administrative 
environment where rail was constrained in its commercial decision making.  At the 
same time rail was not funded to the level where the technology was enabled to 
produce a competitive supply option to the market.  Lines remained on old 
alignments, the age of fleet was often beyond their asset life, and communication 
systems (particularly inter-state systems) were complex and out-moded.  This led 
directly to the closure of the most uneconomical branch lines and passenger 
services very much following the British approach in the Beeching era (discussed 
below). 
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Effort on the suburban railway in the main became focused on maintenance 
and renewal.  However, funding even for these activities was heavily constrained as 
the financial contribution of passenger services to profitability became negative.  
Funding and focus has tended to increase only after rail disasters notably Granville 
1977 (the condition of the permanent way was found to be a factor in the accident), 
Glenbrook (factors identified included procedures, their application and training) and 
Waterfall (factors included and under developed safety culture)31.  Arguably, 
technology investments in signalling and traffic control systems may provide 
improved management visibility of network operation. 
Effort on the main interstate connection lines was significant in the period from 
the 1960s following federal government interest in improving freight movements.32  
This interest and activity gathered strength again in the 1990s, when the federal 
government took action to resolve problems with different rail gauges that crossed 
State borders.   
It is interesting to note that in general, funding for initiatives to assist inter-
state rail movements was provided by the federal government to the state in the form 
of interest bearing loans rather than direct cash grants (as was the case with road 
projects in the same era).  Road investment was the dominant priority in line with the 
needs of the global institutional regime and  reflective of the limited funds available 
for transport generally in Australia where a large land mass and a relatively small 
population (and therefore market) could not support investment in both modes at 
similar high levels simultaneously. 
                                            
31 For details refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 6087, State Archives, Investigator Series Detail 3631, 
McInerney 2001, 2005. 
32 For extensive detail on the gauge issue refer to Kain, 1995. 
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4.6. Managing decline: 1932-1996 
By 1932 expenditure on both roads and railways was considerable and 
proving a drain on the State’s finances.  Railway losses were at record levels with 
revenue having fallen steeply.   This situation produced a crises sufficient to 
generate punctuate the prevailing policy equilibrium and enable a change in 
administrative arrangements.  A major overhaul of the transport administration aimed 
to improve co-ordination and derive more value from expenditure.  The Transport 
(Division of Functions) Act, 1932 (No.31, 1932) abolished the Board of Transport 
Commissioners and created a Ministry of Transport.  It established three 
Departments controlled by Commissioners:  Railways; Road Transport and 
Tramways; and Main Roads.  The increased power of the Minister to direct the 
Railways attracted considerable criticism at the time.  However, this structure 
continued with little change until 1972 despite some rebuilding and massively 
increased competition from road transport after the Second World War. One of the 
respondents interviewed for this thesis commented on this period in the following 
terms: 
 “In the 1950s rail was self sufficient.  It had extensive workshops and built 
trains.  It employed every trade.  The railway was like a city.  It manufactured 
everything.  It did all its maintenance, made its own tools and all the signals.  It was a 
fully integrated railway employing well over 50,000 people.  There was extensive 
training.  Modules were linked to positions.  They were even run by correspondence 
from the Railway Institute in Surry Hills.  Seniority was very big.  You were locked 
into particular streams of employment.  Up until the 1970s and 1980s no one spoke 
of costs and budgets...The railway was not attuned to the cost to the public purse.  
Workshops were renound for the slow turnaround.  There was a problem with 
alcohol.  There was a blame culture. The unions were against change” (Respondent 
1014, 6, 7, 8 October, 2009). 
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By the early 1970s, increasing debt, ever increasing costs (especially staff 
costs with employee numbers in excess of 55,000) and industrial issues led to the 
government adopting a British model of railway rationalisation.  Philip Shirley who 
had been a Vice-Chairman of the British Railways Board in the 1960s and heavily 
involved in the Beeching era of line closures and commercialisation was brought out 
to restructure and commercialise transport in NSW.  The aim was to reduce costs 
and return the operations to financial solvency. 
The Public Transport Commission was established by the Public Transport 
Commission Act, 1972 (Act No. 53, 1972), which commenced on 20 October 1972.  
The Act abolished the Offices of the Commissioner for Railways and the 
Commissioner for Public Transport.  The Commission consisted of five 
Commissioners appointed by the governor (two were nominated by the Minister) one 
of which was appointed Chief Commissioner.  The Commission inherited the 
functions (as set out in the Railway Acts of 1912 and 1930), business and liabilities 
of the previous Commissions. 
In its first year the Commission was required to advise the Minister on 
changes required to improve the integration and co-ordination of services.  The 
Commission identified the need to increase the emphasis on marketing, planning 
and personnel functions, to improve industrial relations and to update equipment.  
Organisational structural changes began almost immediately with the combining of 
the rail and bus functions.  The structure while inheriting some features from the past 
reflected a new emphasis on functional accountability and streamlined 
administration.   Most importantly titles were changed from Chief to Director 
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reflecting a new managerial focus.  The main branches of the PTC are set out in 
Table 4.5.2 below. 
 
Table 4.5.2 Structure of the Public Transport Commission 
Branch  Functions 
Engineering Co-ordination of the combined bus and 
rail engineering functions 
Operations Management of commuter, country, 
passenger and freight operations, for 
buses, trading and catering services, 
rostering of locomotives and locomotive 
staff 
Planning Short, medium and long-term planning, 
feasibility studies, cost-benefit analysis, 
evaluation of alternatives, corporate 
planning including forecasting trends 
and advising on investment policies to 
assist specific planning in the areas of 
marketing, operations and finance 
Personnel Recruitment, training and industrial 
relations policies 
Secretariat Administration, Legal Advice and 
Property administration 
(Source: State Records, Archives, State Archives, Investigator Agency 539) 
When their full report was completed in 1974 the recommendations included 
stronger legislation; re-equipment; upgrading of workshops to meet technological 
development; improvement of freight terminals; capital investment; more effective 
use of all of the Commission’s resources; productivity improvements; 
decentralisation; and co-operation with other authorities – including other NSW 
agencies and the railways of other jurisdictions.33  As one respondent noted, 
                                            
33 Refer to the full report (Looking ahead NSW : report by the Public Transport Commission of New South 
Wales to the Hon. M. A. Morris, M.L.A., Minister for Transport, N.S.W., November 1974.  
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“In Britain they tried to get rid of the railways.  Marples and Beeching had a 
belief they could replace the railways with the motor car.  There were some 
significant rationalisations and this was copied in New South Wales” (Respondent 
10052, November, 2009). 
Shirley’s approach was radical and the cuts he oversaw were unpopular with 
the public, unions and the state opposition.  The public criticism was so bad that he 
retired two years early in 1975.   By 1980, new legislation – the Transport Authorities 
Act, 1980 (Act No. 103, 1980) – was passed by Parliament. This legislation dissolved 
the previous Public Transport Commission  and reorganised public transport 
services into the more specialised units of the State Rail Authority (SRA), with a 
Railway Workshop Board subsidiary, and an Urban Transport Authority (UTA) that 
became responsible for the operation of bus and ferry services.  The SRA consisted 
of seven members who took on all of the functions of the PTC except those 
conferred on the UTA. 
One of the respondents commented on this era, 
“The railways were monolithic.  It was a huge organisation with a non-
vertically integrated structure. In the 1960s and 70s rail had over 50,000 employees. 
If you went to the Traffic Branch you stay there your whole life. They had their own 
catering, they even grew their your own produce on farms” (Respondent 1014, 6, 7, 
8 October, 2009). 
 
Another respondent also reflected on this era,  
“In the early 1970s I took up a position in the marketing Department of the 
new State Rail. There had been a merger of rail, bus and ferries in the early 70s. I 
was placed where I was because I was one of the few people who had a degree 
other than engineering degree. In the early 70s I was the only qualified accountant in 
the railways. Here I did work on the analysis of some products so that we could 
understand the demand for freight on the east coast and hence bid for our share of 
the work. It was the first glimpse that New South Wales railways had the ability to do 
real economic and financial work. I was the first employee of the railways to use a 
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computer. Shirley's idea was we needed to understand the market to have an idea of 
freight movements. I don't recall customers ever being mentioned.  
In 1972 Shirley amalgamated transport. He tried to replicate the Beeching 
report in New South Wales. New South Wales was concerned that the railways were 
continuing to lose money and it was time to consolidate. Shirley started focusing on 
core business. The biggest thing he did was to change the colours to blue-and-white. 
He rolled out the S wagon, and they were timber framed on a fixed bogey over 50 
years old, he wanted to make an impression. He tried to create economies through 
organisational change.  He ran into trouble because he was talking to people who 
were not talking to each other. He closed Branch Lines on the basis of maintenance 
cost against the revenue stream. He bought on people, all graduates who had 
experience in rail operations. He took the unions head on and it didn't work it didn't 
work under [David] Hill either [CEO of the state Rail Authority from 1980-86]. The 
only thing he left behind was the blue and white colours. The change was too big, 
too fast, he could not get the people on side. It was a family business and Shirley did 
not understand the culture. Shirley did not understand the internal politics” 
(Respondent 10092, November, 2009). 
 
The State Rail Authority Board consisted of seven members - four ex-officio 
members and three appointed members. The appointment members were the Chief 
Executive and two Deputy Chief Executives of the State Rail Authority and the 
Managing Director of the Urban Transit Authority.   The functions of the Board were 
to efficiently operate all passenger and freight rail services in NSW, with the UTA to 
provide efficient, adequate and economic urban passenger services, and meet future 
rail transport needs.  The rationale behind the changes was instigated by the then-
Premier, the Labor Party’s Neville Wran.  One respondent noted, 
“In 1976 Wran got in because he promised to cut the fares and was going to 
fix the railway.  It was a belief that you could win elections with these things.  The 
mantra was and is make the trains run on time” (Respondent 10052, November, 
2009). 
With the passage of the In 1980 Transport Authorities Act, Wran appointed 
David Hill as the founding CEO of the State Rail Authority. The links between 
political patronage and rail management during this era were commented on by one 
respondent: 
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 “David [Hill] was an intelligent person. He had a close and trusted relationship 
with Wran. He put the railway on an economic footing. He was there seven years in 
total. He consolidated the focus on core business. David fixed on time running 
quickly by taking trains out and extending the definition from 3 to 5 minutes. Neville 
Wran said late trains lose elections. David appointed the right people and set out 
KPI's. David saw reliability as the main service issue. He didn't reduce staff to any 
extent in the first three years as there was a deal done with the unions.  He set up a 
train reliability program and he also studied productivity line by line. After Granville 
[rail accident] the government started to reinvest in rail. They realised there were 
serious problems but it was all about cost. He put in place maintenance programs, 
he listened to people on the ground; he was effective getting money from 
government” (Respondent 10092, November, 2009). 
The SRA undertook a substantial modernisation program which included the 
extension of the electrified network34 and the purchase of a range of rolling stock.  
The rolling stock decisions included an extension of the double deck carriages, five 
types of locomotives and replacement of the country rail fleet.  
One of the respondents who was involved as a consultant during this era 
reflected on the time. 
“In 1986 I was asked to review the Metropolitan strategy study for State Rail. 
The first thing I noticed was problems with the data.  I said to them you have to 
check your data here, you have to have details on passenger you carry.  There was 
dead silence. ‘What happens if we don't have that data?’ they asked.  I said ‘you 
must have something, how about ticketing data?’   How do you know how many 
people you carry?  The real answer was they didn't know because the focus was 
running trains, the focus was not on moving people. 
I said to them, ‘so you want us to reorganise your services but you don't know 
how many people carry’.  By 1986 they had never had a survey of the whole city.  A 
way of guesstimating was to look at average amount of revenue divided by the 
average fare and it gave you an idea of how many people you carried.  Any figures 
reported prior to 1986 really were worked out this way. 
I told them we have to count the passengers so we set about working out how 
we are going to count them.  The local stations knew the number of journeys so that 
was one possibility.  Another was to count the tickets but not all machines printed 
tickets. The other problem was that tickets were printed by government ticketing 
office in Harris Street and Station Masters often found that they had two boxes of 
tickets with identical numbers so the ticket numbers were not a reliable method of 
                                            
34 Gosford to Wyong – 1982; Wyong to Newcastle – 1984; Waterfall to Port Kembla – 1986; Riverstone to 
Richmond – 1991; Coniston to Dapto- 1993. 
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identifying passenger numbers.  A final problem with tickets was that so many 
passengers used to just give small change to staff at the barriers on the way out.  
We didn't know the size of the problem and we really have no idea how many 
passages there were compared with the number of tickets sold.  So really we did not 
have reliable passenger data. 
We ended up doing physical counts using 500 field staff from State Rail.  We 
had to use 500 workers from State Rail because the consultants we initially 
employed were removed due to union complaints and the work was given back to 
State Rail.   
We found out what we already knew that there were a lot of trains with no one 
on them.  A (senior managers) view was that the government wants more trains so 
we ran them.  We ended up getting rid of the night time trains that were no benefit 
because there was nobody on them and they were costing a lot of money to run.   
We did the surveys again to see what had changed.  We were able to better 
manage timetables with this data and look at matching services to what would suit 
the various markets.   
You had a marketing budget of $2-$3 million per year and 95% was spent on 
country services like the XPT .  no one was interested in the metropolitan services.   
In 1986 there were about 760,000 passengers a day by 2009 there were a 
million passengers a day.  We can't know all that passengers on a first name basis. 
My impressions from 1986 is that it was like stepping back in years.  It was a 
strange environment It was nothing like the environment I had come from.  It was 
nowhere near as rigorous as anything I have been used to in British Rail.  If the 
station master saw an auditor once in three years it was considered harassment.  
Nobody was interested in fair discipline.  It’s gotten better but still not up to 1980 
British Rail standards.  There was no form of respect for fair discipline.  New South 
Wales ran on the basis of no competition.  If you take a look at the 1986/87 annual 
report you get a look at the culture.  The Commissioner was David Hill, the Chief 
Engineer had engineering qualifications , the Chief Operating Officer had been a 
junior station attendant,  level three managers in passenger operations and freight 
operations had basically, come up through the ranks with little additional education.  
The Chief Operating Officer was there to see that the trains on time.  People who 
dealt with customers were level three managers.  The capital works program did not 
add up.  It was given to the railways on whatever basis.  There were no economic 
calculations, there was no logic.  Rolling stock had been operating since the 1920s 
and was way past its life expired date.  When Tangaras [a type of urban passenger 
train] were introduced they were different from the rest of the fleet and drivers could 
not remember how to drive them.  It ran as one complete railway so to change 
anything you had to change everything. There was an attitude that the government 
pays everything the notion was that it was all okay because at the end of the day the 
government would pay the bill ” (Respondent 10052, November, 2009). 
The election of the market-friendly Greiner government in 1988 saw the 
implementation of a new set of reforms to NSW rail. The overarching ideological 
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premise guiding these reforms was to introduce competitive principles into the 
management of the sector. The initial policy shift was undertaken via the Transport 
Administration Act, 1988 (Act No. 109, 1988) which reconstituted the board of State 
Rail Authority to comprise the Chief Executive of the SRA and between four and 
seven members appointed by the minister.  Reflecting the competition imperatives of 
the Greiner administration, the main function of the Board was specified as being to 
determine the policies of the SRA and ensure their efficiency.  The Board could 
recommend candidates for the position of the Chief Executive.   The Minister could 
give written directions to the Board relating to the conduct of the SRA’s functions.  
Almost immediately, the private sector firm Booz Allen Hamilton was 
commissioned to review the operations of the SRA.  Their report in 1989 
recommended major restructuring along Business Unit lines and significant 
rationalisation of services35.  The rationalisation impacted the country services most 
where staff was to be reduced from 18,000 to 10,000 and major services on the 
northern and western lines ceased.   The SRA was divided into four business units: 
City Rail; Country Link; Freight Rail; and Rail Estate.  
These changes in the late 1980s were heavily influenced by neo liberal 
economic policies that reduced the role of the state, deregulated markets and 
corporatised government operations.  There was a belief that the private market was 
more efficient and that government businesses needed to be structured to operate 
on business lines and where possible face market disciplines associated with direct 
competition.  Under this policy many functions within the newly established 
government businesses were outsourced to the private sector.  In the case of the 
                                            
35 The Report had recommended the closure of all country services but this was politically unacceptable. 
105 
 
SRA it was in this era that the final demise of the railway monolith occurred.  This 
philosophy as it was adopted in NSW at the time owed much to ideas out of both the 
UK and the USA that were behind equally sweeping changes in administration in 
those nations. 
 
4.7. The Neo-liberal Reform Agenda in Rail: Competition and 
Open Access 1996 - 2000 
The neo-liberal agenda for NSW rail following the election of the Greiner 
Government was then built upon by competition policy reforms in the 1990s 
spearheaded the national government. Until 1993 interstate freight was operated 
independently by each state using its own standards and operating procedures.  The 
operating deficit was in excess of $300m per year.  This fiscal situation led directly to 
the formation of the National Rail Corporation.   At the same time the Federal 
government had instigated a review of national competition policy by Professor Fred 
Hilmer.   The Hilmer Report (Hilmer, et.al., 1993) had major implications for the 
reform of public monopolies such as the railways.  In April 199536 the Council of 
Australian Governments agreed the national competition policy reform package37.  
The package agreed principles to drive restructuring of public monopolies, open 
access to essential services, ensure competitive neutrality and review legislation 
restricting competition.   
                                            
36 Madden (2004: 43) and see full article for a review of the impact of National Competition Policy on 
Australian Regions. 
37 For a discussion of neoliberal reforms in Australia see O’Neill and Fagen (2006). 
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By late 199538 Federal government policy was driving a neo liberal agenda in 
rail transport.  The open access regime that emerged as part of national competition 
policy was seen as mechanism to access funds directly from the private sector and 
unlock the public sector monopoly.  It was argued that effectively regulated 
competition would improve innovation, service quality and use.  The US and UK 
experiences were used a guiding examples.  As one respondent noted, 
“In the mid 90s the Hilmer report led to the breaking up of the railways.  
Hilmer said you have to break up the railways etc.  There was an underlying notion 
that they wanted to corporatise with a handful of people.  Access payments and 
charging arrangements was the potential future structure of the railway” (Respondent 
10052, November, 2009). 
In NSW, the national policy reforms were put in place with the Transport 
Administration (Rail Corporatisation and Restructuring) Act, 1996 (Act No 56, 
1996).39  This divided the SRA of NSW into four separate entities.  The SRA was 
reorganised into four separate organisations: (i) the Freight Rail Corporation 
(commercial competitive freight operator); (ii) the Rail Access Corporation (owner of 
rail infrastructure responsible for track funding upkeep and provision of access); (iii) 
the Rail Services Authority (track and rolling stock maintenance under contract); and 
(iv) the State Rail Authority (passenger service operator running CityRail and 
CountryLink and train control under contract). A detailed description of each of these 
entities is provided in Appendix A. 
Interviews with key informants highlight an array of complications, and indeed, 
contradictions, which accompanied the implementation of neo-liberal reforms in the 
NSW rail sector. Seen in its broadest terms, the innate problems associated with 
                                            
38 The 1991 Industry Commission Report into Rail Transport found that the core issues were the history of 
ownership, the monopoly status of supply, the lack of customer focus, the short term decision making and the 
inflexibility of the workforce.  Subsequent federal policy addressed these issues. 
39 The Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 required the separation of infrastructure and operations. 
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these reforms stemmed from the attempt to instil the logics of private sector market 
behaviour to a highly complex organisation that was designed (no doubt in ill-fitting 
ways) to attempt to meet multiple social goals and with profoundly important aspects 
of institutional lock-in – in terms of capital, operational systems and workforce 
relations. The apparent zest of policy-makers in the 1990s to reinvent this system 
along neo-liberal principles betrayed a myopic inability to understand the complex 
roots of this institutional architecture. 
The first and most obvious clash in the implementation of neo-liberal 
principles in the NSW rail system pertained to the need to disentangle the 
commercial operations of rolling stock management and passenger services 
(constituted by the reorganised SRA) from the ownership and maintenance of rail 
infrastructure (constituted by the Rail Services Authority [RSA] and Rail Access 
Corporation [RAC]). In accordance with the objectives of National Competition 
Policy, the latter set of services was put out to tender. One key informant described 
the process in the following terms: 
 “The Fred Hilmer report led to competition policy.  The view was it was 
necessary to create competition to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  Below rail 
was put out to tender. There was a view that we should use any organisation that 
could meet the requirements. RSA was a State Owned Corporation and had to 
compete.  Tendering started two years after RAC was established.  The idea was to 
tender slowly in 13 bundles over a 2 to 3 year period.  With the first two bundles 
Fleur [a private company] won one and RSA the other.” (Respondent 10042, 
November, 2009) 
However, this functional separation between ‘above rail’ and ‘below rail’ 
services did not mirror the organisational realities within these organisations: 
“With hindsight the creation of RAC was never really well thought through.  
RAC had little ability to be an informed buyer too many of the staff had been left with 
RSA.  Rail was very rundown there was a lack of understanding of the state of the 
asset and of asset management.  Information was not put into RAC.  But there was 
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clarity of what information was required for long term institutional change and for the 
asset to be appropriately funded.  RAC had an understanding of the role in terms of 
government policy and urban form.  The CEO understood strategic thinking and 
strategy and planning.  RAC had a get up and go culture.  In SRA there was a lack of 
direction and leadership.  RSA did well given the mandate it was given to compete or 
die.  Focus on Service delivery was very limited.  The key was network control.  The 
network control contract between RAC and SRA began to unravel the black box and 
the related time and motion studies started to put in place accountability KPI's to 
support service delivery.” (Respondent 10042, November, 2009) 
These views were supported by another key informant, who suggested: 
“People don't understand the complexity of the system the baggage of the 
past.  It's continually compared with the private sector.  But our overheads are high 
and our costs are high and there is no profit margin so we should be operating as 
efficiently as possible but will never make a profit.  For contracts done externally the 
railway groups take delight they say, “... you reckon you're so good go for your life 
and we will step back”.  They will not assist until they have to save the day.  Guys 
get precious about their work they take criticism to heart - ,there is no culture of 
working as a team.  Government doesn't understand that the business model can’t 
work if it doesn't take into account human factors and the culture” (Respondent 
10072, November, 2009). 
The respondent then went on to say: 
The model could have worked but didn't because the culture of the 
organisation was not taken into account the way it was structured.  Unions were 
extremely concerned about contractors coming in and taking over.  When the south 
coast was won by flirt the minister requested postponement of the contestability 
process.  The next scheduled one was the Hunter Valley It was seen as the jewel in 
the crown it was $100 million plus contract.  The contestability program was 
postponed for about six months.  When it was reinitiated instead of the Hunter going 
out it was the Illawarra Metro and RSA won.  The next one was to be the Hunter 
Valley and at that time the Glenbrook rail incident occurred.  The contestability 
program was seen as a contributor to the accident.  The unions were pushing the 
point that the guys could not concentrate on work and were fearful of their jobs.  
There was a big push to stop contestability on safety grounds.  The Hunter Valley 
tender got to RFP but the results were never released.  The program was cancelled 
by government and RAC and RSA were joined. In October 2000 on the East hills 
Alliance a passenger train derailment was put down to problems with maintenance 
on the line by Fleur.  Fleur and RAC got it wrong.  We understaffed that region.  It 
was only a small region and largely capital works, maintenance was not big but the 
infrastructure was in need of upgrading.  Just after the 2000 Olympics a decision 
was made to reintegrate RAC and RSA.  In 2001 RIC was created. There were 
rumours of a RIC / SRA Integration but it didn't happen until 2004” (Respondent 
10072, November, 2009). 
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Fundamentally important to the functional separation of these activities was 
the role of State Treasury, the policy epicentre for the roll out of neo-liberalism in 
government program administration. Yet the policy ambitions of Treasury were 
thwarted, or at least challenged, by the complex detail of engineering and other 
technical knowledge that was embedded within the operation of these systems. This 
clash between viewing the system through neo-liberal and engineering terms was 
clearly brought to the surface in 1999 when a rail accident (at Glenbrook, south of 
Sydney) provided a punctuated equilibrium that reasserted the need for safety 
protocols and technical expertise, over and above the commercial worlds of the 
Treasury economists: 
“Treasury despised RAC.  The appointment of the CEOs and the period of 
transition when the arrangements were getting sorted was a difficult time.  There was 
inadequate leadership.  The commercial arrangements were never modelled.  It was 
categorised as economic rationalism.  Unravelling the complexity of the original 
organisation was massive. Nobody really understood it and nobody could really 
influence it.  There was a shared view in terms of the outcomes wanted - that is 
improved efficiency and effectiveness.  But nobody in government adequately put in 
place the accountabilities and the people to deliver it.  The unions were not a 
decision maker but they became very important.  After Glenbrook [rail accident in 
1999 which killed seven people and injured 51] the unions mounted a campaign.  
Over the period there were really massive changes.  The biggest learning was 
management beginning to manage rather than waiting for the unions to tell them 
what to do. Now there is more staff engagement and the people factor is viewed as 
important, it has risen to the top”   (Respondent 10042, November, 2009). 
Ironically, whereas the functional separation of track and operational 
components of NSW rail was intended (at least in the minds of by neo-liberal policy-
makers) to de-politicise the system, by making decisions more closely beholden to 
market rationalities, the bureaucratic challenges of making this happen invoked the 
claim that policy in the 1990s was becoming increasingly politicised in favour of 
market solutions. These processes are akin to what Peck and Tickell (2002) 
influentially labelled ‘roll-out neo-liberalism’. Thus, according to one key informant: 
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“[The] State Owned Corporation Model does not work for an agency like rail.  
It pretends you can treat rail like a business.  It doesn't work you can't separate the 
service outputs from the input issues.  It tries to stop the politicians from interfering in 
the inputs but the inputs are political issues.  Treasury hates political interference in 
all services.  This is because as a general rule political interference leads to bad 
decisions. So they try to minimise that interfering.  Free market ideology dominates 
in Treasury.  The minister does not want it put down in writing that he made a 
decision to protect a union.  The political reality is that the community whatever the 
issue is quite rightly holds the Minister for Transport responsible.  So the Minister for 
transport feels accountable and wants to manage the issues so that he is seen to be 
accountable.  Hence, it is a government model that does not match the political and 
public perceptions so it does not work.  If you want a model where we separate the 
contracted outputs from inputs you have to privatise. However, in the case of rail you 
privatise gains and are left to socialise losses.  There is now a global view that 
separation does not work.  The model applied in rail was applied first in electricity.  
Electricity is simple, rail is much more complex. And it's further complicated by 
industrial issues” (Respondent 10082, November, 2009). 
And according to another key informant: 
 “In the 1990s there was too much political interference. In 1995 it was split 4 
ways.  This did not help avoid Glenbrook.  They started to roll out the contracts after 
2 were won by the private sector the union complained and government went weak it 
was all rolled back.  We never had such a good maintainer as Fleur. They 
maintained the track with a lot less possessions and better organisation.  Fleur 
downsized” (Respondent 10062, November, 2009).   
The general misalignment of the model with the actual situation it was 
supposed to remedy was complicated by overly complex layers of deals and 
agreements with the various stakeholders.  These in turn were not sufficient to 
address the processes that required significant change and served to further lock in 
particular arrangements in various parts of the model to serve the interests of the 
various parties.  This additional complication is described below by one of the 
respondents 
“… hated it and wanted it all brought back into the centre.  The unions hated 
sectorisation  because it does not fit with their structure which is centralised.  …They 
viewed it as losing control….they insisted that CityRail kept signalling.  …  Nobody 
owned the timetable. .On 28 December Len came in and after that it was a done 
deal.  
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Competition led to a weak rail access corporation, it made rail services a very 
well protected monopoly.  …In terms of the impact on the governance infrastructure 
nobody really knew exactly what the outcome would be.  But the system had setup 
conflicting objectives. RAC was set up as a SOC with the need to make a profit so to 
balance the books. It had to reduce maintenance spending. RSA was set up like a 
private company competing regardless.  It didn't have to maintain the infrastructure 
in New South Wales it could go anywhere else and get a good rate. SRA had to write 
the timetable but had no power because they could not control investment in the 
infrastructure. An example of an outcome was that RAC made investments that were 
not necessarily in tune with what the operator wanted. The customer service 
outcome was station staff came under SRA.  …decisions were not made at the 
sector level, and competent managers were let go” (Respondent 10052, November, 
2009). 
The model also set up internal conflicts within the system.  The entities were 
organised for competition but were not necessarily focussed on the track in NSW 
and they were not set up to transition in a managed was from the past to ensure that 
all the interfaces were covered and associated risks were managed.  This was 
complicated by a range of old rivalries that came across in the new model.  For 
example, 
“RAC was a small organisation with a number of staff from the private sector 
but it was viewed by RSA and SRA as being arrogant and smart arses.  At times this 
was an appropriate description.  
“…the work was to be contested.  The reality was RSA never going to win 
everything.  So the approach was ‘What am I going to do? I'm going to focus on life 
outside of New South Wales and RAC. ...  
…RAC had a charter to reduce costs.  There was a view that RSA inherited 
an operation that was fat and could be cut down in value.  … It was perfectly 
reasonable to say you needed to sweat the asset more.  The problem was how it 
was done and the interpretation that was put on it by the RSA Guys.  RAC copped 
criticism.  When RSA won contracts they inevitably went for variations and really 
gouged for money. …There was never visibility on bundle costs.  It was a general 
understanding that no government department will take another to court so what 
happens it’s all too hard.  The bottom line is … that these guys are a law unto 
themselves. When you try to understand what went wrong it was always the element 
of blame.  The management style in the past didn't encourage the team approach.  
When you get everybody on board they can do an exceptional job. When you get the 
CEOs aligned at the top it can work like a valued asset.... 
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A key problem with the new setup was the SRA, really it was missing in action 
the eight CEOs in 11 years and there was no stability it was always a negative”  
(Respondent 10072, November, 2009).   
An additional issue was the failure to understand the business side of running 
a railway and to factor this into the structures.  One respondent observed, 
“The break up was poorly conceived in that each entity was given different 
charters… by the government and the shareholding ministers.   
RAC was to make the infrastructure efficient and achieve cost savings. 
The executive of each organisation was set up on separate lines to run on its 
own but each was linked and couldn't run on its own.  For example, contracting train 
control to SRA had issues for RAC on how it managed other operators on its 
network.   
…Part of the problem was that they didn't see it as a business.     
…From a business perspective a number of models could have worked but 
they took no notice of the culture and known factors and competing agendas when 
they set up the agencies and it was doomed to fail” (Respondent 10072, November, 
2009). 
Another respondent observed similar issues but from much closer, 
“In 1995 I was asked to come and sort out the rail system …. They had 
brought in all the consultants in the world to work out how to move the railway 
forward.  I chaired meetings between the unions and the senior managers to work 
out the structure of the separate organisations ….  There was the dual driver of the 
Hilmer report and the need to save money.  There was the separation of the 
passenger function from freight.  RAC was given ownership of the rail and 
stewardship of the access model.  RSA was to be responsible for maintenance of the 
track as it won various tenders. 
 
There were problems.  RSA never had to be competitive, it was a sole 
provider.  Government didn't want to upset the unions, there was a three seat 
majority.  It was a mongrel model it was never going to work.  RAC was a facade. In 
the first year it made $115 million profit.  All it did was fail to spend money on 
maintenance.  They were basically running the railways down.  Separating 
passengers and freight was bad financially.  Freight has contributed $220 m a year  
cash surplus to passengers.  It cost $40m For RAC administration in year one. RSA 
was monopolistic.  The government had separated out freight, the cash cow, and left 
all of the costs in government.  The SRA was the whipping boy of the group it was 
the largest and most vulnerable.  Whatever could go wrong did go wrong” 
(Respondent 10092, November, 2009). 
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4.8.  Conclusion 
This chapter has interpreted the NSW rail system from 1850-2000 through the 
lens of institutional analysis. It has identified five main themes of change.  First, from 
1850 through to the 1920s the notion that the railway was the engine of growth led 
directly to the construction of the heavy rail networks.  It was this set of ideas that 
embedded the first set of institutional forces which shaped settlement patterns, 
developed the economic base of regions and locked in technologies further 
embedding a range of related social relations and networked economic forces.   
Second, the rise of motorised transport and the associated demand for increased 
personal mobility that followed the First World War then challenged the dominance of 
this regime.  
These forces directly impacted the earlier investments in rail creating a 
competitive environment requiring adjustments and divestments which resulted in 
the reconstruction of the prevailing institutional arrangements.   This reconstruction 
required by the transition to new global institutional forces took place over a 30 year 
period and it was not until the 1950s that the transition to the new institutional 
arrangements was achieved.  The modernisation phase of the 1950s, which is the 
third theme of change during the period, served to both align institutional 
arrangements with the new economic and technological requirements of global 
economy after the Second World War and to transition regions fully to the new 
regime.   
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The fourth theme of change is one of urban growth and commercialisation.  
Urban growth led directly to a need for improved city planning and mobility.  This 
demand for mobility found its expression in improved suburban rail but also and 
much more significantly further generated demand for roads indirectly contributing to 
a financial crisis for the railway.  These crises provided the context for 
commercialisation to become embedded in existing institutional arrangements.  The 
final theme of change that had significant impact was the implementation of the 
neoliberal agenda that lead to significant transformations in the institutional 
arrangements and investment climate for rail.    Unfortunately the outcome for NSW 
was summed up by one of the respondents,  
“In New South Wales the change had been an absolute disaster, it was a 
terrible mess. In New South Wales in RAC they were talking from the treetops and 
getting a commercial return because they didn't invest.  At the end of the day the 
cost was the network.  It was the same outcome as in Britain they privatised and the 
railway was broken” (Respondent 1021, 7 December 2009). 
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5. Qld Railways 
“The answer used to be its railways.  Queensland was laughed at for its slow 
narrow gauge railways.  Economics, however, dictated that the Queensland 
Government build cheap, low standard lines across vast distances of a sparsely 
populated state...Queensland’s cheap construction and its light rolling stock often 
proved more appropriate to the freight task in rural Australia than expensively 
engineered railways built to imitate those in Britain.  Ironically, every state except 
New South Wales had to resort to narrow gauge.” (Kerr, 1998: 1) 
“Although many of the links with the past have disappeared, understanding 
today’s railways – and understanding today’s Queensland – requires an 
understanding of the past.  The choices of a low standard of construction and 
especially of a narrow gauge were events that determined the future far more than 
our forebears imagined.” (Kerr, 1998: 2) 
 
5.1. Introduction  
The quotes above identify perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the 
railway in Qld – the narrow gauge.  This decision, dictated in large part by 
geography, is illustrative of an ability that decision-makers in Qld would continue to 
demonstrate throughout the period covered by this thesis.  It is an ability to adopt 
ideas and apply them with sensitivity to the particularities of their region.  These 
decision-makers displayed – and continue to display - an extensive record of 
creative adaptation based on researched case studies and informed, inclusive 
debate.   
From the selection of the narrow gauge to the timing of electrification and the 
selection of the technology associated with the move to faster trains (tilt train 
technology) Qld decision makers made choices which were closely aligned to the 
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geography of Qld, to available funding, and to prospects for economic development.  
The narrow gauge choice was reflective of the physical geography of the colony – its 
size - the limited finance available and the desire to develop the colony quickly.  It 
enabled the construction of large lengths of railway with relative speed and at 
relatively modest cost compared with what would have been possible if there had 
been a decision to use a standard railway gauge.    
Railway development in Qld commenced shortly after that in NSW and was 
driven by the same global processes and transmitted through the same global policy 
networks.  Indeed, the first propositions for railway investment in the colony of Qld 
came from NSW.   The railway age gripped Qld in much the same way as it did 
NSW.  This innovation, the associated discourse, networks, industries and 
institutional structures transferred swiftly through established political and 
administrative networks support by the same capital that funded the NSW railways.   
In Qld, as in NSW, railways focused on improving transport links that enabled 
the more efficient flow of goods to markets.  The difference in Qld was the larger 
geography of the State which combined with its financial situation and small 
population.   This led to three distinguishing features of rail development in Qld:  (i) 
the initial development of three separate rail networks which were not joined until the 
1920s (and realistically administered as one single entity until the 1990s); (ii) the 
choice of narrow gauge which conferred a number of advantages and impacted a 
range of related asset choices, and; (iii) the settlement pattern and the resulting 
economies of communities and regions across Qld.    Notwithstanding these 
differences, the development of rail in Qld shared with NSW principles of spatial fixity 
and path dependent lock-in to the prevailing economic forces.   Qld ports were a 
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focus for railheads and the institutional structure and arrangements in international 
shipping reinforced the shape of the railway network in Qld.  Railway policy was 
driven by global trends but the spatial allocation of capital was a result of the 
geography of Qld and the way its economic history played out in policy arenas. 
Notably, in Qld, population has traditionally been relatively dispersed into 
large regional population centres.  This has occurred because:  the location of 
mining developments and their efficient servicing in later periods by modern railways 
that were operated to internationally competitive standards; the development of 
tourism in regional centres; and the political power of regional Qld that has been 
supported by advocacy groups that have been successful in securing the location of 
administrative government agencies and key institutions such as universities.  These 
factors have not been as apparent in NSW where the dominance of Sydney was 
reinforced by the nature of rail devilment directed as it was by the city merchant 
class.  
The periods of institutional stability (equilibrium) in railway transport policy that 
was interrupted by crises that punctuated that equilibrium mirrored those in NSW.   
This is because the policy changes emerged from ideas dominating the discourse in 
policy networks, which themselves were part of the institutional structure that was 
not related to jurisdictions but to the institutional forces associated with the railway.   
The speed and extent of the implementation of these ideas can be seen to be related 
to the strength of the advocacy coalitions in Qld that supported individual actors.   
Unlike NSW, the development of the railway system was not centred on the 
State capital of Brisbane.   Suburban railway development did not become the focal 
point until the 1880s when Brisbane was finally connected and even then the boom 
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in suburban construction lagged behind that elsewhere but it did eventuate.   The 
suburban system in Brisbane served the same purpose as in Sydney to enable the 
growth of the city and provide transport for the working classes.  Hence, the urban 
spatial fix required by that stage of the institutional capital regime had the same 
implications for railway policy and investment decisions as in Sydney.  The 
difference was in later periods when Qld was unable to afford the reinvestment in 
railway innovations (for example diesel and electric engines) until long after Sydney.   
Aligned with this, the tight purse which was always characteristic of Qld 
Treasury meant that all railway administrations had to practice severe economies.  In 
relation to asset use this meant extended use until well past the original design life of 
the asset.  This nuanced approach resulted in an ability to reinvest because the sunk 
costs of initial investment were less, and hence played a lesser role in precluding 
future reinvestment.  The need to fully utilise assets also influenced the timing of 
investment.  Hence, while Qld investigated electrification as early as the late 1890s 
the actual investment did not occur until the 1970s enabling the leveraging of 
substantial economies associated with later and more advanced technologies. 
This stability in the Qld approach to decision making about long-term 
investments was assisted by equally stable administration.  Major changes in the 
administration of railways in Qld were few and while following (rather than mirroring) 
trends elsewhere they always took into account the local situation.  Four key 
administrative phases can be identified: (i) from 1863 – 87 railways were 
administered as a Department within the Public Works portfolio; (ii) from 1887 – 
1932 railways were administered as an independent Department; (iii) from 1932- 91 
railways were managed as a sub-department of the Department of Transport, and 
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(iv) from 1991 – 2000 railways were moved to a commercial basis and managed as 
a state owned corporation (Queensland State Archives Agency ID366, Railway 
Department).  Equally stable was the management. For example Kerr (1998: 218) 
notes, 
“In 125 years there have been 52 Ministers of the Crown responsible for 
railways, several for only a few days....In the same 125 years there have been just 
19 Commissioners...” 
This stability was also noted by many respondents, for example, 
“In Qld, there is time to do the job.  There is time for discussion.  You can talk 
and get the idea across. It’s slower.  You are not harassed by politicians.  You get 
the time to do the job.  They had some vision.”  (Respondent 1007, 26 October 
2009). 
“Here, if there is vision they want to talk and listen...In NSW if you have a 
good idea they want to park you in your car...In Qld if you have a plan for the future 
and you convince the government they will let you do it...The people are different – 
there is more loyalty.” (Respondent 1021, 7 December 2009). 
“In Qld there was less political interference.  Politicians were kept away from 
the detail, the nitty gritty of the day to day.  People could just get on with it.  The 
management and the whole scene was much more stable then NSW.” (Respondent, 
1009: 2 October 2009). 
The timing of development in Qld has been noted elsewhere as an important 
factor in its development. 
“The timing of the creation of Queensland is important.  With Victorian 
economic optimism and the liberal doctrine of equality of opportunity in their hey-day, 
the climate of opinion was favourable to economic progress and 
development...Capital for the development of what seemed the very promising 
resources of a new colony were readily available.  Again the time was propitious.  
Victoria growing rich from the recent gold rushes could offer investment capital and 
entrepreneurial skill...The Queenslanders inherited liberal democracy from other 
people’s efforts.  Government could concentrate on the problems of development.  
The Queensland legislature was also able to learn   to some extent from mistakes by 
Victoria and N.S.W....” (Farnfield, 1974: 10 -11). 
Hence, perhaps Qld had an element of luck from the beginning in its 
economic and social development. 
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5.2. Early Railway Development 1863 - 1887 
After the separation from NSW in December 1859, the colony of Qld was very 
minimally developed.  It was described as follows, 
“..there was a very small population (European), the distances were immense, 
there was an immense amount of land, the transport network was dreadful, the 
population settlements were small and located in isolated pockets, resources and 
minerals were thousands of miles away.” (Respondent, 1002, 7 October, 2009)  
Figure 5.2.1. shows the limited development in Brisbane in 1862.  The first 
census after separation in 1861 found a population (European) of just 30,059 
(Cameron, 1989:4).  
Figure 5.2.1 View of Brisbane 1862 
 
(Source:  Cameron, 1989:5) 
The driver for railways in Qld was the development of the colony.  Power at 
the time was in the hands of a very small number of rich graziers who wanted to both 
intensify economic exploitation of the colony and increase the white population (Lee, 
121 
 
2010:128).  This focus on ‘opening up the country’ as a central role for Qld railways 
was to remain for well over a century.  Railways provided the infrastructure that 
supported agriculture and, then, in a more recent period, mining.  Both phases were 
vital for the development of Qld. 
“The role of the railway in Queensland was to be the development of the 
country.  This was to mean that railways would often be built into rural areas in 
advance of settlement and led to the establishment of railway towns, towns which did 
not exist before the advent of the railway and which were often heavily dependent on 
the railway for their economic base.” (QR, 2002: 2) 
While railway development in Qld had been planned prior to separation40 the 
first tangible attention to this issue came after the report of the Select Committee on 
Transport in 1860.  The Committee regarded railways as beyond the resources of 
the colony and recommended urgent road works.  They did however consider the 
value of tramroads.  A private company, the Moreton Bay Tramroad Company, was 
established in 1861 to build a tramway from Ipswich to Toowoomba.  The initial 
funding basis was a land grant railway – a similar funding basis to some American 
railways at the time.  The Act of Parliament that incorporated the company granted it 
one acre of land adjacent to the track for every pound spent.  Despite the generous 
land grants there was insufficient capital in the colony to finance the railway.  In 1862 
the company went into insolvency selling its only assets (the survey plans) to 
government (Kerr, 1998:4). 
                                            
40 The first planning for a railway in Queensland was in 1855 when Thomas Hood moved a motion in the NSW 
legislature for a survey of a ‘tramroad’ (a horse powered railway on wooden rails) from Ipswich to the Darling 
Downs via Warwick to Tenterfield.  No construction eventuated.  The only outcome for Qld was a debt (Kerr, 
1998: 3). 
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The Railways Bill in 1863 (see Figure 5.2.2 below) authorised the government 
to build railways.  It was finally passed after significant debate especially relating to 
the decision about the gauge41 (refer to Appendix B).     
Figure 5.2.2 Queensland Railways Bill 1863
 
                                            
41 For a detailed discussion of the gauge issue refer to Knowles, 1981. 
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Administration of Qld railways during the nineteenth century was designed to 
provide considerable regional autonomy (for full details, see Appendix D). This 
administrative structure (with some name changes to Branches and key positions) 
remained largely in place until corporatisation in 1991. This set of administrative 
arrangements evolved in no small part because of the State’s geography. The long 
coast line meant that coastal shipping was very important.    Railways were 
connectors to either sea or river ports.   Hence, they were isolated lines and were not 
connected until the north coast line was built in the mid-1920s.  This had a major 
impact on the settlement pattern and on the spatial fixity associated with railway 
development in Qld.  The first lines constructed in the early period were the first part 
of the western and northern railway lines.  The western line was the first and its 
development was all about supporting agricultural trade.   As one respondent 
observed, 
“The first railway was from Ipswich to Bigge’s Camp.  It was completed on 31 
July 1865 it was wool to the world.”  (Respondent 1010, 8 October, 2009) 
Key milestones were:  from Ipswich to Grandchester 1865; Toowoomba 1867; 
Dalby 1868; from Ipswich to Brisbane 1876.  A southern extension was built to Allora 
in 1869 and to Warwick in 1871.  The northern line (the result of the political deal to 
get the Railway Bill of 1863 passed) was next with the railway from Rockhampton to 
Westwood.  Copper mines at Peak Downs were one of the drivers for this railway 
and it can perhaps be considered as Queensland’s first mining railway (refer to Kerr, 
1998: Ch. 3 and 4).  By 1875, 226 miles of railway had been constructed at a cost of 
three million pounds (Cole, 1945: 310).  These early lines are shown in Figure 5.2.3 
below. 
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5.2.3 Queensland – Early Rail Lines
 
(Source: Kerr, 1998:  24) 
The speed of the construction of these early railways can be compared with 
that in NSW.  The narrow gauge and the construction approach using lower 
standards allowed faster construction.  The Ipswich to Toowoomba lines was 
completed in three years.  A line the same distance in NSW from Sydney to the Zig 
Zag (in the Blue Mountains) took 19 years (Lee, 2010:128).  The railway construction 
resulted in a rapid influx of migrant labourers who added to the growth of local 
economies. 
Unlike the other eastern State capitals, Brisbane was too small to have 
railways built solely to serve its suburbs.  Indeed, Brisbane was not the site of the 
first railway and it did not have a railway until 1875 - the end of the first decade of 
railway building in Qld.   Some lines were built for specific purposes (for example the 
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Beach railway to Sandgate45 and the race railway to Eagle Farm) others were built to 
accommodate suburban expansion (for example Melbourne St and the Cleveland 
Branch Line) and others to accommodate industrial development (examples include: 
the South Brisbane Line – coal; Bulimba - wool, sugar, sawmills; Enoggera Branch – 
livestock).   By the end of the 1880s two systems46 had been built in Brisbane. One 
of these was in the east, and an entirely separate system centred on South Brisbane 
which at the time was an important commercial district.  Hence, while the city and the 
suburbs grew around the railway in Brisbane, this was due to opportunistic 
association rather than by design.  In Brisbane, commercial drivers to support 
industry were the engine of suburban rail development for passenger travel which 
was required to support the changing industrial structure associated with 
urbanisation facilitating transport of labour in the city. 
Geographical features influenced the shape of the city of Brisbane and the 
direction of urban development.   Situated at the head of the Brisbane River, in a gap 
between coastal ranges and bordered by hills, these physical features divided the 
city into quadrants.  The location of a suitable port in Brisbane and its development 
cemented the commercial role of the city over Ipswich.  Again, it was physical 
geography that played a major part in encouraging development as the Port 
developed and grew in volume of trade and importance.  The role of the Port of 
Brisbane was enhanced by the coastal railway and its increasing ability to tap the 
trade of north and central Qld.    
“Brisbane was a country town until the 1960s...The railway was not important, 
trams developed Brisbane.  The railway was an afterthought.  It almost got closed 
                                            
45 See The Brisbane Courier, 11 May, 1882: 3 
46 For over a century passengers on the South Brisbane line had to catch a tram across Victoria Bridge to reach 
the city (Lee, 2010:210) 
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after the war....Suburbanisation occurred around the railway line. ..The bridge across 
the Brisbane River in the 1970s was a key link.  No one foresaw fast electric trains... 
A rail link to the Gold Coast was secondary to the two lane freeway. ‘You can’t carry 
a surfboard on a train kind of thinking’” (Respondent, 1001: 28 September, 2009) 
 
5.3. The Railway Age 1887 – 1932 
Building the Trunk Lines 1887 - 1900 
The railway boom of the 1880s swept through Qld as it did in the rest of the 
Australian colonies.   The table below (Table 5.3.1) shows this boom in construction.  
The role of the railway in Qld remained that of building trunk railways to the 
hinterland from ports. As one respondent suggested: 
  “..Qld [was] built from the Ports.  Interconnectivity was not important in the 
nineteenth century.  Railways were built to get rural produce to the ports.  Back then 
the number of ports was not a problem.    Post war (World War II) with bulk transport 
of commodities and bulk inter modal transfers it matters.  International shipping 
companies only want to go to one Australian port.”  (Respondent 1009, October, 
2009)  
The small population, the long elongated coastline, and the availability of 
ports meant that geography was the dominant influence on railway construction in 
the nineteenth century (Fletcher, 2002: 67).  This geographic hegemony was not 
challenged by the then organisation of the international transport industry it was 
characterised by small ships stopping at a large number of ports, large and small.  
The current industry structure of large ships and global hubs would have led to the 
dominance of a single large port probably, Brisbane. 
This was a time of significant agricultural and mining development in Qld.  The 
colony was dominated by agricultural, pastoral and mining interests.  They were 
spread over very large areas and all wanted good transport links to overseas 
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markets (Lee, 2010:134).  This intermodal transport relationship was reinforced by 
the lobbying of the various agricultural, pastoral and mining groups which led to the 
development of isolated rail links that operated as individual railways albeit reporting 
to a single head office in Brisbane. They formed very effective advocacy groups and 
supported local politicians who power bargained in the legislature for their regions.  
The east – west construction was a distinguishing feature of the railway in Qld.  In 
the other Australian colonies railways tended to radiate from the capital.  This 
separation tended also to reinforce the regional thinking in Qld and was a key reason 
for the regional development and decentralised location of government services 
(Cameron, 1989: 43).   
Table 5.3.1 Railway Construction 1859 – 1900 
 
(Source Cameron, 1989: 42) 
There was no detailed government plan or design that supported the 
development of the railway in Qld.  Its location was greatly influenced by the power 
of the various districts and their parliamentary representatives.  The government 
policy was very much one of providing for current needs.  The lack of financial 
resources reinforced this policy as did the settlement pattern.  After separation, 
squatters spread out over vast distances largely encouraged by very liberal land 
policies.  Two policies were used by the Qld legislature to encourage development:  
land and immigration (Farnfield, 1974).  Liberal land grants to settlers led to the 
development of a powerful squatter group that had significant political power which 
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was used to ensure the protection of its interests.  This group was important in 
lobbying for the railway as it provided a means to markets for agricultural produce.  
There was however no transport or communications policy that supported these land 
and immigration policies.  The result was a sparse and haphazard settlement pattern 
that would only develop with improved transport links.  Settlements which had 
tended to spread out along rivers came together in towns along the railway at key 
terminus points.  The railway was critical to the development of the settlement 
pattern in Qld from 1859 – 190047. 
“Probably the greatest influence on the spread of closer settlement was the 
railway building programme embarked on so enthusiastically by the Queensland 
Government under Premier Herbert in the 1860s and supported by successive 
government’s up to 1930 when the present network, excluding recent mineral lines, 
was substantially completed” (Cameron, 1989: 13).  
The initial lines were primarily to support graziers’ interests to allow the more 
efficient export of wool.  The Darling Downs District had substantial power in the 
legislature in the 1860s as three powerful ministers came from this district:  Lands, 
Public Works and Treasury.  Hence, their interests were well supported by railways 
during the first phase of expansion (Courtice, 1937: 164).  The later lines were built 
to support mines after the discovery of tin, gold and copper in the 1860s and 1870s.  
The mines provided both the need and the finance to support rail development.  By 
1891 there were 11 separate railways in Queensland.48  
                                            
47 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between railway development and the settlement pattern in 
Qld see Courtice, 1937. 
48 The Western line – Brisbane to Toowoomba, Roma (1880), Charleville (1888) and Cunnamulla (1898); The 
Central line – Rockhampton to Westward, Emerald (1879), Barcaldine (1886), and Longreach (1892); The 
Northern Line – Townsville to Charters Towers (1882), Hughenden (1887) and Winton (1899); Bundaberg 
Railway to Mt Perry (1884), (1884); Maryborough Railway to Gympie (1881), extensions to Burrum coalfields in 
1883, to Howard (1886); Emu Park Railway to Rockhampton (1888); Cooktown Railway to Laura (1888); Cairns 
railway to Redlynch (1887), to Kuranda (1891) and Mareeba (1893); Normanton Railway to Haydon (1889) and  
Croydon (1891); Bowen Railway to Wangaratta (1891). For further details, consult Appendix E. 
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The development of the bulk of these lines in the 1880s was funded by a large 
loan.  The new Government acquired a loan for ten million pounds in 1884 (about 
one billion dollars in today’s terms) to fund railway development.  Railways were built 
for a wide range of interest groups as the railway was seen as a means to certain 
prosperity (Kerr, 1998: 49; QR, 2002:4).   It was not until the appointment of the 
Railway Commissioners in 1889 that such overt politics was removed (at least 
somewhat) from railway development. 
The early locomotives used on the Qld railways were imported from Great 
Britain49 and America and built to designs from these countries.  By 1877 however, 
local manufacture began in Ipswich.  This was successful and except for the early 
imports, all the drawn rolling stock used on Qld railways from 1877 to 1900 came 
from the Ipswich workshops (Cameron, 1989: 55) and the rest of the fleet was 
sourced within Qld for example from workshops at Maryborough. 
In 1888 legislation was passed which attempted to limit political interference in 
the railways.  The politicisation caused a level of public debate, concern and uproar 
punctuating the policy equilibrium enabling change exactly as it had done in NSW, 
and at the same time.  Hence the Qld legislation was similar to and followed the 
legislation that was passed in the other east coast colonies.  The norms and 
behaviours were reflective of the institutional milieu generally and not of the location.  
They were reproduced wherever the railway operated.   
The 1863 Act had provided for a Commissioner for Railways who (while 
responsible for all matters of administration) was subordinate to the Minister 
                                            
49 “Class B locomotives in service were originally manufactured in Glasgow, Scotland by Neilson and Company 
and imported to Queensland” Qld State Archives, 1864 Railway Makes Tracks. 
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responsible for railways.  The 1888 Act provided for the appointment of three 
Commissioners with full powers (similar to a Board of Directors) covering 
administration, management and construction of railways.  The powers of the 
Minister were not abolished but were defined so that the Ministers became an 
intermediary between the Commissioners and Parliament.   The Commissioners had 
to provide an annual report including a detailed report to the Minister (Knibbs, 1908: 
565).   
A key aim of the legislation was to limit patronage in the appointment of staff.  
Only Parliament could remove the Commissioners.  The Act also instituted a process 
of examinations before appointment and six months of probation for staff.  There was 
an underlying assumption that the railway would be run on commercial principles, 
however the Minister assured Parliament at the time that the dominant motive was 
not profit but to ‘induce and promote close settlement of the colony’ (Kerr, 1998: 90).  
The salaries offered were substantial and attracted overseas applicants.  John 
Mathieson came from Glasgow, Andrew Johnston from Great Britain and John Gary 
who had been Under Colonial Secretary of Queensland.  The enthusiasm 
accompanying the appointment of these Commissioners is captured in a report of 
the Brisbane Courier newspaper at the time, reproduced in Appendix F. By 1894 the 
number of Commissioners was reduced to one after the overseas Commissioners 
came into conflict with key engineering staff over critical decisions.  Amendments to 
the Act resulted in the appointment of a single Commissioner (Gray was appointed) 
and while the powers were retained the reality was that the Commissioner’s 
recommendations to Parliament reflected government policy and the concept of an 
independent Board was removed.  This proved an enduring feature of the 
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institutional environment of Qld railways. Every future Commissioner until the very 
last one (prior to the organisation being fundamentally restructured in the 1990s) 
came from within the railways (Kerr, 1998: 90 - 91). As one key informant noted: 
 “...They didn’t bring people in from outside.”  (Respondent, 1001: 28 
September, 2009) 
The Board sought to drive efficiency within the administration, although this 
ambition was hampered by distance and the need to duplicate administration on the 
three main rail systems.  Stations and lines with very low patronage were closed and 
costs were reviewed regularly and intently.  As there was little construction in the first 
part of the early 1890s (due to the recession) retrenchments occurred in the Chief 
Engineer’s Office.  These included John Bradfield who had joined the Qld railways in 
May 1889 and went on to work in NSW railways. 
By 1900, 18 million pounds (Courtice, 1937:165) had been spent and the 
basic structure of the railway in Qld had been formed with the exception of the north 
coast line that was to connect the separate lines.  This was completed in 1924.   The 
map in Figure 5.3.1 below illustrates the location of these railways while the map in 
Figure 5.3.2 shows and their relationship to ports, mines and centres of agriculture.  
It is reflective of the close association of the railway with centres of primary 
production and its initial role in providing effective transport for the colonial regime. 
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Figure 5.3.1 Queensland’s Railways 1900
 
(Source:  Cameron: 1989: 54) 
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Figure 5.3.2 Qld Railways, Agriculture and Mining Interests 1900 
 
(Source:  Courtice:  1937:166) 
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Building the Branch Lines and Joining the Separate Railway 
Systems 1900 – 1932 
Between 1902 and 1920 branch railways grew all over the State as they did 
during the same period in and slightly earlier in NSW.  Again this is reflective of the 
fact that it was a response to forces in the prevailing economic regime that were 
embedded in the regional economy and associated with that stage of railway 
development.  .Some lines were in response to demands from farmers for rail 
services and others were to open up land for agriculture.   In the south, branch lines 
were built to: Dayboro, Canungra, Yarraman, Mount Edwards, Mulgowie, Haden, 
Cooyar, Cecil Plains, Bell, Jandowae and Glenmorgan, Wandoan and Injune, 
Millmerran, Goomburra, Maryvale, Amiens and Texas, Kilcoy, Brooloo, Kingaroy, 
Tarong, Nanango, Proston and Windera, Dallarnil, Gayndah, Monto via both 
Gayndah and Many Peaks, and Morganville.  In central Qld, branch lines were built 
to: Yeppon, Theodore, Lawgi, Blackall, extending the Mackay railway to Netherdale, 
Kungurri and Owens Creek, and Mareeba to Ravenshoe, and Millaa Millaa (QR, 
2002: 5).   
The first ‘grand rail plan’ for Qld since the 1860s was presented to the Qld 
Parliament in 1910 (QR, 2002: 7).  It presented the concept of the North Coast 
Railway (linking all the railways on the east coast) and the Great Western Railway (a 
link across western Qld linking the Southern, Western and Northern Railways).  
When Parliament approved the legislation on 21 December 1910 it was the greatest 
length of railway ever approved by the Qld Parliament in one day and indeed in one 
year (Kerr, 1998: 123).  The North Coast Railway was completed in 1924 and the 
link on the east coast was completed.  The Western Railway was never completed 
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and work ceased on it in 1917.  While this achievement was impressive this period of 
railway building in Qld was dominated by the construction of Branch lines.  Between 
1905 and 1924, 4,800 km of new track was built and of this amount, 2,780 km was 
Branch lines (Cameron, 1989: 110). 
By 1935 10,569 km of railway construction had been completed in Qld.  This 
can be compared with NSW which at this time had 700 km less track, 
notwithstanding the fact that at the time, the population of NSW was three times that 
of Qld.  The railway was the largest single employer in the state.  Hence, the 
financial burden of the railway in Qld was much more significant than in NSW.  
However, successive state governments in Qld had borrowed and invested heavily in 
railways because they believed that railway development was central to the 
development of the state (Cameron, 1989: 110).  A consequence of the high interest 
payments and the low traffic on many of the lines was that until the late 1960s when 
bulk haulage of minerals from Mt Isa and the central coal fields commenced, the 
railways rarely had an operating surplus.  In fact they made very little contribution to 
the interest paid on borrowings or to the retirement of loans.  This financial situation 
led to the payment of very low wages and increasing union militancy in the period 
from 1900 – 1930.  This period was marked by numerous railway strikes (Cameron, 
1989: 112).   
The depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s combined with competition 
from road transport led to reduced haulage of freight by rail and reduced income for 
the railway.  This was the same crises that faced NSW and it produced the same 
policy window allowing a change to be implemented.  The administrative response in 
Qld was similar to that in NSW - the formation of a Transport Department.  However, 
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the ambit of this Department was vastly different from that operating south of the 
border: 
"The only real similarity between the latest Queensland Act and the New 
South Wales measure Is In the name," said the secretary of the Federation (Mr. C. 
A. Gregory). "The Queensland Government has been careful to omit practically the 
whole of the contentious (i) sections of the New South Wales Act, notably those 
empowering a non-representative board to impose crushing taxation on privately-
owned motor vehicles. On the other hand, it has many equitable provisions, including 
representation of commercial, financial, and transport interests on its transport 
board, that were studiously omitted from the New South Wales measure and strongly 
resisted by the Government when the bill was going through Parliament." (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 17 March 1932:4) 
The 1932 State Transport Act merged the formerly separate functions of the 
Commissioner for Railways and the Commissioner of Main Roads to form a new 
Transport Department. A State Transport Board was also established, "for the 
purposes of providing for the improvement and for the co-ordination of transport in 
the State".  The Board's executive consisted of:  two representatives of the 
commercial, financial and producing interests of the State; the Commissioner of 
Railways; the Commissioner of Main Roads; one other transport officer; and a 
Secretary. Its responsibilities were to devise and execute schemes to co-ordinate or 
otherwise improve transport, to make financial recommendations and decisions, to 
undertake inquiries into transport matters, and to set up Advisory Committees into 
various matters (Queensland State Archives Agency ID385, Transport Department). 
This was a time of substantial financial pressure on the railways.  Haulage 
was down (by 2 million tons), passenger numbers were down (by 30%) and freight 
rates were reduced.   Tables 5.2.3 and 5.3.3 illustrate the size of the railway burden 
by 1931 and the financial situation.  Economies were exercised as overheads and 
costs were reviewed in all aspects of operations.  Low traffic branch lines were 
closed.  The competitive pressures from road transport that were becoming an 
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increasing problem for the railways continued to escalate despite various regulatory 
responses and substantial inroads were made into the rail freight business.  The 
‘common carrier’ requirement and the publication of rail freight rates did little to assist 
the problem.  The first three decades of the twentieth century then saw substantial 
investment in railways in Qld.  Table 5.3.4 illustrates the scale of this activity and 
Figure 5.3.3 shows the extent of the Branch line construction. Again, this is similar to 
what had occurred in NSW. 
 
Table 5.3.2 Railways – Interest Payments
 
(Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1933: 227) 
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Table 5.3.3 Railways – Profit or Loss 
 
(Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1933: 227) 
 
Table 5.3.4 Railway Track Completed 1891 – 1950
(Source: Cameron, 1989: 110) 
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Figure 5.3.3 Railway Construction Queensland 1902 – 45
 
(Source:  Cameron, 1989:  111) 
The level of this investment was justified in terms of the anticipated catalyst 
railway construction would have on the state’s growth. The slogan of the railways in 
Qld was, “A partner in Queensland’s Progress”. (QR, webarchive).   However, by 
1930 the level of the investment in railways was being questioned on economic 
grounds.  It was noted that the investment in railways had increased by 46% since 
1920, which was well ahead of the increase in the value of production (15%), the 
increase in the value of agricultural production (34%), and the increase in population 
(24%).  The level of the railway debt was also massive.  These views combined with 
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the economic depression in the early 1930s brought railway construction to a halt50 
as it did in NSW.  However in Qld investment did not recommence on the same 
scale after the War as in NSW due to a change of government.  It did not take off 
until the 1950s and it gathered speed when the mineral railways of the 1960s 
(Cameron, 1989: 113) provided the capital. 
During the whole period from 1863 until the late 1930s, the technology used 
to construct the railway in Qld was adopted largely from Great Britain but each 
element was scaled down – gauge, track strength, rails, axle loads, rollingstock, 
bridge design, stations, and gradients.  The narrow gauge proved to be suitable to 
Qld’s economic situation and to the highly distributed and relatively low volume of the 
transport task.  Indeed, it was copied by Tasmania, Western Australia and South 
Australia but it was different from NSW.  The gauge and the associated lower 
construction standards proved to be suitable for Qld needs.   
“Queensland Railways led railway technology in Narrow Gauge. It was not, 
initially, an indigenous technology but wholly imported, but making the technology 
workable and economical was entirely in the hands of Queensland Railways. Once 
the initial construction period was over, and using the staff and the equipment 
imported from Britain, it was purely a local enterprise. In those early years there was 
a sense of confidence that in choosing narrow gauge and adopting cheap methods 
of construction, Queensland had made the right choice at the right time. Narrow 
gauge would eventually spread - to Japan, Africa, New Zealand and much of 
Australia, and in metre gauge to India, South East Asia and South America, in many 
countries as the principal and main line gauge - reinforced the judgement.” (QR 
Webarchive). 
 
In addition to the narrow gauge Qld used lighter track and often adopted a 
track geometry with curves and gradients that would impose limits on loads and 
speeds.  While a pioneer and an innovator in railway timber bridge design this too 
would prove to be a limitation on the functionality of the system.  However, in Qld the 
                                            
50 The line from Thangool to Lawgi (13 kms long) was the last to be built in 1933. 
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timing of the investment, the ability and willingness to delay reinvestment until the life 
of the asset had well expired and the determined reinvestment aligned to return 
(whether at the level of the individual project or the associated economic spin offs) 
allowed a system level rejuvenation at critical periods to further reinforce economic 
growth trajectories.  This is demonstrated during the next period of the evolution of 
the railway in Qld (refer to Kerr, 1998 and to QR Webarchive). 
 
5.4. Reconstruction and Profiting from Minerals 1932 – 1991 
Qld railways during the Second World War became vital to the defence effort 
in North Australia.  The fleet, tracks and staff were literally worked around the clock.  
Reducing turnaround times, running engines beyond their usual maintenance 
schedules, running rolling stock that was in need of maintenance, cancelling all staff 
leave were all elements of the ‘Pony Railway’  that played such an important part in 
the war effort.  This has been well documented elsewhere and will not be discussed 
in detail in this thesis.  It is important however in understanding the state of the Qld 
rail system at the end of the war and in the early 1950s.  The situation after the war 
was described by several respondents: 
“The war destituted QR: management acumen; equipment; rollingstock...In 
1955 there were square miles of rotting locomotives, and carriages in Ipswich.  They 
were all run into the ground and there was no money to fix it.  It was a bleak 
landscape - there were shortages of everything...Even the signal and telegraph room 
was a stall in one of the toilets in Rockhampton....Timetables...it ran on leftovers 
from the 1890s...carriages were built pre-war...wages were pre-war...The track had 
not been upgraded for years. Bridges were rotting...At that time it was Queensland 
Government Railways.  It employed 20,000 people... all the railways files were in the 
Secretary’s Office in spiral rows four deep around the room.  The Commissioner at 
the time (Moriarty September 1952 – August 1962) was brilliant man.  No one really 
knew him.  A Brigadier General.  Tyrannical (thinking he was still in the Western 
Desert), ran a dictatorship, the managers were overawed by him...They needed it.  
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They were a rag tag lot.  His major contribution was that trains ran on time.  The key 
people were all very competent – the Chief Civil Engineer, the Chief Mechanical 
Engineer and Chief Traffic Engineer.” (Respondent, 1001: 28 September, 2009) 
Similar sentiments were expressed by other respondents for example, 
“After the war everything was run down there was still steam engine's. Diesel 
was not introduced until 1951-52.  Steam was not phased out until 1989...The 1950s 
were a time of renewal all sorts of new things came in - air conditioning and in 1953 
the Sundowner.” (Respondent 1015, 6 October 2009) 
“After the war the Railway in Queensland was a derelict railway, the 
infrastructure have been very run down because it had been worked to death during 
the war.” (Respondent 1014, 6, 7,8 October, 2009). 
The economic situation of Qld after the war and up to the early 1960s was 
described by another respondent, 
“Queensland’s finances were desperate and the economy was at a standstill. 
In one year in the mid-60s, we were forced to apply to the Commonwealth for a short 
term loan to pay wages and current running expenses... As far as the economy was 
concerned back then, we had just one major company MIM [Mount Isa Mines Ltd] – 
and it was in trouble because the rail between Mt Isa and Townsville was clapped 
out.  The rest of the economy depended very much on our pioneer industries.  
Elsewhere it consisted of a string of cottage industries, stove foundries, a boot 
factory, small clothing establishments, a couple of woollen mills and sustenance type 
personal endeavours.  We didn’t rely on service industries where people work for 
people as they do today.  We painted our own houses, mowed our own lawns, grew 
our own vegetables in the back yard, had our own chooks and rainwater tanks.  
There were some important branch offices of banks, Dalgety’s, Thomas Brown, the 
state branches of oil companies and so on... The reason for this economic 
stagnation principally was that Queensland was still enduring the debilitating effects 
of the 1930’s depressions followed by the complete focus on the war effort in the 
1940s with Queensland as a front line State, and then the austerity that followed. 
    In the 1960s, we still had no coal industry, no bauxite/aluminium industry, 
no tourist industry.  Brisbane stopped at the tram termini at Balmoral, Belmont, Mt 
Gravatt, Salisbury, West End, Toowong, Stafford, Chermside, Clayfield and Ascot, 
and trains were steam driven...”  (Respondent 1003, Private Address for 10000 
Friends of Greater Sydney 2009). 
The derelict railway of the immediate post war era gave way to the rapidly 
modernising railway with significant influence from key bureaucrats (Commissioners 
Moriarty, and Lee), a powerful Minister (Gordon Chalk first as Transport Minister and 
then as Treasurer) and an external consulting Group (the American firm, Ford Bacon 
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and Davis) whom developed a road map that influenced the design of the railway in 
Qld for at least 50 years.  In the 1950s and early 1960s steam gave way to diesel, 
tracks were significantly modernised, infrastructure was upgraded and stations were 
modernised51.   
It was the mining boom of the 1960s52 however combined with the innovative 
financing devised wholly in Qld that facilitated the transformation to the corporate QR 
of the 21st century.  Broadly, from the 1960s until the mid-1990s rail freight rates in 
Qld were negotiated by the Treasury with the companies.  The role of Queensland 
Rail was to provide the rolling stock and infrastructure and implement the terms of 
the Treasury agreement.  As the Qld Government noted in a submission to the 
Queensland Competition Authority in relation to rail access, rail freight rates 
contained a significant level of Royalty payment until the early 1990s, 
“Over the years, QR has received a substantial amount of funding from 
companies for the purpose of upgrading or extending the rail network, or for 
purchasing new assets including rolling stock. These capital contributions were 
usually paid up front to QR and paid back (or otherwise recognised) to the 
                                            
51 Critical developments in this period were firstly, modernisation of the network which began with the 
introduction of new diesel-electric locomotives, new country passenger trains, and new buildings on stations 
in regional Queensland (such as Charleville), and overdue investment in specific infrastructural works (QR Web 
Archive). 
52 Since the late 1960s practically all construction has been to develop mining, and to rebuild or upgrade the 
existing network. The spur to Callide Coalfields in 1953 being the first coal specific railway.   All subsequent 
mining railways, starting with the Moura Short Line completed in 1968, have been built as government 
railways but funded by mining companies provided deposits which have been refunded out of rail freights 
providing agreed tonnages were met.  Construction under this heading included Gladstone to Moura Mine, 
coal spur lines to Utah Mine (Koorilgah), Laleham, Curragh, Gregory and Gordonstone spurs in the Blackwater 
area, the Goonyella system from Hay Point to Goonyella, Blair Athol mine and a series of mines ending at Oaky 
Creek, Collinsville to Newlands with a spur to Abbot Point port, and Rosewood to Ebenezer in southern 
Queensland, all built for coal. Other mineral lines included Cobarra near Townsville to Greenvale for nickel ore, 
and Phosphate Hill in the Cloncurry district. The only exception to government construction was the short 
standard gauge railway built privately by Comalco to haul bauxite to port at Weipa. Much major reconstruction 
of Gladstone-Rockhampton-Blackwater and of the Collinsville branch has been financed by mining companies. 
No mining company finance was involved in the reconstruction of the Mount Isa Line Collinsville-Mount Isa 
during the 1960s. Some recent lines have been built for other than mining, Fisherman Islands (1980) to provide 
Brisbane with a new port, Roma Street to South Brisbane (1978) to link the two almost separate suburban 
systems in Brisbane (QR Web Archive). 
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companies under various terms and conditions that were set out in contracts known 
as rail haulage agreements (RHAs)... 
 In the period up to the early 1980s, mining companies made capital 
contributions to QR by way of an up-front payment of a refundable security deposit to 
cover the cost of constructing rail infrastructure (and/or purchasing rollingstock). 
Subject to performance criteria, these upfront security deposits were refunded to the 
companies through a schedule of repayments (generally including an interest 
component and often established through Acts of Parliament) set out in RHAs 
between the contributing companies and the Government (represented by the 
Commissioner for Railways. A capital component to fund the refunds was 
incorporated into the rail freight charge... 
In the early 1980s, due to a change in Commonwealth taxation rules, the above 
arrangement of refundable security deposits was replaced by “non-refundable” 
capital contributions. The non-refundable capital contributions were recognised in 
terms of a lower freight rate for the term of the contract or the life of the asset.” (Qld 
Govt, 1999, 5) 
 
 
 The Treasury Under - Secretary, supported by a network of bureaucrats 
(most importantly, the Co-ordinator General and the Commissioners of Rail and 
Roads) and a network of Queenslanders that included bankers, lawyers and the 
most senior politicians enabled the social and economic transformation of the railway 
and the State.  Ideas that were implemented in NSW that stemmed from the 
Beeching reforms in the UK were also implemented in Qld at this time.  However, 
balancing the line closures were large investments in new bulk haulage lines 
requiring very large purchases of rolling stock and a revolution in the management of 
rail freight.  This investment began in 1968 with the new coal lines and continued into 
the 1980s with electrification, starting in Brisbane in 1979.   
All informants commented on the importance of mining development to the 
redevelopment of the railway in Qld.  Some examples are set out below: 
“The Mt Isa mine upgrading was the start of QR growth.  It was 1956...Ford 
Bacon and Davis, the US railroad consultants came in and took over running many 
functions.  They transformed the railway.  They developed a succession plan for 
staff....They were there on and off for 10 years...I suspect it was Sir Leo  who was 
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behind it...Ford Bacon and Davis brought in IBM to do aptitude testing on anyone 
who asked...There as a new emphasis on training and skills...Alva Lee was the 
Commissioner at this time...ineffectual.. The Mt Isa project revolutionised freight 
working – dieselisation.  The emphasis was on freight.  They were never used on the 
suburban lines – they had steam until 1972.” (Respondent, 1001: 28 September, 
2009) 
“New opportunities and especially minerals emerged.  The Cowboys came in.  
It was like a gold rush.  People went into totally different areas of economic activity.  
It was frantic activity.  The more it happened the more likely it was that Queensland 
would have to embrace the southern states where the money was.  Industry started 
to interact more dynamically across all sectors of the economy.”  (Respondent, 1033, 
8 October, 2009). 
“In the 1960s the coal industry was important.  Then in ‘66 to ‘67 Utah 
became important in Queensland and you had the first heavy haul, the first purpose 
built railway at Gladstone in the 1970s.” (Respondent 1002, 7 Oct 2009) 
 
The initial railway infrastructure development that was enabled by mining had 
a ‘plantation effect’ more broadly on the Qld economy.  The role of Sir Leo Hielscher 
and a small team of bureaucrats around him in successfully harnessing the capital 
from the mining boom and using it to drive Qld economic development was 
emphasised by all respondents.  For example, 
Railways were seen as a core part of the economic development of the state.” 
(Respondent 1009; 2 October, 2009).  
   “Sir Leo is a personal friend. I started to go fishing with him 42 years ago.  
1976 was our first fishing trip.  He has made a major contribution to Queensland.  He 
is a Queensland patriot – he puts 3 teaspoons of sugar in every cup of tea to help 
Queensland industry.  He is a gentle giant.  A good judge of character.  He had 
worked his way up.  He was not Catholic.  He is very personable.  He was very 
influential with the Premier.  He controlled the budget and never let Joh Bjelke-
Petersen know what was going on.  Joh was not interested in detail.   He ran 
Treasury with an iron fist.  He got the money, made sure it was spent with tight 
control.  Made sure the public servants didn’t set up silos through the role of the 
Coordinator General which was established in the 1950s.  Joh was Liberal [sic, 
National].  Goss was Labor.  The perfect Sir Humphrey without Humphrey’s empire 
building... 
Economic development brought money into Qld.  It was a ‘plantation’ effect.  
The mining companies made money and Sir Leo charged royalties to make sure Qld 
got a share of the profits.  Sir Leo put it to economic development projects.  There 
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were big employment spillover effects. For example, Brisbane suburban 
electrification in the 1980s.  Jim Goldston was the Commissioner (July 1976 – 
December 1982) but Mendozsa (January 1983 – January 1986)  was the father of 
electrification.  The method and approach were selected by Ford Bacon and Davis.  
The project was financed by one billion dollars out of the levies on coal.  Sir Leo did 
it.  Everything was upgraded, everything was new, new buildings  -  revolution in 
attitudes.  They couldn’t believe it.” (Respondent, 1001: 28 September, 2009) 
 “In Qld we had key capable people in the right agencies (Premiers’ and 
Treasury). In NSW there have been too many changes.  When a Minister or a CEO 
changes it takes a year for the agency to settle down”.  (Respondent, 1013, 8 
October, 2009). 
“Sir Leo was brilliant.  He underpinned the Queensland economy, he ran 
surpluses and he was able to keep the economic rationalist outs.”  (Respondent 
1002, 7 Oct 2009) 
“Queensland has a lot to be thankful for to Leo.  Leo has been a committed 
lifelong bureaucrat.  Early in his career he rose to be under secretary.  He had huge 
influence.  He attracted large amounts of revenue from the resources sector. He is 
as tough as God Almighty.  Nobody failed to respect him. Queensland succeeded 
basically due to Leo's skills.   Leo is clever at manipulating people... Sir Leo had a 
pivotal role in generating income out of the mines. He spent it well.  He helped 
Brisbane get the infrastructure it needed it and enabled Brisbane to perform better.”  
(Respondent, 1033, 8 October, 2009). 
The central role played by key decision makers in the bureaucracy was 
enabled by several factors among them: a level of stability in the positions of key 
bureaucrats and an ability to place the right skills at the right time in organisations; 
the stability in key ministerial portfolios especially Premiers, Transport and Treasury; 
the time made available for discussion between ministers and bureaucrats; and an 
evidence based approach to decision making which was accepted at the political 
level.  The last point, the evidence based approach to decision making can be 
identified in relation to the railways since the first piece of legislation in the 1860s.  
Many respondents commented on these points. For example, 
 “On the operations side you would join as a station junior and work your way 
up.  You were moved around, like the military.  You knew the network and you knew 
how to get things fixed. They had stability.  They had a minimum number of ministers 
and Commissioners.  There was continuity. Qld generated cash.  They were able to 
reinvest it.  It allowed economies within a vertically integrated railway...Every time 
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they shopped around and identified best practice.”  (Respondent 1009; 2 October, 
2009).  
“In Qld, they kept the politicians away from the detail – the nitty gritty of the 
day to day. The Coordinator General was a very important role in Qld.  The focus 
was on how can we develop this state?  How can we catch up with the economic 
strength of NSW and Victoria?  They had a narrow set of goals.  There was unifocus 
not multi focus.” (Respondent 1009; 2 October, 2009).  
“...A lot of political stability gave the senior public servants confidence. They 
understood what the government wanted and they were able to talk turkey to the 
minister.  It was a partnership in an administrative sense. There was also a process 
whereby people were identified for future promotion.”  (Respondent, 1013, 8 
October, 2009). 
 “Basic to my story is that all this good story did not just happen.  People 
made it happen.  People working entrepreneurially, thinking and working outside the 
square, throwing away the ‘precedent’ book, bending the rules a little, being 
innovative, bravely blazing new trails, creating new opportunities and thus, 
maximising the benefits that flow from them.  I guess simply put, people who were 
possessive of the outcome of their efforts; people who treated the whole exercise as 
though it were their individual own.  They made it happen.  They would glow with 
pride at their success and worry with personal hurt if they missed the mark….  It was 
these people thinking entrepreneurially, getting around the rules, bending them 
occasionally for the good of the cause, who were the imperative that brought 
Queensland from a moribund, bankrupt State in the mid 60s to the most robust 
cashed State in Australia today – one of the best performers in the world...”  
(Respondent 1003, Private Address for 10000 Friends of Greater Sydney 2009). 
The ability of the key bureaucrats to drive the changes needed to 
revolutionise the Qld economy was underpinned by a very strong desire on the part 
of many sections of the Qld populace to ‘cease being the laughing stock of Australia’ 
and the ‘butt of jokes’.  The equally strong sense of parochialism and regional 
difference created uniqueness about the Qld culture that all respondents argued was 
important in building a core of support for what were at times difficult reforms.  For 
example respondents comments below provide a window into these sentiments, 
“Qld was the laughing stock of Australia – backward, underdeveloped in every 
way.  It was an agricultural state run by cowboys up until Joh.  Brisbane was the 
financial centre but it had no banks.  They felt down trodden.  They had been 
laughed at for many years.  They felt resentful toward other states.  They worked 
hard to prove them wrong.  They had a vision of Qld as the leading state achieved 
through resource development and development of the people….   The stage was 
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set.  Joh Bjelke-Petersen (Premier from 1968 – 1987) wanted to put everything on a 
business footing and a development footing.  The state had to be developed at all 
costs.  The emphasis was on bringing in capital, encouraging development, taking 
money off the mining companies.   Money was no object.  They got money from all 
the projects – royalties from mining and freight and sugar and copper.  The image of 
Queensland was totally changed – from the laughing stock to respected player.”  
(Respondent, 1001: 28 September, 2009)  
“Qld is more parochial and a very proud state.  Qld wanted to be better than 
the southern states.”  (Respondent, 1013, 8 October, 2009). 
“There is a heavy sense of regionalism in Queensland.  It's an important point 
of difference between us and the other states...  Queensland focused its culture and 
collective activity on Queensland. It was a fierce Queensland focus and drive that 
developed Queensland for Queensland. Everyone pulls together everyone feels part 
of the state and local scene against everything from down south.”  (Respondent, 
1033, 8 October, 2009). 
On the economic side, we firstly had to cultivate a development culture.  
Several generations had lived and worked in conditions where frustrations, doing 
without, saving for the rainy day, not over-committing, careful, careful, were the 
essential of our very existence. The recognition that there may be a way out was the 
first step. Then we had (horror of horrors) to seek out and accept globalisation, and 
facilitate the investment of foreign capital, particularly into our mineral industries. 
Then one by one, create the opportunities and support the opportunities others 
created.  The Government’s role was to facilitate – not to fund or expose the 
taxpayer monies to great risk.  It had to be entrepreneurial in its thinking, and its 
actions, while at the same time securing as much benefit for Queensland as 
possible. The first project, if my recollection is correct, was the upgrade of the Mt Isa 
rail line.  We searched the world for the best practice private sector engineers to plan 
and complete the works and eventually contracted an American firm, Ford Bacon 
and Davis. We should look back occasionally but momentarily to appreciate that 
human management has brought us here and human mis-management could take 
us back to the desperate days as they were just 40 years ago.”  (Respondent 1003, 
Private Address for 10000 Friends of Greater Sydney 2009) 
Several respondents identified major institutional changes to work in the 
railway as being fundamental to the success of the broader change program.  These 
changes were based in the emergence of a competing technology (motorised road 
transport) and its impact on the scale of railway operations.  Reforms that originated 
elsewhere (most notably the Beeching Reforms from the UK) were implemented to 
improve the financial situation of the railway.  However, they usually occurred later 
than elsewhere due in part to the peculiarity of the gauge which reinforced a level of 
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isolation.   These changes also involved changes to the involvement of unions.  For 
example, 
“At this time there was also work on destroying the power of the unions...It 
was subtle...1955 – 1970s...The unions had a stranglehold on the workshops.  They 
brought in political spies and stooges to break the power of the union... (at this point 
the respondent would not speak he insisted that he could only write it down but 
would not say the words.  He wrote in capitals CATHOLIC CHURCH.  He said he, “... 
thought it was Opus Dei.”) 
It was the McCarthy era – under every bed...There was a belief that unions 
were fostering communism in their ranks...Work was done to undermine them so that 
the threat was eliminated...The most significant effort was at Ipswich...The focus was 
on eliminating communist involvement in the workshops...The Australian Railways 
Union and the TWU [Transport Workers’ Union] were very big.  The TWU had 
representatives in the Federal Parliament. You could not get a job unless you were 
Catholic in the 1950s and 1960s...This died out in the 1970s.  .”  (Respondent, 1001: 
28 September, 2009) 
“There were big strikes in the mid-1920s.  In the 1930s the unions got control 
of QR. The unions have always had a very significant influence. The power of 
George St  was very significant.  North Queensland has always been more radical - 
the ARU from time to time has been very important. Joh Bjelke Petersen set out to 
smash the ETU.... 
 “In the 1980s Don Lane [Minister for Transport] significantly changed work 
practices, reduced guards on trains, changed staffing on stations and there was a 
major rationalisation of the workforce.  In the mid-1980s there were 30,000 staff 
today there are 12,000. Previously QR made everything today everything is made 
outside by contract. The Beeching reforms had a big impact here. It was a high level 
of competition with roads.  Gordon Chalk had shares in trucking and in bus 
companies that operated in and out of the Gold Coast.  This was a time when the 
railways were ripped up and the Branch lines were closed” (Respondent 1010, 8 
October, 2009) 
“The union person [was] more important than the pay person… In the 1970s 
there was a strike every five minutes. During the Joh Bjelke-Petersen years the 
unions focused personally on him the premier it was a very disruptive time there was 
a stronghold by the unions because of the political issues.” (Respondent 1015, 6 
October 2009) 
The critical role of the availability of finance was emphasised by respondents 
in relation to the role of the mining boom in providing capital for development 
(discussed above) or in relation to the need to develop innovate methods to 
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overcome institutional barriers.  For example one respondent described a key 
moment in Loan Council funding, 
“On the funding for the upgrade, we firstly tried to do it (within the square) with 
a special Australian Loan Council borrowing allocation.  This was rejected.  We then 
approached the World Bank as a mendicant.   Well, not really as a mendicant – we 
had a very good business case that concluded that we could return the loan and 
interest within 10 years.... Our application apparently skated through and was about 
to be approved when the Bank phoned Canberra to ask the question, why one of 
Australia’s provinces with a project like this couldn’t be funded domestically. 
Canberra, it appeared, was appropriately embarrassed and we had the funds from 
Loan Council within weeks and, of course, repaid within 10 years. ” (Respondent 
1003, Private Address for 10000 Friends of Greater Sydney 2009). 
Through all this redevelopment the administrative structure of the organisation 
stayed largely the same.  This stability in administration, both in the bureaucracy and 
in the government, is a defining hallmark of Qld that was identified by all respondents 
as critical to Qld being able to reinterpret ideas and apply them in a way that was 
seen to be beneficial to the State’s interests.  The final feature of Qld that was 
identified by all was the role of the narrow gauge in creating an ‘island’ where it was 
harder for outsiders to penetrate and which assisted in providing the time for more 
adaptive change facilitating the ‘best deal’ for the local in the face of global forces. 
Queensland it was suggested was further advantaged by the relative size of 
Brisbane City Council.  Many respondents pointed to the significant size and political 
power of Brisbane City Council as enabling a singular approach and a single critical 
negotiating point for key decisions, relating to the development and management of 
the city.  For example, 
“Brisbane is the largest council in Australia...responsibilities have included 
water, power and transport.” (Respondent, 1053, 7 December, 2009). 
“BCC is large!  In planning terms it often did more than the State.”  
(Respondent, 1055, 7 December, 2009). 
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”Winston Churchill had commented at the time that ‘the Lord Mayor of 
Brisbane was the most powerful person in the world’.” (Respondent, 1013, 8 
October, 2009). 
“Brisbane can plan better because it's one administration.  Its structure is 
homogeneous within itself.  There isn't duplication. It’s big enough so that it can 
employ enough good people. It’s got scale. Brisbane has a deliberate process and 
clear decision-making processes that have been streamlined overtime.” 
(Respondent, 1033, 8 October, 2009). 
The excerpts from extensive interviews (sometimes up to 12 hours in length) 
above illustrate the key institutions involved from very personal perspectives during 
this formative period in Qld railway development.  These institutions were:  The State 
Cabinet – the importance of rail was such that critical decisions were beyond the 
preview of any one minister; the Transport Unions – indeed one could argue that it 
was the whole union movement (This has been extensively documented in several 
theses (see for example Cribb, 1972; Fleming, 1998; and Stevenson, 1988); the 
Catholic Church - particularly the role of the Catholic Social Studies Movement – ‘the 
movement’ - in breaking up the unions.  This has also been extensively documented 
in Stevenson (1988: 210 – 216) and coined the ‘railway family’ in Qld. Indeed, it can 
be argued that this ‘family’ was the dominant institution in this key period of Qld rail 
history, having its own norms and rules which governed the individual and collective 
action of its members. However, the resilience of this institution was to be challenged 
in the next key period in Qld rail, associated with corporatisation. 
 
5.5. Corporate QR – 1991 - 2000 
By the late 1980s there was significant impetus for rail reform.  The most 
pressing issues were: the increasing deficits of state rail authorities and the 
consequent need to reduce costs and increase revenues; increasing pressure from 
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industry for more efficient service provision; increasing modal competition; and 
increasing calls for increased contestability in state owned enterprises which 
culminated in the implementation of National Competition Policy in 1995 (Wills-
Johnson, 2007; Walker, 2006; Productivity Commission, 1999) as discussed in the 
previous chapter.   As on respondent noted, 
“In the very early 90s in relation to neoliberalism the situation of QR was that 
we were ripping the coal industry off. We were a monopoly with a schedule of rates. 
We had a large country freight network and there was a cross subsidy of $500-$600 
million a year. And competition was in the wind…” (Respondent 1021, 7 December 
2009). 
In 1992 the Economic Planning and Advisory Council estimated that returns 
on all public railways systems in Australia were a negative 11.5% (Baber, 1994: 573) 
(Table 5.5.1.), however Qld was the best performing state, both on account of the 
way in which freight charges from the mining industry bolstered its bottom line, but 
also, importantly, because it took action much earlier to improve the financial 
performance of the railway. In this important respect, Qld provides an example that 
differs from NSW and, indeed, the rest of Australia.  Perhaps this is in part because 
the Ministers would take time to talk with and listen to their senior bureaucrats.  This 
key difference from NSW was noted by many respondents for example, 
“… Here if you have vision they want to talk and listen… The Minister was 
very easy to talk with.  It was easy to access the Minister. The Minister wanted to 
talk, wanted to hear what you had in mind for the place….In Queensland if you have 
a plan for the future and you're able to convince the government they let you do it.  
It's much more stable here.  There is a respect for ability” (Respondent 1021, 7 
December 2009). 
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Table 5.5.1 Australian Rail Deficits by System 1982-83 to 1993-94 
 
Source: BTE, 1995: 11 
During this period there were a number of reviews of the industry by the 
Federal Government where the ideas that were eventually implemented in the late 
1990s were developed.  In 1991 the Industry Commission (Industry Commission, 
1991) recommended increased competition, and commercialisation including 
increased competitive outsourcing and tendering, increased flexibility in the 
management of  labour, and the separation of internal units to facilitate the operation 
of a funder / provider model where costs could be transparently managed.  These 
ideas were pushed further by National Competition Policy with the implementation of 
open access regimes for rail where the role of the infrastructure operator was 
separated out and multiple operators could access the network for fees.  In 1998 the 
Productivity Commission was asked to review the progress in rail reform.  The 
findings were that more could be achieved principally by: structural separation – into 
discrete businesses; horizontal separation – product separation and reduced cross 
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subsidy between freight and passengers; and vertical separation – above and below 
rail operations (Productivity Commission, 1999:92; Wills-Johnson, 2007: 1-3; Walker, 
2006; 5: Everett, 2006). 
These policy actions which were pursued by all Australian governments at all 
levels did involve significant moves to: increase competition (through increased 
contestability and market tendering); increase the involvement of the private sector 
(through privatisation and outsourcing); increase pressure for government owned 
enterprises to act as businesses; and reductions in the role of government in service 
provision to reduce direct expenditure outlays.  These policy stances are all 
consistent with the pursuit of a neo-liberal agenda.  However, the driver for the 
change was in general the growing financial difficulty which the state rail budgets 
were presenting for state and federal treasuries.  The neo liberal ideas which were 
almost uniformly adopted in Great Britain and Europe as well as Australasia (Wills-
Johnson, 2007:1) in the rail sector were just the latest wave in the series of waves 
that have swept through railways since their inception to deal with common problems 
of finance, borrowings, debt management, stakeholder management and supplier 
management.  What is interesting is that Qld was again different. 
Competitive reforms to rail began earlier in Qld then elsewhere in Australia.  
In the early 1980s in response to increasing deficits the government set targets for 
revenue and resources to achieve break even, non-performing assets were divested 
(these included non performing lines), profitable niche markets were exploited, and 
there was renewed focus on labour productivity.  At the same time common carrier 
obligations were all but abolished as was legislation that restricted the carriage of 
some goods to rail (Wills-Johnson, 2007:2).   
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However, despite significant staff reductions (from 26,000 in 1983 to 21,000 in 
1989) and a move to more commercial operation – ‘the business railway’ – the 
financial breakeven point was not achieved.  This contextualised the decision of the 
newly elected Labor government in 1989 (led by Premier Goss) to release a Green 
Paper on Corporatisation in 1990, which paved the policy landscape in favour of 
corporatisation.  Along with this went a major restructure away from the regional and 
engineering focus that had been in place since the 1880s to a more customer 
focused corporate structure (Qld Government, 1999: 3).  As Barber notes there was 
a significant turning point in rail policy in the early 1990s which forced the change in 
organisation and culture,  
“The political ideology of Queensland changed with the White Paper on 
Corporatisation which was released in March, 1992 together with the State Economic 
Development Policy which was released shortly afterwards. Previously, successive 
state governments had sought to balance the twin objectives of maintaining a 
competitive export coal industry and producing a return to the ultimate owners of the 
resource, the Queensland public, through QR coal rail freight charges. The Goss 
Government, faced with competitive world pressures in the coal industry, realised 
that the twin objectives had to cease and now the single objective is to enhance 
Central Queensland's coal export competitiveness with a Coal Rail Credit Scheme 
under which rail freight charges for export coal are based on an escalation formula in 
line With changes in the CPI. This change in political ideology translated into a 
change in organisation culture of QR from one of public benefactor to commercial 
corporatisation.” (Barber, 1994: 563). 
The first administrative reorganisation then was in December 1989.  There 
was an amalgamation of all transport functions in the public sector into one 
integrated and streamlined Transport Department.  It was a merger of the former 
Departments of Transport, Harbours and Marine, and Main Roads. Queensland Rail 
was included as part of the Department's structure until 30 June 1991 when it was 
restructured along commercial lines as a separate organisation under the Transport 
Infrastructure (Railways) Act, 1991.  
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The reorganised Transport Department was headed by a Director-General 
who was supported by four Executive Directors, the Commissioner for Railways, 
nine Divisional Directors and five Regional Directors. The responsibilities of these 
Executives included major policy issues, and the monitoring of programs. Divisional 
Directors were responsible for developing and implementing specific policies and 
programs (Queensland State Archives Agency ID385, Transport Department).  
The Transport Infrastructure (Railways) Act was the most significant 
legislative change to impact Qld railways since the changes in the 1930s.  This Act 
allowed Qld Railways to operate on a commercial basis as a State owned 
corporation. The new Act also established a Board of Directors to oversee the 
commercial direction of the Railway Department. The restructure of 1991 established 
four business groups: Passengers, Coal and Minerals, Freight and Workshops; and 
three support groups being: Corporate Services, Human Resources and Financial 
Services (Queensland State Archives Agency ID366, Railway Department).  This 
change was described by one of the respondents, 
“…With the change in government the environment was one of change. The 
government sacked all the Director-General's except me, the head of the Police, and 
Department of Transport. I had a view, I told the truth and my plans were 
accepted…. They (the other States) had treated us as the mendicant railway of the 
North, by the end of the 90s we led the nation.  We became a nationally focused 
organisation…. 
So I ran a major internal program in the 90s that was about progress through 
people. There were significant barriers between different levels, the power in the 
organisations down low but it was locked in time.   QR ran a major leadership 
program in the 90s and QUT helped out.  In July 1995 QR became a modern 
corporate entity.  The accounts went from cash to a modern business footing. 
…(Respondent 1021, 7 December 2009). 
In Qld then the neo liberal ideas played out in transport as they did in NSW 
with this new legislation.  However, in the case of the railway there was a very 
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significant difference.  A key bureaucrat, the new Chief of the Railways (Vince 
O’Rourke) influenced the Cabinet of the day to interpret the commercialisation and 
competitive neutrality reforms in such a way that the railway was “kept together” and 
the management of above and below the rail was not broken up as had been the 
case in almost all other instances where these reforms had played out around the 
globe. (Including NSW, as described in the previous chapter.) A critical meeting with 
the Qld Cabinet was described by several respondents in the same terms.  This 
discussion was described by one of the respondents, 
“Our belief was that QR was one QR and that we had the best narrow gauge 
railway in the world.  We did our homework.  We looked at the British rail experience.  
We saw what had happened in New South Wales and Victoria. We argued very 
strongly in 96 to 98 that the Queensland Railway should not be split up.  They had a 
commission of audit that said QR should be split up. They wanted above and below 
rail as well. They did the lobbying etc.  I argued that QR was like the US railways not 
like the British railways and that a vertically integrated railway here as in the US 
could be the best and most productive in the world. I played up the safety angle big 
time.  The Swedish and the UK with the first to implement these ideas. I pointed to 
the outcomes there to highlight issues.  
I argued that we could review the method of managing a fully integrated 
railway and give effect to competition.  I argued that Chinese walls between above 
and below rail groups could effectively deliver a competitive environment.  
Competition was just the first step towards privatisation sometime out in the future.  
Your sources are correct I did give an address to cabinet.  Only the coalition wanted 
to break up rail.   Beattie believed that QR was right.   At the time David Hill didn't 
know what to make of all this stuff he could not believe it. QR has been strong the 
story of QR is the story of Queensland” (Respondent 1021, 7 December 2009). 
 
All respondents were in agreement that “Vince saved QR and Qld from the 
worst impacts of neo liberalism” (as stated by one of the respondents).  The thread in 
all the reflections was that in Qld there was time to more fully consider the 
articulation and implementation of the reforms and to develop them in a manner that 
benefited Qld or at least damaged it least.  This time to consider was provided by the 
time given to new ideas, the time allowed for discussions between senior 
158 
 
bureaucrats and key ministers and the time provided by the narrow gauge which 
forced major adjustments on private sector participants who wanted to enter the Qld 
rail industry with the commencement of the open access regime.  As one respondent 
noted the narrow gauge may have slowed the implementation of neo liberal reforms 
providing time for a more consider policy response,  
“With the advent of competition policy the narrow gauge presented barrier to 
entry early up.  Maybe we did slow it down a bit because of this”... (Respondent 
1021, 7 December 2009). 
The 1990s in Qld saw a major overhaul of the focus, operation and 
infrastructure.  There were major investments in track, rolling stock and stations and 
complete review of the operation of the freight railway.  Most significantly the focus of 
the entire organisation was changed to one of business and the customer.  The aim 
was to establish a commercial railway and to support the continued economic and 
social development of the state.  This transformation is described below by one of 
the key players.   
“In the early 90s Goss went to Canberra and got rolled on the Grant’s 
commission issue.  We needed to find $100 million for investment. This is when we 
had to close down a third of the Branch lines.   Country Queensland knew it was a 
major government issue.  Goss made the announcement and the state went berserk, 
everyone worked for the railway. Within two weeks the government had to change 
the decision. Tom Burns had to go around Queensland and review the network. The 
community is very close to the railway up here.  They can't take the pain of the 
southern states.  In New South Wales the view is let's fight with them every day of 
the week.  I would be firm but fair.  I wanted to people to embrace the change. I saw 
that the union had a lousy job, they have lost 10,000 jobs in 10 years. I made the 
unions a partner. We were clear we were not going to do that they were doing in the 
southern states. Yes, we will do it but in a caring and sensitive way, we had to 
deliver the change but in an innovative way that delivered growth for Queensland. 
We had a clear growth strategy. The CEO, the minister and the Board were a team.  
Neville Blunt ran a very solid board. New South Wales was self-destructive.  We had 
a vision for the passenger railway and a vision for the freight Railway. It involved 
restructuring, reorganisation new products, new development.  
We were very conscious of history, were very conscious of the environment, 
we wanted to take the good things from the past with us. We established the railway 
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museum in Ipswich, we reviewed and refurbished some of the workshops. David 
Hamel was visionary, a Rhodes Scholar, a courageous guy. We saw ourselves as 
part of the train industry. For example with the tilt train we sent people around the 
world and then I went and got the money. What will happen in the future?  
Queensland passenger rail will be hived off.  They will split QR, coal will be 
privatised, and general freight will be run with the CSO. The track is where the 
money is” (Respondent 1021, 7 December 2009). 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The same themes of change that were evident in NSW were important in Qld.  
However a comparison of the case studies shows that policy in both case studies 
changed as result of the emergence of ideas that capture advocacy within policy 
networks which are themselves part of the institutional structure.   The policy 
responses varied in New South Wales and Qld in relation to the implementation of 
the same idea due to the impact of locally embedded economic, social and cultural 
forces shaped by the prior economic histories and the respected geographies of 
jurisdictions.  Intergenerational learning described by North is a powerful force that 
can be observed to be operating within the cultural dynamic in both NSW and Qld.  
Strategies that were successful were copied and embellished by future generations 
of policy decision makers. 
In all cases a precondition for a change in policy was the emergence of a 
policy window created by a disruption in the prevailing stability caused by an event or 
crises that punctuated that equilibrium.   The ability to implement change was limited 
by the lock in effects of prior policy decisions.  So communities, cities and regions 
created or at least constrain their own futures by their past decisions and the 
associated created economic history. 
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In relation to the case study analysis five sets of ideas serve to exemplifying 
this finding.   First the idea that rail investment was essential to support the emerging 
industrial development in the mid 19th-century and that it led directly to social and 
economic prosperity of communities, towns, cities, regions and nations.  Second the 
notion that motorised transport would solve both the financial problem of the railways 
and the perceived need for seamless transportation.   This idea gained currency 
after the First World War.  Thirdly, the idea that took hold from the 1960s that 
freeway development was intricately and intimately associated with the development 
of successful global cities.   Fourth, the rail rationalisation ideas of the 1960s that 
were associated with Beeching and led directly to the commercialisation of railway 
investments and government railway organisations as well as the rationalisation of 
the associated railway assets.  And finally, the neo liberal ideas that took hold from 
the mid-1980s and drove massive restructuring and rationalisation in road and rail 
sectors in both the case study jurisdictions, however took root in starkly different 
ways between the two states.   
All of these ideas originated in powerful policy arenas and were transferred 
and transmitted through a range of networked policy communities that are 
themselves globally connected to educational, political, industrial, commercial and 
financial networks that are global.   What they had in common was that they all 
addressed a need or a gap that emerged in the institutional fabric and required some 
form of fix to enable the regime to continue to operate effectively.  In the case of rail 
transport infrastructure the fix had significant spatial implications. Rail lines spread 
out across regions connecting them to remote markets across the globe through 
aligned connectivity in port and shipping transport infrastructure.   
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At the local level agricultural and mining enterprises flourished as rail 
transport reduced transaction costs and shrank the distance between places by 
reducing the transit times.  Towns and cities grew up around railheads, fleet 
construction and maintenance depots, rail facilities and the location of aligned 
industries.   
In essence the ideas provided a correction within the prevailing institutional 
regime, extending its life and allowing it to continue to function.  In two instances, it 
could be argued that the sets of ideas themselves signalled the emergence of a new 
institutional regime.  These ideas were the railway ideas of the mid 1850’s that 
signalled the hegemonic phase of the industrial revolution and the motorised 
transports ideas of the early 20th century that signalled the emergence of the Fordist 
regime.  This is because the mode of transport itself was central to the success of 
the prevailing institutional regime.   The relative dominance of the transport modes 
were part of the economics of the regime and the ideas that took hold to support and 
reinforce it.  The transport mode itself unleashed forces which had spatial elements 
that were transformative for places and for place making.  This is because they were 
key mechanisms in the spatial fixes that were associated with the regime. 
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6. NSW Roads 
“Road transport is the dominant mode of transportation in Australia and 
around the world and it is a vital link that brings people and goods together.  In the 
last 40 years, there has been an enormous expansion in vehicle fleets around the 
world. Even with limited change in the distance travelled per vehicle, this translates 
to a corresponding huge growth in traffic levels...” (BITRE:  2012:1) 
“In Australia, as in other countries around the world, traffic growth has been a 
feature of the post World War Two experience. The automobile and commercial 
vehicles have multiplied, as living has increasingly been intertwined with mobility. 
And yet in spite of its obvious benefits, traffic growth presents one of the key 
challenges to those tasked with assuring the continued benefits of mobility. It is 
therefore important to understand the nature, causes and outlooks for traffic growth.” 
(BITRE:  2012:71) 
“Over the years, and particularly since the end of the Second World War, 
many Australian cities have gradually transformed from quite tightly knit layouts 
(typically well suited to passenger movement by mass transit systems), to more 
sprawling suburban (generally low-density) configurations. This transformation of 
urban form – as the major cities have tended to grow ever outwards, often leading to 
longer and longer average trip lengths – has been accompanied, and assisted, by 
considerable improvement and spread of road systems and an even faster 
expansion in car ownership. Another factor … is this rapid escalation of car use 
(especially in the post-war era), leading to the current dominance of private motor 
vehicle travel, in terms of aggregate km share, within the Australian urban transport 
sector.” (Cosgrove, 2011: 11) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The quotes above relate to the hegemonic period in road management which 
dates from the late 1930s and became entrenched after the Second World War.  
This chapter outlines the history of road agencies in NSW from first European 
settlement until 2000.   It highlights the role of the state road agency and argues that 
while it has undergone several branding changes it has essentially remained 
unchanged since the creation of the original Department of Main Roads in the 1930s.  
An understanding of the relationship between the road agency, local government 
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and the Department of Planning is critical to understanding how the road agency has 
come to dominate not just road construction and management but land use planning 
in Sydney and the other major urban areas across the State.   
The economic, social and political reach of any road agency is reinforced by a 
range of established formal and informal networks that are closely managed at all 
levels of geographic scale and result in significant advantages through the 
sophisticated management and application of knowledge.  In line with Ettlinger’s 
(2003) analysis these multiple networks of confer advantage and enable networks to 
influence economic practices.  The relational geometry is especially dense in the 
road regime’s institutional arrangements and the interconnections and interactions 
contributes significantly to the level of power embedded in the networks.  As one 
respondent noted, 
 “There has always been an interchange of ideas and knowledge between the 
road agencies.  Far more then in rail.  Commissioners of Road agencies met formally 
twice a year.  My first meeting was for 3 days.  It is enormously collegiate. We 
funded ARRB to provide technical development and AustRoads to promote 
interchange. We networked globally eg USA for traffic management technology and 
transport planning.  We became very good at managing knowledge.  The Australian 
highway organisation then transferred skills into Asia.  Rail always highly operational; 
Rail engineers always working through how we are going to operate things more 
efficiently......” (Respondent I013, 8 October, 2009).  
These networks have enabled the road policy arena to become incredibly 
strong, highly adaptive and resilient with embedded structures and processes for 
attaining knowledge that ensures its ability to remain relevant.  This arena which is 
supported by extensive connected networks operating at all scales from the 
neighbourhood to the global.  They are extensive in their coverage (health, 
education, military, commerce, banking, legal, global firms, universities, research 
organisations, unions, professional and industry associations).  This arena has 
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demonstrated the ability to extend its policy reach into a large number of adjacent 
and overlapping policy arenas (land use, urban form, and local, regional and national 
planning and economic development) largely through the effectiveness of the central 
state authority in structuring its power base.  Critical to this networked power 
structure is the relationship with local government which has grown up from the role 
of local government in relation to road ownership and shared management.  As one 
respondent noted,  
 “Local government (Councils) are an extension of the RTA.”  (I168, 4 
November, 2009)  
An institutionally based understanding of the operations of road agencies 
seems critical at this point in time, where, during the first few years of the 21st 
century, vehicle kilometres fell in Australia (Figure 6.1.1.).  The analysis of pre-2000 
institutional arrangements presented in this thesis provides a basis for 
comprehending how these new trends will affect policy contexts. Will this policy area 
be resilient enough to adapt so that it reinvents itself to align with the new demands 
for mobility in a way the railways failed to do from the 1920s onwards?    
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Figure 6.1.1 Australian Trends in Vehicle Kilometres Travelled
 
(Source: BITRE, 2012: 2)  
Perhaps the answer lies in this observation by, one respondent who described 
road authorities as fundamentally different from railways.  The respondent made the 
point that road authorities are  
“’below road thinkers’...that ‘...they provide a network for third parties to use..’  
and that “..they were never expected to cover costs” (Respondent 1009; 2 October , 
2009).    
Moreover, this respondent also made the point that, 
“Joe Public (everyone) uses roads.  Road quality is discussed by all.   
Politicians use roads, most never ride on trains and they are not aware of quality 
differences.” (Respondent 1009; 2 October, 2009). 
Hence, the social and political positioning of roads is quite different to that of 
railways.  It is not a separate, permanent way but intimately connected with how 
every person goes about their daily life; even if they do not own or ride in motorised 
transport they are road users.  This high level of connectivity both generates conflict 
and creates a basis for ongoing discourse which is never far from public attention.  
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This chapter will attempt to explain the size, power and significance of the road 
authority in NSW in relation to transport and landuse planning highlighting its 
significant impact on urban form. 
 
6.2. Early Road Building 1788 – 1924 
Prior to European settlement the Indigenous people used tracks53 some of 
which showed signs of some level of construction.  In the first years of European 
settlement the rivers were heavily used as transport routes but by the 1790s the two 
roads connecting Sydney with Parramatta and Windsor had become important54.  
Road construction was a major part of the influential agenda of Lachlan Macquarie 
(NSW Governor from 1809-22) and he oversaw significant road development55 
(making extensive use of private contractors as well as using convicts), which 
included the establishment of tolls on most roads, and the introduction of basic traffic 
management (for example registration of carts, restraints on the weight of vehicles 
and wheel widths and the ‘keep to the left rule’).   
By 1830, most land along the roads had been settled as roads formed the 
boundaries for land grants.  They also formed the boundaries for the Parishes when 
they were set down.  Roads initially connected settlements within the County of 
Cumberland and then moved out as settlement spread into the Picton and Goulburn 
Plains and then into the Illawarra.  Arrangements to finance roads were formalised in 
1832 with an Act that provided the ability to levy tolls generally on roads.  In 1833 an 
                                            
53 See McBryde, 1978 (cited by Kass, 2006). 
54 In 1805, a voluntary committee of officers and other notables was formed to collect contributions to keep 
the two main roads in repair (Kass, 2006:11). 
55 Macquarie developed Windsor Road, Liverpool Road, and the road over the Blue Mountains. 
167 
 
Act was passed which separated main roads which were to be funded by a levy 
upon from the whole colony from local roads that were to be funded by local 
inhabitants. 
In 1837 responsibility for road construction was moved from the Surveyor-
General’s Department to the Royal Engineers.  From the 1830s and into the 1850s 
roads pushed south (to Goulburn and Wollongong), west over the Blue Mountains (to 
Bathurst and beyond) and north (to the Hunter and beyond)56.  In 1840 the colonial 
government sort to pass responsibility for roads to local land owners with the Parish 
Roads Trust Act.  This Act established road trusts to maintain roads, to levy a rate on 
local land owners, and to raise tolls.  This has been seen as the first attempt at local 
government in NSW.  The Act was flawed however and little used.  From the late 
1840s special Acts setting up individual road trusts or road trust areas were passed 
(for example for the Sydney Suburban Roads Act, the Cumberland Roads Act, and 
the Maitland Roads Trust).  The decay of the roads and the failure of the councils 
that were to manage them led to a Royal Commission into the administration of 
roads by the Surveyor- General in 1855.  In 1856 the responsibility for roads was 
transferred to the Public Works Department.  
The 1850s was also the commencement for railway building in NSW.  The 
enthusiasm for railways saw the already bad condition of roads worsen as the 
railway was seen as the answer for long distance travel.  From this very early time 
road and rail development exhibited a level of competition which was strongly related 
to the demand for funds but also to the various interest associated with the modes 
that had a stake in their development.  Hence, the new Commissioner for Railways 
                                            
56 For extensive detail refer to Department of Main Roads, 1976  
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(Martindale) who also had the lesser responsibility for main roads57 recommended a 
relatively cheap form of road construction.  The surveying and alignment of roads 
remained with the Surveyor-General (later the Department of Lands).   Martindale 
developed a district based organisation for road management.  No major changes 
were made until Bennett was appointed Commissioner and Engineer-In-Chief for 
Roads in 1862.   
Bennett set out a list of prioritised road works in 1865.  However, from the 
1860s into the early part of the next century the success of local members was 
heavily dependent on their ability to lobby for their electorate and gain railways, 
roads and bridges.  This power broking behaviour in relation to roads was no 
different to that which applied to railways in both NSW and Qld.  Communities 
formed coalitions to lobby for local infrastructure in an effort to develop their towns 
and regions.  The need to appease this local lobbying undercut the ability of the 
Public Works Department to provide a transport network based on an overall state 
plan.  In addition, in these ‘boom railway’ years, roads remained at the bottom of the 
transport hierarchy and were seen as feeders to river ports and railways.  Railways 
not roads were the drivers of settlement and the growth of towns.  Once towns were 
established and motorised transport was available, roads could expand the trade 
district of towns empowering their growth.  This was a period of rail hegemony and 
roads were not as important and were not seen to warrant investment.  The 
discourse was all about railways and how they would inevitably lead to prosperity for 
communities and regions.   The railway ‘idea’ was dominant. 
                                            
57 The Main Roads Management Act (21 Vic No 8) of June 1858, made Martindale responsible for the three 
main roads leading out of Sydney to the north, south and west. 
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In 1858 the Municipalities Act58 enabled the creation of local government 
authorities.  They would have the responsibilities for local roads in their areas.  
However, the Act was not well constructed and many local government areas were 
too small to raise sufficient revenue to support local roads; a problem that continues 
in NSW into the present day.   By 1865 there were 34 toll bars and 5 toll ferries and 
3,286 miles of minor roads had been transferred across to Public works in 1864.  
Large parts of this network were then transferred in road trusts59.  Major road works 
in the 1860s and 70s were in the north of the state around Armidale, Kempsey, 
Glenn Innes and Grafton.  The mineral development in the west of the state was 
dependent on a mix of river, road and rail transport.  The Barrier highway (to the 
mining town of Broken Hill) was not complete until well into the 1930s. 
In 1906 the Local Government Act devolved responsibility for roads to 
councils and all roads and bridges except those declared those declared as National 
Works were put under the control of Councils.  Public Works remained responsible 
for National Works and for road development in ‘closer settlement’ areas and some 
key urban redevelopments.   The closer settlement work increased after World War 1 
with the solider settler grants creating the need to enable access for the farmers to 
market.    
To provide funding about 150 roads were declared as Main Roads and 
received funding from 1913 onwards.  In 1924 the list of Main Roads was increased.  
Under this system of administration the roads still fell into disrepair because only a 
limited number of roads were declared under the legislation and could receive 
                                            
58 For detail on the history of local government in NSW see Larcombe, 1973 
59 South Head, Maitland, Penrith, Parramatta, Campbelltown, Liverpool, Windsor, Richmond, Narellan, 
Randwick-Coogee and Sydney (Kass, 2006: 20) 
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funding.  This led road users (who tended to be the well-off section of the 
community) to lobby for increased road funding through the automobile associations 
(first formed in 1903).  Indeed, when the National Roads and Motorist’s Association 
was formed in 1923 one of its main aims was the establishment of a Main Roads 
Board to maintain and construct roads and resume land for future roads. 
Much of the legislative tinkering with institutional arrangements for roads in 
the period prior to the 1920s was really concerned with funding.  It was not until the 
road lobby became organised and the road use by motorised vehicles reached a 
level that impacted political power in the early 1920s (refer to Figure 6.2.1) that the 
roads policy arena was catapulted into a new policy window which would lead to its 
hegemonic position for nearly a century. 
Figure 6.2.1 Mode Share of Urban Passenger Task 1900 - 2010
 
(Source:  Cosgrove, 2011: 12) 
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Returning soldiers from the First World War and the need to accommodate 
them both in employment and residence created an interruption allowing a policy 
window for increased road funding through Federal road grants.  The federal 
government first commenced funding for roads in 1923 under the Main Road 
Development Act.  Grant money could be used for three categories of roads60 and 
the funds were allocated through the Department of Local Government and later the 
Main Roads Board.  In 1924 a Bill to establish a Main Roads Board was presented to 
the NSW Parliament.  The new legislation represented a radical departure from 
previous transport legislation in that it signalled the acceptance of the ‘age of the 
motor vehicle’.  As Kass notes, 
“The intention of the Main Roads Act was to create an authority, which would 
provide a road system suitable for the motor age, a radical departure philosophically 
from previous transport works. The Act signalled the acceptance of the motor age in 
NSW” (Kass, 2006: 28). 
This was not the first Main Roads Board in Australia; the Victorian Country 
Roads Board was established earlier.  Again like the early rail institutional 
arrangements, these were not isolated but rather they can only be understood as 
artefacts of the regime.  They were similar everywhere and it was part of the 
articulation of the policy virus associated with the rise of motorised transport. 
 
6.3. The Main Roads Board 1925 – 1932 
The Main Roads Act61, came into force on the 1 January 1925 and provided a 
Main Roads Board62, consisting of three members - a President who was the 
                                            
60 The three categories were:  Main Roads (opened up new land for primary industry); trunk roads (that 
connected settlements with no railway); and arterial roads (where there was insufficient local finance). 
61 Act No.24, 1924 
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permanent head of the agency; and two members. Two of the members were 
required to be engineers with special knowledge of road construction.   The function 
of the Board was the management, maintenance and development of Main Roads.  
(More specific details are provided in Appendix G.) Initially the Board had difficulty 
attracting staff, with both Local Government and Public Works lobbying to reduce its 
role.  The government clarified its role in 1927 (see Figure 6.3.1 below) and the 
Board was able to proceed with its mandate.    
                                                                                                                                       
62 “The Main Roads Board was a body corporate, that is, it had perpetual succession, a common seal, the right 
to sue or be sued in its corporate name and to purchase, own and dispose of property.  The decision of the 
majority of the members was a decision of the Board. Two members of the Board formed a quorum. If only 
two members were present at a given meeting, any matter on which they disagreed was to be deferred until a 
meeting at which all three members were present when the matter was discussed again and a vote taken.  The 
Board was required to record and retain the minutes of its meetings, and both an annual report and statement 
of accounts were to be presented to Parliament via the responsible Minister. The Board could appoint staff to 
assist with the performance of its role (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
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Figure 6.3.1 Structure of the Main Roads Board – 1927
 
(Source:  Kass, 2006:  29) 
The Board undertook its work in a professional and systematic fashion having 
inherited a somewhat ‘patchwork’ collection of main roads that had previously been 
managed by a range of councils and local road trusts.  For example, to inform road 
design and construction, the Board undertook a traffic survey of the weight and 
characteristics of vehicles using minor roads.  It also established standards for 
kerbing and guttering, road drainage, road surfaces, road width, side streets, and 
signposting.  The Board also experimented with concrete roads and pipes.   The 
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quote below from State Archives explains the main road system that the Main Roads 
Board inherited, 
“Before the Main Roads Board was formed, portions of several main roads 
had been reconstructed either by Local Councils financed by Loan Funds or the 
Public Works Department using money provided by the Treasury through the Local 
Government Department. The Main Roads Board therefore inherited a discontiguous 
road network. Not only had the roads been constructed by various authorities but 
they were composed of different materials including experimental surfaces. Sections 
of roads that passed through more than one municipal authority were of various 
ages, compositions and states of repair causing hazards and inconvenience to 
traffic. Early policies of the Board therefore concerned filling in 'missing links' (poorer 
sections of roads) and 'missing ends' or incomplete extremities of major roads 
radiating from the City of Sydney” (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
 
The main road system was reclassified in 1928 with Country Main Roads 
divided into the three "classes”: State Highways; Trunk Roads; and Main Roads. 
Metropolitan roads were either State Highways or Main Roads63.  Co-ordination of 
road construction and tramway development was defined in 1930 by the Transport 
Act 1930 which detailed the arrangements and responsibilities of the various 
agencies.  This classification framework and the network of relationships with local 
government and other transport agencies created a base for a powerful network with 
a reach from neighbourhoods and local communities (through councils) to global 
industries through the industry supply chain and professional associations 
(particularly the engineers).  It was reinforced by the connected and well organised 
motoring associations which from very early days had global linkages. 
The Main Roads Board was abolished and its powers were transferred to the 
State Transport Commissioners by the Ministry of Transport Act, Act No. 3, 1932.  
                                            
63 These new classifications were given statutory force in the Main Roads (Amendment) Act, 1929. The Act also 
enabled the Main Roads Board to assist the Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (defined for these 
purposes as a shire council) in the construction of main roads in the Central Division of the State; and extended 
the Board’s jurisdiction to the Western Division of the State (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
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This administrative arrangement was changed by the Transport (Division of 
Functions) Act in November 1932 which established the Department of Main Roads. 
 
6.4. The Department of Main Roads 1932 – 1956 
In 1932 the Transport Act established a Ministry of Transport64 responsible to 
the Minister.  The various transport agencies were grouped together into three 
Departments each under a Commissioner (Railways, Road Transport and 
Tramways, and Main Roads).  Under the Commissioner for Main Roads the 
geographic organisation of the agency was unchanged.  The Metropolitan Highway 
Division65 and the six country highways divisions remained.  In the late 1930s the 
number of registered motor vehicles expanded rapidly (refer to Table 6.4.1 below) as 
did the size and responsibility of the DMR66.  Additional administrative Divisions were 
created in the city (Outer Metropolitan 1 and 2 at Petersham and Chatswood) and 
the country (centred on Bega, Grafton and Broken Hill).  Legislation added 
responsibilities relating to the Western Division, roadsides and guttering and the 
ability to charge councils for work. 
The traditional and enduring structure of the Department was noted by one of 
the respondents, 
“The DMR had a simple corporate structure.  There was a Commissioner and 
Deputy Commissioner.  The state was divided into regions called Divisions the 
Divisional Engineers had full authority within the region reporting to the 
Commissioner.  In the early years there was seen to be a need for a professional 
structure.  There was a Chief Engineer who progressively developed Functional 
                                            
64 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 3819 for detail. 
65 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 4022 for detail. 
66 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 2 for detail. 
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Heads to look at specific aspects, for example bridges, urban roads and rural roads. 
It was a traditional structure.  There were about five Divisional Engineers prewar.  
They expanded into 11 or 12 in the mid 70s.”  (Respondent 0086, 30 September, 
2009).   
 
Table 6.4.1 Motor Vehicles Registered (Exclusive of Motor Cycles) per 
1000 of Population 1921 – 1939 
 
(Source:  Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1940: 134) 
At about the same time as the DMR was being established in NSW planners 
in the Unites States of America were responding to the challenge of accommodating 
the increasing number67 of motorised vehicles on the road system.  As Brown et.al. 
(2009) note, 
“Adapting the form of recreational parkways, forward-thinking transportation 
planners like Lloyd Aldrich, Harland Bartholomew, Miller McClintock, and Robert 
Whitten began to devise plans for a new type of facility that they argued could cope 
with the increasing number of autos travelling at higher and higher speeds…The 
freeway borrowed two important design characteristics from earlier rural and 
suburban parkways: limited access and grade separation…The urban freeway was 
widely perceived at the time as an idea whose time had come. The issue was not 
whether they should be built, but how…Lewis Mumford saw limited access highways 
as suitable for connecting Garden Cities, provided that they were carefully 
coordinated with land use and urban design in order to minimize the auto’s potential 
negative effects…Planners…naturally tended to emphasize the concerns of their 
clients. They proposed facilities designed to serve urban trips made by urban 
                                            
67 Between 1925 and 1929 the number of registered vehicles in the USA increased from 20.1 million to 26.7 
million – a 30% increase (Brown, et.al. 2009: 166). 
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residents; the facilitation of intercity through traffic was a secondary concern.” 
(Brown, et.al. 2009: 166  167) 
 
The ideas of these early freeway planners are still to be found in the ideas 
being proposed today for road development projects for example, multi modal 
components integrated into freeways, surrounding landuse being woven into the 
plans, generating urban renewal with area redevelopment projects being part of 
freeway plans, and advance reservations of land to protect the right of way for the 
future freeway (Brown et.al., 2009: 168-69).  By the end of the 1930s freeway 
designs had been completed for most major American cities.   The delivery did not 
meet the plans in most cases due to financial constraints and by the mid-1950s 
control over city transport plans had moved from the cities to the State legislatures 
as the power followed the funding mechanisms.  This result was the transfer of 
power from the cities and their planners to the state based highway engineers who, 
“…dominated state departments of transportation espoused a narrower, more 
technical view of transportation planning. They aimed to maximize safe traffic flows 
and to minimize costs while adhering to uniform design standards. Shifting control 
over urban highways to the states imposed this perspective on metropolitan as well 
as rural freeways…won the debate over urban highway development thanks in part 
to well-intentioned Progressive Era values that favoured expertise and science in the 
management of urban affairs…engineers were more readily perceived as experts 
than were the planners. Engineers could produce hard numbers,… could deploy 
scientific mathematical and analytical techniques…widely viewed as impartial and 
above the corrupt political fray, though in truth their choice of questions and methods 
did reflect their own biases and preconceptions…this engineering vision of urban 
transportation planning had political backing….engineers exerted more influence 
than any other single group…Thus began a new and narrower urban transportation 
planning mission, focused on congestion relief, higher vehicle speeds, and funnelling 
traffic into and out of city centres as safely and efficiently as possible.” (Brown, et.al. 
2009:  170 – 171). 
 
 
These ideas were to find their way into road plans for Sydney after the 
Second World War. 
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During World War II the Department of Main Roads was heavily involved 
supporting the war effort68 and much of the usual work was postponed.  Some 
Divisions even closed for the duration of the War.  Towards the end of the War the 
Department was concerned with planning for post war reconstruction including:  
restoring roads and bridges to their pre-war condition; resuming the construction 
program that was delayed by the war; developing a new road program to link towns 
and districts that had been growing; and re-surfacing state highways.   Progress on 
these items which began in 1946 immediately after the War was hampered by 
shortages of materials. 
In the late 1930s the DMR undertook a major review of the classified road 
network based on a set of principles which have remained largely intact through to 
the present day69.  The Department used this review as a basis to begin to develop a 
plan for the future roads in the County of Cumberland.  In the mid-1940s the 
Department undertook surveys of landuse, traffic flows and population densities, 
applying town planning approaches to the construction of its 1945 “County of 
Cumberland Main Road Development Map’.    The plan included a large number of 
freeways which have now been built in Sydney primarily as PPP projects.  This plan 
                                            
68 This war work involved the following:  construction of strategic and tactical roads and of roads in connection 
with military establishments;  construction in conjunction with local government or roads to and within 
Commonwealth properties and of roads, paths and tarmacs of Royal Australian Air Force stations;  
strengthening bridges to carry military traffic and preparing works for demolition in the case of invasion;  
constructing concrete work for gun placements and making excavations for fuel depots; and building 
aerodromes, runways and dispersal areas throughout the State (State Archives, Investigator Agency 2). 
69 “...the DMR instituted a review of the Main Roads System in 1937-8, followed by an extension of the 
network. New State Highways, Trunk Roads and Main Roads reflecting the changing population distribution 
and traffic trends were proclaimed on the basis of the review. Hence, 1,359 roads were reclassified as State 
Highways. A total of 847 miles (1,363 km) were selected for proclamation as Trunk Roads and 910 miles 
(1,464.5 km) as Main Roads, although not all were proclaimed within the 1937-8 financial year. (Kass, 2006: 
39) 
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was used by the County of Cumberland70 (C of C) to produce its plan in 1946 
(released in 1948).  Indeed there is little difference between the two.  The DMR Plan 
outlined both Main Roads and Expressways.  The County’s Development Plan 
included sketched-in roads and expressways (140 kms) and it acquired the vacant 
land impacted by the proposed roads while the Department acquired developed 
land.   One respondent reflected on this work, 
“In the late 50’s the DMR appreciated that the focus was in the cities.  It 
developed the first city plan for New South Wales.  There was no department of 
planning.  The road plan would lead to the County of Cumberland Plan and then to 
the Sydney Region Outline Plan.  It established the first greenbelt For Sydney. From 
the late 50’s until the 80’s plans for Sydney and New South Wales were the output 
Of the Department of Planning.  However the dominant authority was the DMR.  The 
reason was financial.  The planning authority needed the DMR’s money to do the 
plans.”  (Respondent 0086, 30 September, 2009).   
The inter-departmental co-operation that emerged in this era was to morph 
into the State Planning Authority71.  Similar plans were developed for the Illawarra 
                                            
70 The C of C has been described as “A second and more radical innovation in metropolitan governance was 
the formation of the Cumberland County Council (CCC) as a tier of government intermediate between local 
and state governments, to oversee preparation and implementation of Sydney’s first statutory metropolitan 
plan. The Council was established under the provisions of the Local Government (Town and Country Planning) 
Amendment Act 1945, which enabled councils to prepare comprehensive local planning schemes for the first 
time. The process was overseen by a new Town Planning Branch in the Department of Local Government 
headed by Norman Weekes, with another new creation, the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee, 
overviewing and providing high level ministerial advice.  
Released in 1948 but not legally gazetted until 1951, the County of Cumberland Planning Scheme was once 
described as ‘the most definitive expression of a public policy on the form and content of an Australian 
metropolitan area ever attempted’.27 With some inspiration from the famous London plans by Patrick 
Abercrombie, the County Scheme introduced land use zoning, suburban employment zones, open space 
acquisitions, and the green belt to Sydney. The Main Roads Department supplied a ready-to-go expressway 
network. Yet, despite the best intentions, the CCC was an overall failure. It met strenuous opposition from 
property owners and by the mid-1950s had 22,000 claims against it for ‘injurious affectation’ arising from 
County zoning.28 It also faced hostility from more entrenched state government agencies such as the Sydney 
Water Board and the Department of Housing. The green belt to prevent sprawl was the most contentious 
element, and land releases incrementally whittled it away to accommodate unpredicted population increases 
from international migration and the ‘baby boom’. A breakthrough compromise was the securing of developer 
contributions to help fund infrastructure in new release areas.”(Ashton and Freestone, 2008: 16 – 17). 
71 The SPA has been described by Ashton and Freestone (2008: 17 - 18) “From 1964 until 1974, broad 
responsibility for planning matters in New South Wales passed to the State Planning Authority (SPA). Unlike 
the CCC, it had significant powers to acquire and develop land as well as the ability to specify corridors for 
development and ‘growth areas’. But it was also subject to direct ministerial control. In its 1968 Sydney Region 
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(Wollongong) and the Hunter (Newcastle) in 1952.  All future plans for Sydney 
including the current genre of Metropolitan Plans grew out of developments from 
these early plans.  A major innovation was the inclusion of all modes in the late 
1970s with the Sydney Area Transportation Study (1974) which included public 
transport on roads and railways as well as private vehicles on roads.  From this very 
early time the DMR established a strong voice and a significant level of influence 
over planning.  This was strengthened by the already strong relationship with local 
government who also had a significant stake in planning. 
The work of the Department changed radically after the war.  As one 
respondent reflected, 
“The DMR was very different pre-and post-World War II.  Before the war the 
task was very simple it was essentially keeping the motorists out of the mud and 
sealing the highway system in New South Wales. 
After World War II it was a change in the development of cities.  Cities 
became large population centres.  Cities became the centre of the economy as 
distinct from the country which was important pre-war.”  (Respondent 0086, 30 
September, 2009).   
This change is reflective of what was happening with urbanisation in response 
to changes in the broader economic structure and organisation of production which 
favoured urban growth.  The War unleashed innovation in vehicles, productive 
techniques and the drive to modernise after the War created punctuation in the 
                                                                                                                                       
Outline Plan (SROP), the SPA identified a variety of options for controlling growth. These included settling up 
to 60,000 people at Menai, 1.75 million people in growth corridors, and 500,000 people in the Gosford–Wyong 
area.34 Given miscalculations, especially in economic trends and transport, the SPA helped create as many 
problems as it solved. This was symbolised in troubled social experiments at places such as Green Valley and 
Mount Druitt. The SPA’s selection of places for growth also saw it ridiculed for providing land speculators with 
guides to getting rich quickly. Nevertheless, SROP set the basic blueprint for metropolitan corridor 
development in evidence today. Intervention in Mt Druitt town centre and the setting up of the Macarthur 
Development Corporation in 1974 signposted a more proactive implementation strategy by the state 
government. 
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policy equilibrium that required and enabled the change in road policy focus to shift 
to the urban area. 
 
6.5. The Department of Main Roads 1956 – 1989 
By 1956 the extent of the sealed main roads had increased significantly (refer 
to Figure 6.5.1) and from 15 March 1956 the Department ceased to form a part of 
the Department of Transport and became responsible to the Minister for Highways.  
All Sections of the Department72 expanded in the late 1950s in response to growing 
road use and the need to accommodate demand.  By 1959 the Investigations 
Sections which had been established to review road proposals was augmented by 
an Advanced Planning Section which was tasked to identify and prioritise future road 
needs.  By the early 1960s the urban issues were such that the Investigation 
Sections was divided into rural and urban specialities.  By 1969 the complexity of 
urban property purchases required the formation of a high-level Property Committee.    
Again the 1960s was a decade of administrative expansion for the DMR with new 
Divisions being created at Bourke, Port Macquarie and Lithgow. 
                                            
72 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 4023, 4025 for detail. 
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Figure 6.5.1 Extension of Road Surfaces from the 1930s
 
(Source: Department of Main Roads, 1976, 168) 
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By 1968 the Head Office of the Department of Main Roads was in the charge 
of the Engineer-in-Chief assisted by a Deputy and three assistant chief engineers. 
Reporting to them were 13 specialist engineers73.  The Head Office also included the 
Principal Land Surveyor and Property Officer; Secretarial, accountancy and legal 
specialists.   Strategic management and design occurred in Head Office and 
Divisions were operational units responsible for constructing and maintaining roads 
and bridges and maintaining services.    
In the 1960s, 70s and 80s the relationship between the two government 
agencies responsible for roads and planning which was formed after the war during 
the development of the County of Cumberland Plan was to become very important in 
the creating the shape of Sydney.   The early relationships were further cemented by 
the creation of powerful professional networks among senior officers.   The basis of 
the formation of these networks was an interest by the Commissioner for Main 
Roads in town planning.  As one respondent recalled, 
“He insisted that all the engineers completed a town planning course.  He was 
an engineer but very switched on to planning.  He may have studied in America.  
The ‘new deal’ under Roosevelt linked transport and land use.  The only course at 
the time was a post graduate course at Sydney University.  The Professor used 
group work in the course assignments; he chose the groups ensuring they were 
multidisciplinary.  It was the most amazing thing.  We got to appreciate each other’s 
roles.  The year I did Town Planning a lot were from DMR.  Some ended up as future 
Commissioners.  We formed strong connections.  We had good relationships.  The 
Town Planning course pulled us together.  We all worked together.  It filtered through 
to the wider work that was done in transport and planning with local government in 
NSW.  These groups formed the basis of professional networks that are still place.” 
(Respondent, 1079, 19 November 2009). 
                                            
73 These were the Bridge Engineer, Road Design Engineer, Urban Investigations Engineer, Rural Investigations 
Engineer, Highways Engineer, Field Inspecting Engineer, Mechanical Engineer, Advance Planning Engineer, 
Engineer for Country Council Works, Traffic Service Engineer, Executive Engineer, Engineer for Standard 
Specifications and Technical Instructions, Materials and Research Engineer (State Archives, Investigator Agency 
2). 
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A perspective on the State Planning Authority highlights how it created a 
powerful network of decisions makers among the key Departments Heads that 
enabled the important decisions to be made to support the growth of Sydney.   
“The State Planning Authority was made up of State Government 
Departments including, DMR, Housing, Department of Transport, Treasury etc.  It 
was a major step.  It got all the main players together.  All the Director Generals 
came together and made decisions.  It was a major period as it was realised that 
Sydney would grow dramatically.  There was both high immigration and a baby 
boom.  This population growth had not been taken into account in the County of 
Cumberland Plan.  The need for a new plan emerged and the Sydney Region 
Outline Plan of 1968 was completed.  Sydney today is exactly like that Plan.  
Looking back it is quite brilliant.  It was endorsed by the whole of government. There 
was general agreement on the direction for Sydney.  Roads were the big issue.   
Housing got federal funding and was a big player.  It was a huge program, they had 
to find land.  DG’s took it seriously.  They went to every meeting.  The Minister’s had 
a lot of confidence in the DGs.  It was not as political as things got later.” 
(Respondent, 1079, 19 November 2009). 
The 1968 Sydney Plan was remarkable because in an era when people were 
looking to the motorways of the USA and the tendency to build towns in relation to 
them the NSW government made a key decision that has been in place ever since 
and has been supported by successive governments.  That decision was the centres 
policy.   Centres were built in close proximity to major railways stations.  Each Centre 
had its main shopping centre, schools, hospitals, economic, social and cultural base 
all located near the major station.  Roads were seen as the connectors between the 
centres.  The railway was not the driver in this planning.  The railway itself (with the 
exception of the North Shore Line) was originally freight lines.  Suburbs grew up 
along them coincidentally.  It has been used as the major commuter public transport 
system mainly due to a drive to build patronage to improve cost recovery.   The 
centres policy was an early idea to provide accessibility at low cost and had the 
impact of reducing total mobility.  Interestingly, as in Qld when the idea dominant in 
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the discourse was adapted to suit the local conditions the outcome was generally 
more in tune with local needs. 
By 1972 the roads built to serve in all weathers had expanded considerably 
(refer to Figure 6.5.2 below).  The other significant change which had been coming 
through the 1960s was the change in the level of traffic (refer to Figure 6.5.3 below) 
which warranted more sophisticated approaches to management.   
 
Figure 6.5.2 Extension of Road Surfaces by 1972 
(Source:  Kass, 1976:  200) 
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Figure 6.5.3 Aggregate Traffic Levels in NSW 1965 - 2019 
(Source:  BITRE, 2012: 16) 
The decision making approach of the Department was explained by one 
respondent, who also noted that the structure remained remarkably stable, 
“It was a change in focus in planning the state with head office planning units 
having dominance over the regional structure.  In the 1950’s and 60’s the regions 
began the work and submitted proposals to Head Office.  Decisions were made on 
the basis of the funds available not on the basis of a broad plan.  In the 70’s and 80’s 
Head Office dominance continued.  Later the dominance of the regions was restored 
through regional managers.  Head Office then provided guidance not dominance.  
During the whole period the structure of the road authority changed very little.”    
(Respondent 0086, 30 September, 2009).   
In 1987, the New South Wales Government Directory described the main 
functions of the DMR:  
"The construction, maintenance and progressive improvement of main road 
system throughout NSW and the installation and maintenance of traffic control and 
traffic management devices for the commercial and social benefit of the community 
(NSW Govt Directory 1987 p. 311.)”  
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Its close relationship with the Planning Department74 remained intact as did its 
role in assisting with the planning of cities.  As one respondent noted, 
“On the 1988 Plan we worked closely with the Department of Transport.  The 
State Transports Study Group (staffed partly by seconded staff from the DMR) did 
the modelling using STATS.  I would come over with rough plans and they would run 
the models... The measure developed was accessibility.  The multi centred city gave 
the highest level of accessibility.  It endorsed the centres policy of the 1968 plan but 
expanded into more areas – MacArthur in the south, Bringelly and the North West 
sector...The spine remained the railways.” (Respondent, 1079, 19 November 2009). 
This network of relationship has been criticised by some because there is a 
view that it erodes the power of the planning agency.  This view is summarised by 
the influential Sydney-based urban planner John Mant, 
“In the State government the strength of the input organisations has left the 
centre with a relatively weak coordinating role.  There is an excessive reliance on 
interdepartmental committees and interventions on an adhoc basis.” (Mant, 1995: 
213). 
During the late 1960s and especially in the early 1970s the DMRs freeway 
building plans were interrupted by urban protests.  This movement was a worldwide 
phenomena that swept through the cities in countries that were delivering freeways.  
In almost all major American cities the protests slowed, altered or stopped the 
building of city freeways.  As Frackler (2009:2) notes, 
                                            
74 Ashton and Freestone (2008: 18 - 19) describe the activities of the State Planning Department in the 19802 
and 1990s.  “…the Department of Environment and Planning (established 1980) published a new regional plan 
entitled Sydney into its Third Century: Metropolitan Strategy for the Sydney Region.  
From the mid-1990s the state government increasingly directed the urban governance of Sydney. Another new 
metropolitan plan appeared in 1995, Cities for the 21st Century, stressing four major goals of equity, 
efficiency, environmental quality and liveability, as well as introducing the concept of a ‘Greater Metropolitan 
Region’ stretching from Newcastle to Wollongong. The plan was released alongside a new integrated transport 
strategy. Testimony to the dynamism of the era, another new plan followed just three years later, Shaping Our 
Cities (1998), along with a companion report, Shaping Western Sydney (1999). The 1998 metropolitan strategy 
was a generalised plea for a more compact metropolis with familiar themes of better integration of land use 
and transport and promotion of suburban activity centres, but with a more explicit concern with urban design 
at a regional scale.36 The 1990s was the decade in which intergenerational equity, resource conservation and 
sustainability emerged as major planning themes at all levels in the wake of the internationally influential 
Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future (1987).” 
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“Because state highway engineers were given considerable funding and 
authority by the federal government, they dominated city planning after 1956. As a 
result of this bureaucratic control, residents of American cities found that they were 
effectively excluded from the decision-making process. As freeway projects 
threatened to carve up San Francisco, Boston, New Orleans, and dozens of other 
cities, protesters fought to save their neighbourhoods and gain a measure of control 
over transportation and land use planning…Because road builders operated under 
pretensions of apolitical expertise, they were often blind to the social ramifications of 
their plans. This myopia would lead to frequent clashes between state highway 
departments and urban residents across the United States in the 1960s and1970s” 
(Frackler, 2009: 2- 12). 
These same tensions played out in most Australian cities at the same time.  
Urban protests linked to environmental, heritage, housing and amenity concerns 
impacted the delivery of almost all major freeway projects in the 1970s.  This was 
augmented by action on the part of the Federal Minister for Urban and Regional 
Development to limit funding for urban freeway projects.  Hence, while road projects 
moved forward in the decade of the 1970s the major urban road projects that had 
been planned in the late 1940s and 1950s would have to wait until the neo liberal 
agenda of the late 1980s and 1990s provided a policy window that enabled financing 
arrangements that supported these projects (refer to the discussion below in Chapter 
6.6). 
Despite this level of urban activism the growth of the road agency, its ability to 
spread it influence into planning, and the increase in the length and sophistication of 
the road network are simply to be understood in relation to the growth in the power of 
the industrial regime with which it was associated.  Nothing occurred in the policy 
arena to interrupt its positioning despite significant urban protest that did result in 
short term government action to stop specific projects.  All forces embedded by the 
initial innovation, including the very powerful networks, worked to continually 
reproduce and build every increasingly powerful communities supported by coalitions 
189 
 
in a broad range of fields.  This growth was further supported by the decline of the 
railway. 
 
6.6. The RTA 1989 – 2000 
On 16 January 1989, the Transport Administration Act (No. 109, 1988), 
abolished the Department of Main Roads and amalgamated it with the Department of 
Motor Transport75 and the Traffic Authority76 of New South Wales (which had 
responsibility for traffic safety and traffic management matters) to form the Roads 
and Traffic Authority77.  The Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (RTA) had a wide 
remit, with responsibilities for:   maintaining and improving the State’s road network; 
road safety;  traffic management;  maintaining vehicle safety standards;  licensing 
drivers, driving instructors and tow truck operators; and  registering motor vehicles. 
                                            
75 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 3 for detail. 
76 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 4 for detail. 
77 Refer to State Archives, Investigator Agency 7 for detail. 
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Figure 6.6.1 Evolution of the RTA
 
(Source:  Kass, 2006:  32) 
The neo-liberal changes that swept through rail in the 1990s also 
reverberated through road, but mainly in the sense of instigating pressures to 
reorganise and manage change within the context of a pre-existing, state-owned 
business model.  There was a push to move some elements of the operation to a 
quasi-commercial basis (for example the creation of ‘Consulting Services’ out of the 
main design Branches that continued to supply the Divisions with specialist 
engineering services) and the move away from day labour to the management of 
large outsourced contracts.  However, by and large, these initiatives had the primary 
effect of encouraging consideration of cost recovery principles within the core body 
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of the organisation’s work. In a reflection on his career in traffic Frank Hulscher 
noted, 
“A new administrative system was being instituted:  cost recovery.  It was a 
provocative concept, demanding considerable administrative resources to make it 
appear that various ‘business units’ were accountable.  Everybody was charging 
everybody else; and if a specific client could not be identified, it was simply charged 
to ‘overheads’.  We suddenly found ourselves part of the Consulting Services 
Bureau, headed by John McKerral.  The Consulting Services Bureau was one of 
those peripheral ‘business units’ which had gathered in old HO sections involved in 
planning and design of roads and bridges, including traffic matters.   We were 
required to have a business plan, brochures were printed to advertise the Bureau’s 
specialist services.  We were warned that we would have to compete with external 
organisations which could offer the same services.  Our priorities were changing:  
beyond mere survival, it now seemed to be more important to make a ‘profit’ than to 
provide services to the NSW taxpayer.”  (Hulscher, 1994: 141).   
It also managed a large scale change towards neo-liberal manageralism in 
the operation of its main partner in road administration (local government councils) 
with a major rewriting of the State Roads Act in the early 1990s and the commercial 
sale of key products to overseas markets (for example the traffic control system to 
Chinese cities).  In all this the RTA remained in control of its destiny.   One 
respondent observed, 
“Historically the RTA had its own sources of revenue – registration  and 
licensing, state fuel tax and state weight tax as well as Federal government 
grants...The view was, ‘That’s your funding.  We are not going to give you more and 
we won’t interfere with your business.’  The RTA was viewed as more efficient.  It 
expenses had not grown.  Expense growth was not out of control.  It was perceived 
as better managed.”  (Respondent, 1066, 20 November 2009).   
The RTA did not escape the staff reductions that had characterised the 
railways at this time.  When the RTA was formed staff numbers increased to over 
10,500 from below 8,000.  A series of systematic reviews were to reduce this figure 
over time.  As Hulscher reflected, 
“..further reviews were to take place...Ahead of us was a period of uncertainty 
and low morale, when reviews seemed roll past with disconcerting regularity, and 
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staff reductions exceeded 25% over the first three years of the life of the RTA.” 
(Hulscher, 1994: 155).   
The reorganisation of the road agency in NSW away from the direct 
management of construction delivery in the main using predominantly a day labour 
force into a manager of large construction projects using contracts was an important 
precursor that enabled the move to a new form of financing – tolls roads under a 
public-private partnership model (PPP).  These PPP projects were to become the 
most visible sign of neo liberalism on the Sydney landscape and are the key 
characteristic of the road infrastructure spatial fixity associated with the neo liberal 
agenda.   
The achievements of the RTA in this period illustrate the ability of the road 
agency noted by one of the Respondents, 
“The DMR had an ability to change with the development of NSW and to 
deliver.” (Respondent 0086, 30 September, 2009).   
While another Respondent commented on the “can do culture of the DMR” 
with “an ability to acquire the necessary skills, including public consultation” and “to 
retain technical expertise” which had been demonstrated over the decades in the 
delivery of road works in Sydney (Respondent, 1009: 2 October 2009).  The RTA in 
the 1990s used the neo liberal agenda to deliver the freeway style road projects that 
it had been planned since the late 1940s.  It is an outstanding example of a 
government agency using a policy agenda to achieve its planning goals.  The RTA 
was assisted by the change in government and the new Minister who was described 
as “..keen to perform with a better understanding of the integration of landuse and 
transport” (Respondent 0086, 30 September, 2009).  The change of Minister to Wal 
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Murray also worked in favour for the road building agenda with “..a move backwards 
to its traditional role of building roads” (Respondent 0086, 30 September, 2009).   
This form of financing where the private sector funds, constructs and operates 
the road has grown in appeal for capital intensive road projects with government 
funding shortages because it removes the expenditure from the government balance 
sheet, provides value for money with greater control on costs (Li and Hensher, 2010:  
541 – 542) and moves risk to the private sector (Chung, 2013: 33).  Australia now 
has the largest network of urban toll roads in the world (260.15 kms with an initial 
investment of $13.27 billion in 200878).  NSW has the largest share of PPP toll road 
projects 8 (refer to Figure 6.6.2 and Table 6.6.1 below) out of the total of 11 
Australian PPP toll roads: the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (SHT), the Eastern Distributor 
(ED), the Hills M2 Motorway (M2), the M4 Motorway (M4), the M5 South-West 
Motorway (M5), the Westlink M7 (M7), the Cross City Tunnel (CCT) and the Lane 
Cove Tunnel (LCT) (Chung, 2012: 34).    
                                            
78 (Source:  Li and Hensher, 2010: 542). 
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Figure 6.6.2 Sydney’s Toll Roads
 
(Source:  NRMA, 2013: 1) 
 As Li and Hensher note,  
“The capital cities of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane have embraced private 
sector participation as a way of fast tracking much needed road infrastructure that 
might reasonably not have been provided by public investment only.” (Lie and 
Hensher, 2010: 542). 
This view was also expressed by several respondents (Respondent 0086, 30 
September, 2009; Respondent, 1079, 19 November 2009; and Respondent 1099 
December, 2009 and 2013).   
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Table 6.6.1 Summary of Sydney’s Toll Roads 
(Source: Li and Hensher, 2010: 544) 
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The radial nature of the toll roads is reflective of the orbital links in the 
Brisbane Plans of the mid 1960’s that were inspired by Wilbur Smith and Associates 
and also reflect the radial freeway options in the Sydney Area Transportation Study 
(1974) which all included a dense network of urban freeways with radial orbitals.  
Ring roads became popular after they were adopted by American transport planners 
to deliver the Interstate Highway system in the early 1960s.  They have appear in 
cities all over the world from London to Beijing.  The Sydney toll roads had their 
genesis in the first post war plan developed by the Department of Main Roads in 
1944 and it the idea has been developed and further embellished in all subsequent 
plans.  All respondents familiar with roads discussed versions of the inner, middle 
and outer Sydney orbitals.  Essentially, the neo liberal agenda in NSW enabled the 
RTA (DMR) to deliver its planned Sydney orbital freeway network (or at least the 
important parts of it).  As with the development of railways the development of the 
toll roads in Sydney coincided with an availability of private capital in the markets 
looking for secure investments. 
The first PPP in Sydney was the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (SHT).  The SHT 
was designed in 1987, construction commenced in 1988 and it was opened in 1992 
(Neilson, 1991: 211).  There had been four previous suggested harbour crossings 
(refer to Figure 6.6.3 below) but all involved significant costs, large harbour crossing 
and or unacceptable levels of urban disruption.  The SHT gained government 
approval because it was environmentally acceptable, funded off the government 
balance sheet, economically feasible, purported to have transferred risk to the 
private sector and its construction involved minimal inconvenience to the community 
(Neilson, 1991: 213).  However, as Chung (2012: 54) notes the project was rates as 
197 
 
‘unusually attractive’ and the Audit Office of NSW found that the financing package 
had been constructed to avoid the global limits of borrowing set by the NSW Loan 
Council, 
“The arrangements were consistent with intentions to avoid Loan Council 
restrictions and they suggest the Authority did not wish these arrangements to be 
known to Members of Parliament and the public which ultimately bore the risks by 
the Authority” (NSW AGO, 1994,p. 293). (cited by Chung, 2012: 55) 
 
Figure 6.6.3 Proposed Alternate Harbour Crossings 
 
 (Source: Neilson: 1991: 212) 
The M4 was first conceived in the late 1940s as the Western Expressway and 
was included in the County of Cumberland Plan.  Corridors were identified (from 
Glebe to Lapstone) and resumed in the early 1950’s79.  Constructions began in the 
late 1960s and the first sections were opened to traffic in 1971 and later extensions 
(all from the western direction) in 1972 and 1974. The announced plans to construct 
                                            
79 Dates in this section are sourced from M4 Western Motorway – Construction Information Ozroads.com.au. 
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the eastern sections from Glebe met with heavy public opposition and were 
abandoned by the NSW government in 1977. The bulk of the public opposition 
occurred in 1974.  At this time the a meeting was arranged by the a member of  
North Sydney (Robyn Read) between the Transport Planner Chris Stapleton80 and 
Tom Uren the Federal Minister for Urban and Region Development.   In this meeting 
Chris provided the Minister with an alternative proposal to the M4 East.  (Chris had 
previously been involved in developing alternatives to extensive freeway 
developments in Edinburgh that would have swamped the city form.) It is not known 
if the Minister acted on this specific advice but other informants provided several 
examples of Tom Uren using Housing policy to influence urban form and protect 
urban environments from freeway development impacts81.  Currently, the M4 East 
remains on the planning board.  Additions to the M4 all west of Strathfield were 
opened in 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1992, and 1993. 
The next PPP was the M2 to the Hills District in Sydney’s North West.  This 
project too was the delivery of an earlier Freeway plan – the Castlereagh Freeway.  
The M2 is constructed in the reserve that was put aside after the concept was 
included in the 1968 Sydney Region Outline Plan82. The M2 contract was executed 
in 1994 and opened in 1997.  Reviews suggest that the road agency learnt from the 
SHT experience and the NSW Auditor General found that the M2 lease 
arrangements allowed the true costs of the project to be more accurately reflected 
then in earlier projects.  However the arrangements were still favourable to the 
private sector in terms of safety of the return for the level of risk, free use of the land, 
                                            
80 Personal Communication from Chris Stapleton December 2013.  
81  Ruming, James, Tice and Freestone (2009: 13) note that frustrating the planned roadway that would have 
demolished housing became an additional incentive for Uren for the Glebe Project. 
82 Refer to M2 Hills Motorway Ozroads.com.au 
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indemnity against future cost increases and an exemption from state land tax.  The 
major community benefit from the project was improved travel conditions (see 
Chung, 2012: 55 - 59).   
The M5 was the next project to be delivered using PPP financing.  It was first 
included in the County of Cumberland Plan in 195183 as the South Western Freeway 
to be the major radial route for the south western suburbs.  Early construction efforts 
meet with fierce opposition from environmental and resident groups and in the late 
1970s led to the Kyeemagh-Chullora Road Inquiry in 1979-80 (Kirby Inquiry).  Kirby 
recommended that the proposed route through Bardwell Park and the Wolli Valley be 
abandoned because it would cause environmental damage (SMH, 1986: 4).   
Despite this finding the DMR was undaunted and proceeded with bridge construction 
that was part of the freeway route (opened in 1985).  The PPP was put to tender in 
1989 and the first stage was opened in 1992. 
The last PPP to be built in the 1990s and the period covered by this thesis is 
the Eastern Distributor.  This concept is linked to the oldest freeway concept in 
Sydney – the Cahill Expressway (proposed as part of Bradfield’s plan for Sydney 
Electric Railways in 1913).  Later the County of Cumberland Plan included a corridor 
reservation for a freeway from the CBD to Old South Head road at Bondi Junction.  
The concepts morphed into the F7 which was to run from the southern end of the 
Harbour Bridge to Bondi Junction in three sections (Cahill Expressway, the Eastern 
Distributor and the Eastern Freeway).  The Sydney Area Transportation Study 
included the Eastern Distributor as a freeway in a trench.  The DMR began 
construction in 1976 but this was stopped due to public pressure and a decision by 
                                            
83 Dates sourced from M5 South Western Motorway History and Development - Ozroads.com.au. 
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the Urban Transport Advisory Committee.  The government abandoned the project 
in 1977 and houses were released from the road reserve. The project went through 
various phases from consultant’s reviews of options (1977–78) to the delivery of an 
underpass of William St in 1987 until the final delivery by a PPP with a 50 year 
concession in 1999.  The delivery of this project again demonstrates the DMR’s use 
of the PPP financing enabled by the neo liberal agenda to complete the road plans 
for Sydney that had been conceived primarily in the 1940s. 
The last three PPP road projects are outside the period covered by this thesis 
however both the LCT and the CCT need to be mention in relation to the level of the 
financial failure that resulted.   This has been outlined extensively by Chung (2012: 
62- 64).   
 This new form of financing brought additional players into close relationships 
with the road agencies; the banks and the large private construction companies. 
Initially at least, there was learning involved in these new relationships for the State.  
For example, a review of traffic estimates used in the PPP projects by Li and 
Hensher (2010) found that they were on average 45% above actuals.  In addition, 
the outcome of the Sydney toll road projects for the private sector and the 
community has been criticised84 by a number of players for being overly beneficial to 
the private sector.  For example, 
“Brown (2005) echoed the findings of Shaoul et al.(2006) and Debande 
(2002). She made it plain that early Australian private tollroads mispriced the level of 
risk that the private sector assumed. These early partnerships increased the cash 
flows available, and lowered the risk of returns, to private equity. Revenue share for 
governments was possible only when actual returns had been greater than some 
hurdle rates based on IRR to private investors. These hurdle IRRs, which were 
                                            
84 Chung (2012: 35 – 41) provides a detailed review of the literature. 
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determined based on inflated traffic estimates, were found to be unlikely to be 
realised in the early years of the concession period. Effectively, governments 
reduced the revenue risk for the private operator. In more recent developments, 
governments purchase a series of call options on the toll revenue with the price of 
the lease granted to the private sector over the land on which the toll road is 
constructed (Brown, 2005, p. 435).”  (Cited by Chung, 2012: 40). 
Others (notably Forward, 2006) have argued that the toll roads have brought forward 
a range of benefits for the community including reduced travel times and vehicle 
operating costs, improved road based public transport and improved public amenity.   
Perhaps more importantly the governance implications in terms of the impact 
of ‘deal making’, ‘model making’ and ‘space making’ have been analysed by Johns 
(2011) and her work illustrates the impact of global equity markets on the 
disempowering the interests of the residents of the cites and places in which the 
projects will be developed.  She argues that when urban infrastructure is financed in 
global equity markets it become installed in the ‘micro culture of a deal’ and this deal-
oriented configuration of work and decision-making neither entails seeing like a 
state, nor seeing like a city (Johns, 2011: 398).  Similarly, model making removes 
important consideration from the decision making around large projects for example 
Johns (2011) argues that, 
“The financial model also plays a key role in the commodification and 
fetishization of deal-structures: that is, the rendering of a deal as a single thing or 
parcel of things available for use or trade and the conferral upon a deal-structure of 
objective existence and value independent of the social relations underpinning or 
arising from it” (Johns, 2011: 406). 
Finally Johns finds that ‘space making’ underscores the power of the global 
over the local, 
“Decisions surrounding the financing of urban infrastructure in the global debt 
or equity markets often become caught up in, or made dependent upon, 
vocabularies and schemes of authority that operate, to a large extent, independently 
of the urban settings in which they are being invoked. For instance, vocabularies of 
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market practice and creditworthiness operative in the negotiation of urban 
infrastructure projects are shaped primarily by global forces and in global fields of 
expertise. The standing of a state or municipality in global financial markets will 
depend less on the material or practical outcomes for city-dwellers of that state or 
municipality financing its urban infrastructure privately, than on how those outcomes 
are perceived and reported by, among others, global rating agencies…” (Johns, 
2011: 411). 
The dominance of interests outside the city in terms of influence over large 
infrastructure projects due to the new financing methods has also been analysed by 
O’Neill (2010) who found that, 
 
“Infrastructure spending, then, becomes an autonomous external variable 
capable of generating major positive or negative economic effects according to its 
timing and level; and decisions about these are increasingly taken outside the realm 
of government, and often by admitting new players and organisations into the 
governance arrangements of a city. These include infrastructure construction and 
management firms, financial institutions and the new industry associations that 
provide private sector brokerage spaces for infrastructure ideas to be mobilised and 
formal access routes to governments so that infrastructure projects can be provided 
with necessary support and approvals.” (O’Neill, 2010: 10). 
 
Hence, while the RTA entered the twenty first century smaller in terms of staff 
numbers it is very difficult to argue that it was less powerful.  It budget was 
substantial and it had evolved with a large network of vertically and horizontally 
linked suppliers who formed global coalitions of power to advocate and lobby for the 
road system.  In addition the organisation cemented its close relationship with land 
development and urban and regional planning through a range of formal and 
informal networks with local government and the state planning apparatus that reach 
back into the genesis of both institutions.  The road industry is best conceived as a 
constellation of aligned and integrated institutions with powerful global coalitions that 
are reinforced by regulation and legislation and global industrial arrangements.  This 
alignment has been so expansive that it impacts most aspect of life through the 
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intimate connection with mobility and circulation and landuse.  A quote from Hansard 
illustrates that this is not lost on Macquarie Street. 
”The sad reality is that we do not have serious planning in our city. We are 
modelling our planning on Los Angeles and ignoring the existing rail system, which 
has had little improvement in 50 years, particularly in western Sydney. Governments 
have released chunks of land to developers, not along the railway line near 
Schofields where the market gardens were and where it should have been released, 
but in Castle Hill, where residents are dependent on vehicles as there is no rail 
transport. Deals have been made to build motorways, and probably clauses inserted 
in contracts to provide compensation if a railway is built. I would like to know whether 
the Parramatta to Chatswood railway link will mean that more money will have to be 
paid to the owners of the M2. 
 
The Roads and Traffic Authority [RTA] has acted as a law unto itself for long time. 
State Rail has behaved like a child playing trains on existing lines instead of planning 
rail transport for the future. The Government seems unable to think beyond busways, 
which suit the bus lines but do not solve the problems of western Sydney. It has 
allowed freeways - the Los Angelisation of Sydney - to be built. The RTA has a 
vision; it wants roads everywhere. No rail planning has occurred. Supermarkets and 
shopping complexes are built without any regard to rail, resulting in low-rise housing 
in Sydney, urban sprawl and traffic problems. The Government is doing very little to 
solve the problem - with the exception of the Parramatta to Chatswood rail link. 
 
If that is not enough, the contracts are secretive and the Government fights all the 
way to the High Court to stop taxpayers finding out where their money is going. 
When the contracts are finally revealed, they are revealed only to members of 
Parliament, and only if they sit in little rooms and do not take copies. If those 
members do not understand engineering they cannot evaluate the quality of the 
contracts.” (The Hon. Dr A. CHESTERFIELD-EVANS [4.32 p.m.], Hansard, 
Legislative Council, 14 October, 1999). 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
The level of spatial fixity associated with the growth of motorised transport is 
unmatched in its impact at every scale from the neighbourhood to the organisation of 
towns, cities and the flows between them.  The industry has been able to manipulate 
the institutional arrangements to skew transaction costs and in so doing cement it’s 
positioning.  The road agency in NSW is merely one example of a road agency that 
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has flourished in the last 100 years.  The trends that impacted it, the networks that 
supported it and the industrial regime of which it is an integral part are global.  The 
ideas, policy windows and key trends discussed above are not singular to NSW.  
They are part of and can only be understood in relation to global moves in thinking, 
innovation, finance and power.  The impact of these agencies endures and therefore 
their activities need to be closely examined and analysed.  As Brown notes,  
“When the First National “Conference on City Planning” took place in 
Washington, DC, 100 ago, the delegates failed to foresee the consequences of 
automobility and suburbanization,…those attending the 1909 conference would have 
understood the difficulties of accommodating widespread private vehicle travel in 
cities, and applauded planners’ efforts to link transportation to land use planning, 
manage congestion, and support non-automotive modes …But at whatever scale 
transportation is conducted, fiscal politics will shape planning outcomes as they have 
in the past. Overlooking this is dangerous, as we are destined to live with the 
consequences of transportation planning choices for a very long time.” (Brown, et. 
al., 2009: 161, 175) 
The major themes of change in road transport in New South Wales are 
directly related to the rise of motorised vehicle use.  As the use of cars increased so 
too did the demands on the road system.  When use reached critical levels important 
groups of stakeholders organised and acted as important advocacy coalitions 
directly impacting the allocation of resources to roads through the political process.  
The impact of motorised transport was such that it led to wholesale to changes in 
thinking by planners about how cities should be organised.  The impact on city and 
regional form and on the location decisions within cities and regions was arguably 
highly significant. 
Ideas about road construction and city planning that were developed in 
academic and policy networks in United States and Britain found their way into 
engineering and planning policy networks and policy communities in Sydney and 
then into the urban form of Sydney. 
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The road transport policy community and its connections are arguably the 
most powerful and strongest of any policy community.  They include important actors 
in academic, government, industrial, financial, educational, health and social 
networks.   This relational depth provides the road transport policy community with a 
level of resilience and adaptability which further reinforces it’s not  insignificant 
power-base.  This resilience and adaptability were demonstrated in relation to the 
implementation of neoliberal reform policies in the administration of roads in NSW in 
the 1990s.  Despite reductions in staff numbers the road authority in NSW in the 
1990s emerged from neoliberal implementation perhaps more powerful and better 
connected then when it entered that phase.   
The standing of the policy community is such that once a set of ideas 
becomes entrench within the networks they are maintained until the implementation 
is complete.  An example of this is the planning of the freeway system in Sydney 
which was complete by the mid-1950s but not delivered until the PPP toll roads of 
the 1990s were built.  Rival policy communities that organised public resistance to 
freeway projects were successful only in delaying projects and altering their routes.  
They were not powerful enough to achieve wholesale change in the policy of freeway 
development itself.  The analysis underscores the importance of road transport 
policy and the management of its impact on urban form and regional development. 
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7. Qld Roads 
 “The first 42 years of Queensland's existence was marked by a series of 
faltering steps towards the provision of a system of roads. The net result of these 
was a very inadequate network only trafficable in good weather and providing a 
considerable impediment to the economic development of the State. It was not until 
the Main Roads Board was established on 29 October 1920 that the Government 
took any really resolute steps towards an adequate road system” (Cameron, 1989: 
61) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
As was the case in NSW the hegemonic period in road management dates 
from the late 1930s and became entrenched after the Second World War.  This 
chapter outlines the history of road management in Qld highlighting the role of the 
state road agency and argues that while it has undergone several branding changes 
it has essentially remained unchanged since the creation of the original Department 
of Main Roads Department.  In broad terms, this is similar to the situation in NSW.  
In Qld, an understanding of the relationship with the Brisbane City Council (BCC) 
and the State road agency is fundamental to contextualising the development of 
Brisbane since the Second World War.  Unlike Sydney where multiple Councils 
complicate the relationship, the power of the BCC is significant, and rivals that of the 
State government in the city.   It could be argued that for the period from the mid 
1960s, BCC was often the senior partner.  An understanding of the relationship 
between the road agency and local government is critical to understanding how land 
use planning in Brisbane is managed in relation to road development.  This relational 
important is matched in the rural areas with rural councils.  This is reinforced by the 
reliance on state road funding of many rural councils in Qld for sources of local 
employment and demand.  These communities transitioned in dependence from the 
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railway to the road agency.  The instituted path dependency instilling in its wake a 
co-dependency that is unlikely to change.  
While the relational capital of the road agency is no less embedded, globally 
connected and hegemonic than in Sydney there are examples of the impact of local 
advocacy coalitions  in shaping the outcomes for the urban form in the face of strong 
opposition from the road agency and the State.  These are examined to illustrate the 
power of the local.  It is suggested that there are cultural differences between 
Sydney and Brisbane which explain in part this community based power.  The other 
significant difference between NSW and Qld is the timing of the large investments 
(especially in freeways and motorways).  These were in part impacted by decisions 
of the Federal government in the 1970s but too had for a time at least a moderating 
influence on the impact of the road agency on the urban form.  However, what is 
clear is that while this was a moderating influence and basically allowed a time lag 
prior to the inevitable investment it did not permanently block this trend which 
emanated from powerful forces embedded in broader economic forces.  
As in NSW the road networks have supported the development of a powerful, 
highly agile, hegemonic road policy arena with a reach from the local to the global 
that easily moulds its policies to accommodate trends.  Thus, it ensures its continued 
relevance.   
 
7.2. Early Road Building 
Like, NSW, prior to European settlement in 1824 the only land transport 
routes were the paths and tracks of the indigenous people.   In the early years of the 
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colony long distance transport was by water.  Indeed, in Queensland water transport 
played an important role for longer than in NSW.  The earliest formed road was that 
from the wharf (on the site of the present Queen’s wharf) the first public structure 
leading away from it up and down the river (Laurie, 1959:51).  The settlement was 
laid out in blocks with roads a chain wide85.   
The first free settlers arrived in the Darling Downs in the 1840s.  Their links 
were to the New England area and they exported their wool through Port Macquarie.  
Hence, their main road building focus was to construct a road to link them to the 
south.   When the convict settlement was moved to Brisbane in 1842 some roads 
were developed to link Brisbane to its hinterland.  Water transports still dominated as 
it was relatively easy to service and link the Qld coastal ports.  Even inland transport 
focused in the river system - for example the traffic between Ipswich and Brisbane 
used the river.  When Qld became a separate colony in 1859 few roads had been 
built86.  Local roads that existed had been built by private local effort with at times 
limited and patchy government support.  
“Where roads or railways did not precede settlement, the individual effort of 
the settler was needed to make a track to his holding,...In some cases the necessity 
was met by joining forces to open up a community road.  Efforts to obtain assistance 
from the government for major works were made through representatives in 
Parliament, by deputation, through the press, or by resolutions made at public 
meetings, but all these efforts were limited by the money available, and even if 
successful did not necessarily imply that the most deserving cases got the first 
attention.  Many instances of favoured treatment occurred.”  (Collinson, 1954: 930-
31). 
In 1862 the Works Department began to establish Districts for road and bridge 
construction.  The first Districts were established were Southern and Northern 
                                            
85 For a detailed discussion of the formation of the first Brisbane town plan see Cox, 1969. 
86 Mr P.D. Vigors had been appointed as a surveyor by the NSW Government in 1854 to survey a road from 
Brisbane to the Darling Downs.  However he resigned in 1856 due to the inability to complete his task with the 
resources provided. 
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(Rockhampton)87.  A third was then set up – West Moreton – to service the Darling 
Downs.  And after the opening of the Port of Bowen a fourth (Far Northern) was set 
up to build roads in and around Cooktown, Cairns and Port Douglas.  This 
administration developed and managed the first non-municipal roads after the 
Colony’s separation from NSW.  The government concentrated on bridge 
construction88 as this was seen as beyond the means of a local authority and at 
times responded to resident demands for improved road connections. 
After the start of railway construction in the 1860s roads were seen primarily 
as providing local access and as connectors to the railway or to ports.  For example 
Cameron (1989:58) observed, 
“...in the 19th century roads were used by pedestrians, equestrians, horse-
drawn drays, wagons and carriages, and bullock drays. With the vast distances to be 
covered in Queensland none of these provided a means of transport capable of 
serving the main trunk routes linking the colony's towns and ports, ... The road 
network certainly could not support the growth of intensive agriculture more than a 
few kilometres from a port. At least with the pastoral industry the product could be 
walked overland to the meatworks located at the main ports and so could expand 
inland ahead of the railways. From the 1880s onwards the railways started to provide 
a reliable long-distance means of transporting people and goods over much of 
Queensland. ... Road transport was therefore essential to provide transport to the 
railways stations, to serve areas not provided with railways and to provide 
connections between discontinuous rail systems.” 
 
The legislation passed in NSW in 1858 (The Municipal Institutions Act89) was 
found not to apply as well in the new colony of Qld.  It had been written to control 
urban, suburban and rural Districts from a municipal centre.   At separation only one 
                                            
87 In 1864 about 55,000 pound was spent on roads in the Southern District and 25,000 pound on roads in the 
Northern District (Cameron, 1989:59). 
88 For example bridges built during this period included The Victoria Bridge over the Brisbane River, The Fitzroy 
Bridge and The Alligator Creek Bridge at Rockhampton, The Lamington Bridge across the Mary River and 
bridges to support the gold rush around Cooktown (see Cameron, 1989: 58-70). 
89 Municipalities Act, 1858 (22 Vic., No.13). 
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Council had been proclaimed, Brisbane.  Ipswich, Rockhampton, Maryborough and 
Bowen followed.  This legislation was largely replaced by the Provincial Councils Act 
1864.  Its purpose was to provide for provincial council beyond the jurisdiction of a 
municipality.   In the 1860s the Minister used this legislation to call for Road Trusts 
with honorary members who together with the Engineers would identify the urgent 
needs of districts.  Approved work was funded by a government grant.   However, 
local favouritism was common, the Trusts fell into disrepute and increasing 
population meant that the government had to find a mechanism to make road users 
pay money towards the upkeep of the roads they used.  The Local Government Act 
1878 provided for municipal councils for cities, towns and boroughs.  The Divisional 
Boards Act 1879 dealt with all Districts not in municipalities and issues outside of 
towns.  It primary purpose was the creation and upkeep of roads and the 
preservation of water supplies.  The Divisional Board system was in place until 1900 
when the Act was amended and the Shire Council were created (Laurie, 1959: 56).   
Uniform traffic control began in Brisbane with the creation of the City and 
Suburban United Municipality in 1885.  In 1886 the Metropolitan Traffic Board came 
into operation.  Its functions were the regulation of traffic and the licensing, regulation 
of public vehicles and the expenditure of licence fees.  Difficulties in membership 
(there were seven members and turnover was a problem), reaching agreement and 
speed of decision making led to complaints and the state government assuming 
responsibility with  the Police Commissioner becoming responsible for administration 
(Cox, 1969:10 - 12). 
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The power of local authorities in relation to roads was further clarified in local 
government legislation in 1902 and 192390.  Despite all these legislative attempts to 
manage the road system the reality by 1920 was that the increasing number of road 
users was demanding a standard of roads that required a more sophisticated 
approach.  At the same time the adequacy of the concept of roads as connectors to 
railways was beginning to be challenged.   
 
7.3. The Main Roads Board 1920 – 1925 
Several factors influenced the increased government focus on roads in the 
1920s.  Among the most important were:  a large increase in car ownership91; 
technical improvements following World War I; men who had learned to drive in army 
services who were keen to continue; the demand for motorists who were becoming a 
significant lobby group92 for better roads; the technical93 and financial inability of 
local government authorities to provide roads; and the growing impact of cars on 
planning.  The War was an important impetus for road building in Qld as it was only 
after motorised transport was proven as a reliable method of transport during the war 
that it took off in popularity and the increase in the number of cars led to an increase 
in the demand for improved roads. 
                                            
90 The Local Authorities Act 1902 allowed councils to open a new road or to divert an existing road but the 
alignment was within the power of the minister.  The Local Authorities Act 1923 defined the powers of local 
authorities over roads and set down minimum standards for roads. (See Cox, 1969: ch1). 
91 Statistic became available with registration in 1921 when there were about 8000 cars and trucks in 
Queensland.  By June 1922 this had risen to 13,807 and by June 1923 it was 16,893 (Diamond, 199?: 16).  
92 The RACQ was formed in May 1905 by 18 foundations members who were made up of Doctors, Engineers, 
merchants and a coachbuilder (http://www.racq.com.au/about_us/racq/club_history). 
93 Motor vehicles added new demands to the road.  For example they travelled faster than existing vehicles 
needing better management of camber, required a smoother surface, had more impact and required 
presented more complex engineering problems. 
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The Main Roads Board was established in 192094.   It was modelled on the 
Country Roads Board of Victoria which was the first state-wide road authority in 
Australia having been established in 1913 (Krosch, 2009:7).   The Board was 
established as the state road authority responsible for developing a network of main 
roads95.  It was responsible for:  the classification of roads; construction and 
maintenance of state roads; conduct of surveys and investigations into the 
construction of roads for the purposes of facilitating land settlement and the like; 
establishment of standards relating to the design, quality and construction of roads; 
regulation of traffic on main roads; opening and closure of roads; collection of 
licensing and motor registration fees; and the acquisition of land for construction 
purposes.96 
In 1921 the Board completed a fact finding tour to identify the condition of the 
State’s roads.  In general, it found them to be in poor conditions and often 
unpassable.  Excerpts from Kemp’s report to Parliament are illustrative of the 
findings. 
“With the exception of one or two roads constructed some twenty years ago 
and roads constructed under Acts in the early sixties, very little attempt has been 
made to construct roads on a systematic plan . . .Local Authorities have, in many 
instances, completely neglected to maintain through roads, bridges have been 
allowed to tumble down and have not been replaced . . .No real attempt in the past 
has been made to locate roads on scientific principles . . .The fact that only a very 
                                            
94 "Main Roads Act 1920", effective 1 Jan 1920.  The Board was not constituted until October 1920 when the 
first Chairman was appointed.  Queensland State Archives Agency ID365, Main Roads Board. 
95  The Main Roads Act of 1920, allowed a road to be gazetted as a ‘Main Road’ under specific conditions. 
Roads within towns remained the responsibility of the council. Outside towns, three priorities were identified: 
to use trunk roads to join towns which were not connected by railway; to construct feeder roads linking 
farming areas to the railway; and developmental roads to open new areas of settlement (www.tmr.qld.au). 
96 The Board had three Commissioners, the first Chairman was Mr J.R. Kemp who was an engineer who had 
been in the position of Engineer to the Country Roads Board of Victoria (SMH, 28 September 1920: 9).  Mr J.A. 
Fraser (the then Deputy Chief Engineer of the Queensland Railways) and Mr S.A. Horsfall (then Shire Engineer, 
Corrumburra, Victoria) were appointed as the other two Commissioners (SMH, 1 January, 1921: 8).  Mr J.E. 
England (an accountant) was appointed as Secretary of the Board in 1923 and became the first Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles (Diamond, 199?: 14). Mr D.A Crawford later became a Commissioner. 
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small percentage of shires were able to furnish copies of specifications or drawings 
of standard road profiles, indicates that work is  generally carried out in a haphazard 
fashion and to no set plan . . .” (Kemp in Cameron, 1989: 118). 
 
The Board acquired the function of motor vehicle registration from the Police 
Traffic Department in December 1921 (Queensland State Archives Agency ID365, 
Main Roads Board).   This responsibility and the associated revenue steam 
(registration fees) was to give the Board a level of independence in determining its 
activities.  For example in 1922 almost half the funding was from registration fees 
and while this was to decline over time when federal grants became increasingly 
important, the principle of independence had been established.  As Golding notes,  
“This financial independence has been a long cherished facet of Main Roads 
operations, and although somewhat watered-down in current times, its spirit persists 
in the modern five-year Roads Implementation Program, of which the first two years 
are firm.  Current Main Roads programmed funding is still benchmarked by Treasury 
against trends in motor vehicle registration receipts” (Golding, 2000: 1). 
Kemp was to be very influential in road building and more generally in public 
administration.  This was due in part, at least, to his interest in and support of 
technical education for engineers. He was very active in the Professional Engineers 
of Queensland and the Institution of Engineers Australia.  He encouraged his staff to 
acquire technical qualifications and was heavily involved in developing the 
curriculum for the faculty of engineering at the University of Queensland.  He wrote 
and presented many papers and was the Australian delegate to the International 
Road Congress at The Hague.  He became a chief government advisor and went on 
to Chair a number of Commissions and bodies outside of roads.  He was the first 
Head of the State Road Authority to go on to hold the position of Queensland’s Co-
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ordinator General of works in 193997.   A position which has subsequently generally 
been filled by Roads Commissioners for more than half a century bestowing 
significant power on the state road authority. 
“These dual appointments placed the Main Roads Commission and its 
districts in a very prominent civil engineering role for the Government...The strong 
ties between service with Main Roads and the appointment as Co-ordinator General 
persisted until about 1990; another cause of on-going angst among other public 
service department heads who aspire to the senior position of Co-ordinator General” 
(Golding, 2000:4). 
In December 1921 the first roads were declared98 under the legislation as the 
first step in providing a connected road system for Qld.  However, Local Authorities 
did not co-operate with the new Board and little was spent on roads in the first year 
of the Board’s operation99.  In the second year of operation road standards were 
established and the board was gaining creditability.  In addition the first 
Commonwealth funds became available which meant that double the amount of the 
first year was spent on roads.  The Local Authorities became enthusiastic and were 
lobbying hard for funding.  The need to allocate priorities and to manage the 
shortage of road funds let to the development of principles and policies that could be 
used to make allocation decisions.  
The Board was established with the objective of managing roads that were 
beyond the boundaries of individual shires by providing financial assistance to local 
authorities in return for works that reflected state and local priorities (Golding: 2000: 
1).  The Main Roads Board initially adopted a policy of responding to urgent needs 
                                            
97 For more detail see http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/kemp-sir-john-robert-10717. 
98 The Tamborine Station — Tamborine Mountain Road, The Landsborough — Maleny Road, The Kingaroy — 
Bell Road, The Brisbane — Toowoomba Road in Sherwood and Tarampa Shires, The Warwick — Toowoomba 
Road in AUora Shire, The Clifton — Pittsworth Road, The Killarney — N.S.W. border road (Cameron, 1989: 117-
8). 
99 Only $218,376 was spent (Cameron, 1989:118). 
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(for example river crossings) especially on roads that served productive purposed or 
supported commercial centres that were not on a rail line and of linking roads to rail 
termini.  This policy is an early example of removing bottlenecks to the flow of 
commercial transport.  It was heavily supported by the rural car owning lobbyists of 
the day who linked poor roads to reduced income100.   
Other roads received attention because they supported other productive 
ventures.  For example the Main South Coast Road began to be gazetted in 1923 
because it supported tourism. Again, this policy was heavily supported by the car 
lobbyists who used their cars for touring.  The Road Commissioners had also been 
influenced by the American Highway Commissioners and adopted their slogan, ‘Sell 
our Scenery’ (Cushing, 2002: 46). These policies did two things:  developed roads 
that complemented railways rather than competing with them; and concentrated 
funding deliberately on a small number of roads provided a basis which would later 
open the Board to criticism.  A map showing the Gazette Main Road Network is 
below in Figure 7.3.1. 
  
                                            
100 For example the Annual Report of the Main Roads Board in 1923 gave examples of financial losses incurred 
by dairy farmers that resulted from inferior roads (Diamond, 199?:18). 
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Figure 7.3.1 Gazetted Roads Queensland 1923 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source:  A Krosch, Personal Communication, 24 November 2004) 
The Board also adopted a policy of building the length of roads over ‘gold 
plating’ the construction standards.  This was at the insistence of Kemp and is similar 
to the policy in relation to rail where the narrow gauge allowed more length of railway 
to built over higher engineering standards.  The financial limitations (small tax base 
due to a relatively small population) and the issues of the geography (size of the 
state, difficult terrain and climate) that existed for rail also impacted road 
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development.  These challenges meant that building a cohesive network of roads 
was well beyond the means of local authorities and perhaps explains why Qld 
established a state road authority before NSW.   Only centrally managed organised 
resources with the technical ability could deliver what the increasing community of 
road users was demanding. 
By the mid-1920s, the car lobby emerged as a significant political power 
which was reinforced by a growing membership and payment of taxes through car 
registration and fuel taxes.  In this environment the federal government decision in 
1922 to establish and fund a National Main Roads policy was to begin to consolidate 
the increasing importance of roads.  The first federal road policy was about the 
provision of construction funds to States to support the building of roads to open up 
and develop the country and provide employment for ex-servicemen101.  Money was 
allocated to the States on the basis of population and area with matching state 
grants comprising half a free grant and half based on the existing Main Roads Act 
(half from each of the State and local authorities).  Under the terms of the legislation 
three types of roads could be funded:  main roads opening up and developing new 
country; trunk roads between important towns; and connecting arterial roads. 
 
 
                                            
101 The plan was incorporated into the Main Roads Development Act of 1923. 
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7.4. The Main Roads Commission 1925 - 1951 
The Main Roads Board was replaced by the Main Roads Commission in 
1925102.  The Main Roads Commissioner was appointed and the powers previously 
vested in the Board were transferred to the Commissioner (Queensland State 
Archives Agency ID365, Main Roads Board). It took over the functions and 
responsibilities of the Main Roads Board which included road construction and 
maintenance and motor vehicle registration. In addition, it was responsible for the 
creation, maintenance and distribution of maps of existing roads and routes and 
advice on local government loan repayments for works on main roads.   The 
Commission was administered by a single Commissioner (unlike the Board that had 
had three Commissioners) who was supported by a Secretary, a Chief Engineer, and 
later the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Refer to Figure 7.4.1).  Interestingly, over its 
life span the Commission came under four different portfolios: Public Lands 1925 – 
29; Railways 1929 – 1932; Public Works 1932 – 1944; and Treasury 1944 – 1951.  
(Queensland State Archives Agency ID113, Main Roads Commission). 
The Commission cemented the position of Kemp as the dominant figure in the 
road authority arena.  His management style and the relatively small size of the 
Commission supported the development of a highly centralised organisation.   The 
District Engineers were the main operatives of the organisation and managed the 
gazetted road system, prioritised works and monitored delivery by local authorities.  
All consultation with local authorities however was managed by the Commissioner.  
This remained the case until after 1945 when the increasing size and complexity of 
                                            
102 The Board was dissolved under the "Main Roads Acts Amendment Act 1925”. 
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the road management task in Queensland led to the development of a more 
decentralised regional structure (Golding, 2000: 1). 
 
Figure 7.4.1 Main Roads Commission Organisation Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
 
The allocation of funds at this time was partially directed by the legislation 
which required that money by expended equally in the three Divisions of the state 
(these areas were broadly the Southern, Northern and Central Districts).   In 
Queensland, as Golding notes, 
“The concept of funding equity on a geographical basis is not a new 
phenomenon; it was once enshrined in law” (Golding, 2000: 4). 
The work of road building continued to grow both in popularity and in demand 
and in turn the length of the gazetted main road network also grew.  With 
Commissioner 
Chief Engineer Secretary 
District Engineers 
         6 - 11 
1930: 6 Districts 
4 – Brisbane Based 
1 – Rockhampton 
1 – Townsville 
 
1945: 11 Districts 
5 – Brisbane Based 
1 – Rockhampton 
1 – Barcaldine 
1 – Mackay 
1 – Townsville 
1 – Cloncurry 
1 - Cairns 
 
(Source: Golding: 2000:2) 
(Technical)     
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Commonwealth funding being cemented by the Federal Road Aids Act (1926), 
funding for roads was significantly augmented.  By 1928-29 the budget had grown to 
over $2 million, the main road network work was over 13,000 kms by 1930 and the 
Commission had become a significant employer (Cameron, 1989: 119).   
During the Depression the Main Road Commission played a very important 
role providing jobs for the unemployed (Diamond103, 199?:39-49).  The government 
saw roads as an opportunity to employ relatively unskilled labour and Kemp was 
made Chairman of an interdepartmental committee on unemployment within the 
Bureau of Industry. This made him what one writer called the ‘supremo public 
service mandarin’ in the State at that time (Golding, 2000:4).The unemployment 
relief effort required the initial policy of developing the arterial road system to be put 
on hold and the emphasis shifted to small projects that targeted unemployment in 
specific areas.  The Commission used the employment relief funding to deliver 
projects that otherwise would not have had a high priority.   
A key factor that impacted the development of roads in Qld during this time 
was the government policy towards the government-owned railways.  The 
government had invested heavily in rail and had incurred large debts (refer to 
Chapter 5).   Hence, there was a strong driver to protect rail traffic (both passenger 
and freight) and in so doing protect the income of the railway.  Indeed the Main 
Roads legislation contained a significant non-competition clause with rail provision 
where the Commissioner for Main Roads was required to consider whether the 
District through which proposed new roads would pass are already served by rail.   
Another legislative change which altered the reporting relationship of the 
                                            
103 This reference did not have a publication date.  The citation approach used National Library has been 
employed. 
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Commissioner was the formation of the State Transport Board in 1932 under the 
State Transport Co-ordination Act 1931 (see discussion in Section 5.3).  Now the 
Commissioner reported to the Minister through the Board which had two key entities, 
the Railways and the Main Roads Commission.  The Commissioner for Railways 
was senior to the Commissioner for Roads and railways were given strong 
preference by various Ministers.   
In the 1930s this preference for rail over road was illustrated in legislation by 
the levying of a Heavy Vehicle tax.  The tax was unpopular and lobbying led to 
various exemptions but it remained in place in various forms throughout this period 
(Cameron, 1989: 119-21).  When the Royal Commission on Transport reviewed the 
level of competition between road and rail transport in 1937 it found that of the 
12,351 miles that were gazetted as main roads only 1,750 miles could be actively 
competitive with railways (Cameron, 1989: 121).  The Commission recognised that 
competition between road and rail was an issue and other then recommending 
investigation of co-ordinated freight haulage did not make recommendations about 
roads. 
As the depression eased, the demand for cars increased104 again and 
lobbying by the motoring organisations again began to put pressure on governments.   
During the late 1930s the state highways took shape, were named as highways105 
and began linking towns and cities in a coherent fashion (refer to Figure 7.4.2).   
                                            
104 111,000 private vehicles were registered in 1937 making roads a priority for government 
http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/. 
105 For example the Pacific, Bruce, Condamine, Cook and Gillies Highways were all named. 
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Projects constructed during this period included the Hornibrook Highway, the William 
Jolly Bridge in Brisbane, the Indooroopily Bridge, and the Story Bridge106. 
 
Figure 7.4.2 Gazetted Roads Queensland 1941 
 
(Source:  A Krosch, Personal Communication, 24 November 2004) 
The Second World War had a major impact on the Main Roads Commission.  
It became heavily involved in the war effort and its focus was not limited to roads.  It 
                                            
106 For a detailed discussion see Cameron: 1989: 123-132. 
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was involved in a large program of defence works. Most of the work was under the 
direction of, the Allied Works Council. The Commissioner for Main Roads was the 
Deputy Director of this body in Qld. War-time projects included roads to defence 
facilities, fortifications, fuel storage tanks, firing ranges, parade grounds, docks, 
jetties and widespread work in airport construction.  A by-product of the War and the 
reduced availability of labour was the increased use of machinery and technology in 
road building.  While the Commission had used tractors and dozers in the 1930s 
they were expensive and when unemployment was high there was little incentive to 
use machinery.  In the War and Post War era of labour shortages however 
circumstance changed.  The increased use of machinery and technology generally 
was to be a feature of road building carried into the future (Golding, 2000: 5;  
Cameron, 1989: Chapter 6).   
Hence at the end of the War the Main Roads Commission had new skills, 
technology and focus and it also had greatly increased size and responsibilities.  The 
Commission had grown into a large government department with multiple 
responsibilities, a large day labour force, significant plant and technical expertise.  
This size and complexity was not well suited to the highly centralised structure that 
Kemp had created in the 1920s (Golding, 2000:5).  Other factors also caused 
difficulties. 
Between the end of the War and 1950 the Commission was impacted by staff 
shortages caused by the War and having to use relatively unskilled labour.  
Generally new migrants were employed who were more transient and saw work in 
road building as short term employment.  This labour situation further fuelled the 
move to increased use of machinery.  The government policy of preventing roads 
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from competing directly with rail remained firmly in place and this meant that any 
potential for significant growth in road development immediately post war was not 
realised (Cameron, 1989:226). The other major factor that impacted the Commission 
was the resignation of Kemp as Commissioner for Main Roads in 1949 to 
concentrate on the role of Co-ordinator General.  This created a significant vacuum 
in the organisation as the next two appointments (D.A. Crawford and A.R. Williams) 
were of staff who were close to retirement and both did not really provide the 
leadership that was required in a role that Kemp had built to become the most 
powerful in the Qld bureaucracy (Diamond, 199?:116).  Hence the Commission 
closed out the 1940s continuing the policy and direction that had been set by Kemp. 
 
7.5. The Department of Main Roads 1951 – 90 
In February 1951 the Commission for Main Roads ceased to be a 
Commission and was the staff were moved into the Public Service proper under  the 
"Public Service Acts Amendment Act 1950", creating the Main Roads Department.  
In the main the Commission’s responsibilities were transferred to The Main Roads 
Department.  It became responsible for the planning, surveying and constructing the: 
State highways; main roads (developmental, secondary connectors, mining access 
roads, farmers' and tourist roads); and bridges and related works. The Department 
also completed many construction projects at the request of other State and Federal 
agencies.   
The Main Roads Department continued to share responsibility with various 
local authorities, the Lands Department, and the Public Estate Improvement Branch.  
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The original structure of the Main Roads Department was little changed from that of 
the Commission and incorporated a number of branches from the Commission under 
the office of the Commissioner of Main Roads. There continued to be District offices 
throughout the State.  
The Department made a policy decision in the early 1950s not to declare any 
more roads until funds became available to cover their construction and 
maintenance.  The period until was initially one of stagnation in the State road 
network and the state road network at the start of the 1960s was the network that 
had been established by the end of the Second World War (Cameron, 1989:228).  
The Federally funded roads however, continued to develop with work on the route 
from Cloncurry to Mt Isa, the connections to the Territory via the North-Western and 
Barley Highways and the development of beef roads in the Gulf and the Channel 
Country.  During this period then growth was in the extremities of the network to 
support economic development and primarily funded by the federal government.  A 
consequence of the nature of this growth was an increase in District Offices remote 
from Brisbane and increasing decentralisation within Main Roads.   Increasingly 
Main Roads engineers would consult with engineers from the local authorities with 
the de facto effect of by-passing Brisbane-based centres of responsibility.  
Several factors worked to end the malaise within the state road system and 
build an impetus for increased road building activity within the state road network.  
First post war economic growth enabled rising car ownership with registrations 
increasing by 400% from mid the 1940s to the mid 1950s (Refer to Table 7.5.1).  
Second by the late 1950s there was significant pressure from local authorities with 
the Local Government Association resolving in 1957 that the Government needed to 
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review which Main Roads were gazetted. Third, also in 1957, a new (conservative) 
state government was elected in 39 of the previous 42 years, Queensland had been 
governed by the Labor Party.  And finally, a new Main Roads Commissioner, Charles 
Barton, with strong government support to drive change was appointed in 1960.  As 
one respondent observed these changes were very significant as roads became to 
be seen as a primary rather than a supporting mode of transport.  These shifts were 
reflected in heightened strategic importance of roads within whole-of-government 
systems of administration. From 1957 to 1991, the Commissioner and the 
Department reported to a wide range of Ministers responsible for portfolio areas 
including mining, public works, local government, police, housing and the Deputy 
Premier (Archives Agency ID192, Main Roads Department I).  These disparate 
reporting requirements at the portfolio level indicated the increasing importance of 
roads to government. As one respondent indicated, this was a change from the 
situation where: 
“Prior to the 50’s roads ran to the rail head” (Respondent 0077, December 
2009). 
Barton was a consulting engineer from Mackay who had been a junior Main 
Roads Engineer in the 1930s, served in the army in the war and had a good 
relationship with the minister of the day.  He was very much the ‘new broom’ and 
was characterised as a ‘strategic thinker and policy planner’.  He had strong 
ministerial support and drove a program of modernisation and devolved decision 
making to deliver increased responsiveness and efficiency107.    Kemp had 
centralised power in Brisbane but the larger network and increased responsibilities 
required more decentralised decision making.   
                                            
107 Barton and his period of administration is discussed at length in Cameron, 1989: ch16; Diamond, 198?: ch6; 
and (http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/barton-sir-charles-newton-12182).   
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“Main Roads was very centralised until the 1960s.  Then Barton reorganised 
and devolved power to the Districts” (Respondent 0077, December 2009). 
“Charlie Barton was significant influence and redesigned the districts. He put 
Assistant Commissioners in to run groups of Districts and he boosted the technical 
capability by adding a technical engineer to each division.  He also reinforced the 
relationship between local government and Main Roads” (Respondent 0087, 
December 2009). 
“Charlie Barton revolutionised Main Roads.  He threw out the old building and 
built the first new ultra modern government building at Spring Hill.  In its day it was 
ultra modern.  He reviewed all the staff and got rid of old wood.  He put them on the 
8th floor, gave them titles and put them, out to grange....The government sent 
Charlie over to the US...He brought it Wilbur Smith and Associates.  They did the 
same to the roads department that had been done by Ford, Bacon and Davis to the 
railways.  It cost a lot of money and the government paid for it” (Respondent, 1001: 
28 September, 2009). 
Barton decentralised decision making to District Officers108, required local 
consultations in decision making as well a driving a strong push to improve technical 
skill (in service training and encouragement of higher qualifications) and 
documentation of standards.  As Golding has noted, Barton’s, 
“...arrival at Main Roads heralded a revolution built around: A decentralised, 
line and staff organisation; Development of a strong core technical capability; 
Delegation and clarity of accountability; Strong training emphasis to develop 
capabilities and skill sets; [and] Enunciation of a clear mission, supported by 
principles of delegation, communication and trust. His mission statement for the 
department was simple and direct: ‘Adequate roads at minimum cost.’ ...He 
delegated widely to District engineers and set them up as the Main Roads’ authority 
in their areas” (Golding, 2000: 10). 
Barton restructured the department in a number of key ways.  First he created 
the position of Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer to reduce his operational 
load.  Second, District Engineers were allocated Deputies to strengthen their 
technical resources.  Third, District Engineers were sent to live in their Districts.  
Fourth new technical streams were created in the areas of construction and 
maintenance and research and planning. These reforms were based on the desire to 
                                            
108 Barton placed Assistant Commissioners and Divisional Engineers in Townsville, Rockhampton and Brisbane 
and a Divisional Engineer in Toowoomba. 
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create an ability to deliver the Road Plan of Qld, which came to fruition in 1963  
(Golding, 2000: 12).  It was the first comprehensive road plan for Qld.  A critical 
element of the Plan was a linked and simultaneous review of the classified road 
network which was based on the nature and direction of travel not the location of the 
road.  This review of the classified network meant that the Plan was a rationalisation 
and re-evaluation of the entire road network.  The Plan also restructured funding for 
roads making the Department responsible for funding all classified roads other than 
Collector, Local and Private Roads.  The ongoing review of the Plan was a key 
feature of the document so that it was dynamic and kept pace with changes in 
demand.  The flexibility in the classification system was underpinned by changes in 
legislation.  This system remained in place until 2001. 
Table 7.5.1 Car Registrations – Queensland 1935 – 2012 
  
(Source: www.tmr.qld.gov.au) 
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The Road Plan of Queensland also marked the end of competitive restrictions 
which favoured railways.  State Highways in poor condition connecting important 
centres that had railways could now be upgraded.  The period from 1960 – 1983 
when most of the important roads in the state (carrying the bulk of the traffic) were 
upgraded to bitumen or concrete was a critical achievement of the Department.  Part 
of this increase was achieved through Federal Funding for Beef Roads under the 
Beef Roads Scheme which was expanded in mid-1961.  In the decade of the 1960s 
over 1,000 km of Beef Roads were built in Qld under this scheme.  Figure 7.5.1 
below illustrates the increase in roads gazetted under the Main Roads Act and the 
increase in Total bitumen and concrete surface roads at this time.   
Figure 7.5.1 Road and Rail Activity Queensland – 1860 - 1990
 
(Source: Cameron, 1989: 233) 
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The Main Roads Department had focused on State Highways and major 
arterials.  Roads within Brisbane City had remained largely the province of Brisbane 
City Council.  As Krosch has observed, 
“The new government [in 1957] made a major push to improve Queensland's 
system of main roads connecting cities and towns. In October 1960, Charles Barton 
made a trip to the USA where he found that the state road authorities were getting 
involved in the road issues within cities. In 1956 a "milestone" transportation study 
had been carried out in Chicago. Prior to that time Main Roads had implicitly seen 
itself as a ‘rural roads authority’.   
When Charles Barton returned from his USA trip, he focused on what Main 
Roads needed to be doing with regard to the road system in Brisbane. The following 
year Mr Clem Jones became Lord Mayor of Brisbane. Mr Clem Jones also sought to 
initiate a traffic study for Brisbane.  Both men subsequently pooled their efforts and 
in 1964 an American consulting engineering firm, Wilbur Smith and Associates, was 
commissioned. Their brief was to undertake a transport planning study and 
recommend a "Road Plan for Brisbane".” (Krosch, 2009:7). 
 
The focus of Main Roads prior to 1963 on rural arterial roads meant that 
gazette roads were largely highways starting from the edges of suburban 
development.  Radial routes in cities and towns were the responsibility of local 
authorities.  Often this led to differing standards on links managed by different local 
authorities.  In Brisbane the result by the 1960s was a road system that was 
inadequate to cope with the demands of rising car ownership and usage (Cameron, 
1989:247). This led to the Brisbane Transportation Study of 1965.109  
The result of the cooperation between Brisbane City Council and the State 
Government was a road plan for Brisbane with recommendations covering 16 years 
to 1981.  The Plan included 155 km of urban freeways, 394 km of arterial and sub-
arterial roads and five new river crossings as well as upgrades to existing bridges.  In 
                                            
109 Transport studies were also undertaken in other urban areas of the State at this time and included the Gold 
Coast in 1962 and Townsville in 1966 (Daimond, 199?:  142). 
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1965 the cost was estimated to be $170 million (Cameron, 1989: 247).  The main 
recommendation was for a central ring freeway (see Figure 7.5.2). 
Figure 7.5.2 Ring Radial Freeway System for Brisbane (Wilbur Smith and 
Associates) 
 
 (Source: Krosch: 2009:7) 
 
The proposed freeway system had an inner ring (the Central Freeway) and 
five radial freeways (South-East Freeway, Eastern Freeway, Northern Freeway, 
North-West Freeway, and Western Freeway).  There were also a radial freeway 
(South-West Expressway) and a route around the eastern side of the city (North-
South Freeway).  This plan was heavily influenced by American approaches to 
transport planning and reflected a CBD-dominant view of the city.  A reflection on it 
by a senior Main Roads Engineer is instructive, 
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“Was it sensible to plan for only one ring - a central ring? Beijing has five great 
ring roads (and more to come). In London, they failed to implement a central loop 
that was planned over 40 years ago - but they did implement, much more recently, 
one great outer ring road called the M25.  An area of debate in urban transport 
planning in the USA during the early 70’s was whether the freeway system should be 
ring-radial or a rectangular grid. The resolution was that it didn’t much matter what 
idea you started out with as the limitations of topography and untouchable sites and 
so on would lead to a pattern of major roads that was much the same - providing an 
interconnected network covering the urbanised area” (Krosch, 2009: 8). 
 
Implementation of the Plan required a large amount of land acquisition 
(including resumption of houses) and a level of freeway design which was outside 
the experience of Main Roads and Brisbane City Council (Krosch, 2010:15).  To 
manage implementation the state government and the Council set up two 
committees to implement the Plan: a policy committee (comprised of the Minister for 
Main Roads, the Minister for Transport, the Lord Mayor and the Coordinator-
General); and a technical committee (comprised of senior officers from both 
organisations).    
At this time (1968) Charles Barton retired as Commission for Main Roads and 
became Co-ordinator General of Queensland just as Kemp had done before him.  
The organisation however, was not to change significantly until the early 1990s.  
Barton’s approach and plans brought on board a new style of engineer (the transport 
planners for example, Finger and Schubert) and a new style of operation that was to 
be largely unchanged until impacted by the neo liberalism of the 1990s. 
Significant funds to deliver the plan were provided by the federal government 
between 1969 and 1974 under legislative provision that allowed the funding of urban 
freeways.   The 1973 federal budget marked the end of this funding program and the 
federal funding reduction effectively ended the large scale delivery of motorways in 
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Brisbane until the recent era of building post 2000. With the funding cuts the plan 
was scaled down (see Figure 7.5.3) and the focus on construction was in the south 
east and the south west of the city.  Between 1970 and 1985 some of the projects 
were completed using federal, state and local government funding included:  the 
Story Bridge and Expressway; the Captain Cook Bridge, the Riverside Expressway 
and the South-East Freeway (Krosch, 2009: 14-16)110.   
Figure 7.5.3 Proposed Scaled Down Freeway System for Brisbane  
 
(Source: Krosch, 2009: 13) 
                                            
110 For a detailed discussion of construction achievement see Krosch, 2009. 
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Much of the Plan however, was not delivered111 due to the federal funding 
redirection in the early 1970s and the shape and nature of Brisbane as a city was 
permanently impacted.   Respondents described the process as follows: 
“modes other then roads were not pursued...  The then Treasurer (Sir Gordon 
Chalk) was most upset that there was no funding for public transport as an outcome 
of the plan.  I remember him saying, ‘I am not happy.  I don’t like it’.... [However]  The 
recommendations of the plan [which were ultimately accepted] were primarily roads 
oriented.  They included 96 miles of freeway and expressway and improved parking 
facilities. As a direct result of this plan the riverside expressway was constructed and 
the South East freeway was built. There were a number of road improvements in the 
plan that were undertaken by the Council.  The Gateway Bridge was in the study. 
The Gateway arterial was in the study. The plan shaped the development of the road 
network.” (Respondent, 10013, October 2009) 
However, the full extent of these roads and freeways-based ambitions did not 
come to pass because of conflicting transport ideologies with the Federal 
Government during the early 1970s, which controlled crucial purse-strings. The 
same respondent continues: 
“In the 1970s it all came to a grinding halt because Whitlam [Labor Party 
Australian Prime Minister] and Uren [Whitlam’s urban development minister] were 
determined not to inflict freeways on urban areas due to dislocation and social 
impact.  They withdrew funds to those facilities.  There was then a resurgence of 
traffic management and local road widening.  Had the full 96 miles of freeway been 
built it would be a profoundly different urban structure.” (Respondent, 10013, 
October 2009). 
 Another respondent described these processes in similar terms: 
 “In 1972, Whitlam was elected and one of the first things his govt 
did was stop funding for freeway construction, hence the network was 
never completed.” (Respondent, 10077, 2004) 
                                            
111 “The Wilbur Smith plan was essentially a ring radial system, supplemented with an eastern outer 
circumferential (the Gateway Motorway). The Central Freeway ring was never built. The only radial that was 
fully built was the South-East Freeway. The outer part of the Western Freeway was built, but not the inbound 
section from Toowong.  The Northern Freeway, North-West Freeway and Eastern Freeways were never built. 
In concept, the Clem Jones Tunnel is really the eastern half of the Central Freeway with a different topology. It 
starts and ends in the same locations as the Central Freeway eastern half. The ICB continues the Central 
Freeway around the northwest sector of the central city and the Hale Street Bridge continues it a little further. 
The Airport Link is fulfilling the same function as the Northern Freeway and the later (aborted) proposal for an 
Airport Motorway” (Krosch, 2010: 24). 
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This period of intense cooperation between Brisbane City Council and Main 
Roads during the 1960s and into the 1970s was significant because it marked a 
major shift in the relationship between local government and state government in 
relation to road management in Brisbane.   Brisbane City Council was very large and 
had always performed the role of road planner for Brisbane.  The State had focused 
on the rural roads.  After the Wilbur Smith Plan the state took on a much more active 
role for urban roads.   
“All public roads belong to the government unless the state decides to run 
them.   It's very similar in New South Wales and Victoria.  Unless they are declared 
state-controlled roads, the road belongs to local government.  Local government are 
road authorities in their own right.  There is a lot of wheeling and dealing about who 
owns what roads. This is due to the funding issues. Brisbane City Council is large.   
The Wilbur Smith plan introduced freeways and expressways into Brisbane City.  
Prior to this the state didn't plan much.  Brisbane City Council defined the plan” 
(Respondent 10087, December 2009).   
 “Main Roads was not big as far as Brisbane City Council was concerned.  
Brisbane City Council did its own thing.  There was not a lot of interaction With 
Brisbane City Council.  It was more interaction with other councils” (Respondent 
10097, December 2009). 
The first signs of the community taking an active opposition to urban 
motorways emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  As Mullins (1979) notes 
there were two clear periods in this early struggle, 
“The anti-freeway struggle erupted in the mid-1960s, with the commencement 
of the freeway programme, but action was constrained during these early years and 
it was not until the 1970s that overt and contestatory action was taken. Differences 
between these two periods were seen to result from structural differences located at 
both an urban and a societal level, with the 1960s being a period when the working-
class had, generally, been tightly contained. In contrast, the 1970s was an occasion 
when working-class action, at both an urban and a societal level, was widespread 
and it was this which brought the contestatory stance of the 1970s.” (Mullins, 
1979:ii). 
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In the late 1970s protesters tried to block the demolition of five houses 
required to build the Markwell St Bridge in Brisbane.  The Police were called and the 
protesters were moved away.  The bridge subsequently opened in 1978.  This 
resistance to freeways that emerged initially in the late 1960s in Brisbane has been 
documented extensively by Mullins (1979) who found that there was relatively low 
involvement by residents and that it was a struggle that was part of the broader 
struggle about urbanisation in Australia, 
“Brisbane's anti-freeway movement, then, existed as three struggles in one: 
there was economic action over the destruction of Windsor housing; ideological 
action over increased dangers of air and noise pollution and over the exploitation of 
the environment by the auto-oil rubber cartel; and political action over the 
inadequacy of public transportation. The effects of this 'three in one' struggle did not 
make an appearance as an urban social movement, but emerged as regulatory 
effects brought about following the indefinite postponement of announced freeways 
and of all future freeways. There was a reprieve to house destruction ('urban 
regulatory effect); a contribution to an increased emphasis on public transport 
('political regulatory effect'); and a contribution to the ongoing ideological attack on 
the exploitation of the environment ('ideological regulatory effect').” (Mullins, 1979: 
396). 
More successful examples of ‘people power’ however, were to follow in the 
1980s and 1990s, as will be discussed below.  
In the early 1980s Qld applied innovative financing (previously applied in the 
railways where freight arrangements with coal companies funded construction – see 
Chapter 5 above for detail) to road construction to overcome shortages of funds from 
traditional sources.   The Gateway Bridge and the Gateway Road System were built 
using a company nominally owned by  two public servants.112 The bridge and funds 
were raised with a government guarantee (Respondent 1003, Private Address for 
10000 Friends of Greater Sydney 2009).  This model was used again with the Logan 
                                            
112 The Gateway Bridge Company was a ‘corporation’s law’ company owned by the Commissioner of Main 
Roads.  It later became Queensland Motorways Limited (QML).  Refer to the Gateway Bridge Agreement Act 
1980. 
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Motorway Company in 1987 where the Logan Motorway Company was established 
to build and operate a tolled motorway across the south of the city.  A more recent 
example of this approach is the Port Motorway Company established in 2002.  Now 
all are subsidiaries of Queensland Motorways Limited (QML)113. 
This activity in the 1980s was described by one respondent,  
“In the early 1980s the Commissioner was focussed on building the gateway 
and the arterial road system.  By that time Main Roads had agreed to take over a 
number of arterial roads in Brisbane.  There was a focus on improving those roads 
through widening etc.  With regional roads the focus was also widening e.g. 4 lanes 
to the Gold Coast; 4 lanes to Toowoomba; 4 lanes to Gympie. The structure of the 
Department meant that the Districts and the Divisions had a close relationship with 
communities and this included consultation on projects” (Respondent 10013, 
October 2009). 
 
By the mid 1980s motorway construction using innovative financing was well 
underway in Brisbane.  The mini boom was however to be impacted by the 
community becoming active in opposition to road works.  The first example of this 
(Markwell Bridge) was discussed above but more striking examples which changed 
forever how Main Roads interacts with the community were Route 20 and the Koala 
Freeway.  The idea for Route 20 emerged after the Gateway Bridge was constructed 
to provide a circumferential route on the western side of the city. Figure 7.5.4 shows 
the link that became the centre of controversy in relation to the original Wilbur Smith 
Plan. 
  
                                            
113 For a history of QML refer to www.qldmotorways.com.au. 
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Figure 7.5.4 Route 20 in Relation to the Wilbur Smith Plan 
  
 (Source: Krosch, 2010: 18) 
 
A community based group was formed to oppose Route 20 CART (Citizens 
Against Route Twenty).  It was active from 1987 to 1990 when the project was 
abandoned by government.  In 1990 CART morphed into Citizens Against Roads 
Transport.  Also in the late 1980s, community opposition prevented the construction 
of a motorway from the end of the Gateway Motorway to Helensvale parallel to the 
Pacific Highway which went through Koala habitats (the ‘Koala Freeway’).  This 
proposal and the related community opposition arguably led to the defeat of the 
Goss government when it lost every seat along the proposed route at the State 
election (Krosch, 2009:22).   
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The role of community action – a type of new advocacy coalition in Qld politics 
– was described by respondents,  
“The community became a player as a result of the freeway program.  [Route 
20] was going to disrupt suburbs and communities.  It was severely opposed.  This 
was the first time a community stopped a road project.  We misjudged the 
community reaction.  Koala Motorway was a proposal to build a duplicate of the 
Pacific Highway but further to the East.   It went through an area that was regarded 
as being essential to the preservation and growth of koalas. It happened during the 
Goss government when I was in [the] Premiers’ Department.  There were several 
alternatives put forward but in the end the State election happened and the Goss 
government believed it cost them 2 or 3 seats in the vicinity of Logan.  [As a result of 
these lessons] there were no big projects from the mid-80s to the early 90s. The 
emphasis shifted to road use management and the funding to public transport; 
increased emphasis on bus usage and an upgrade of the rail system.” (Respondent 
10013, October 2009). 
“Route 20 was an awakening to community consultation.  The experienced 
moved an institution to build a whole range of capability in relation to consultation. 
We had expected to be welcome and then we were thrown out. The Koala corridor 
was the result of confusion and poor communication at both state and federal levels” 
(Respondent, 10087, December 2009). 
“Route 20 was the first real interaction of Main roads with the community. 
People got up in arms.  The State was scared” (Respondent, 10097, December 
2009). 
“Route 20 in Brisbane in the 80s is the first time a major upgrade was beaten 
down by a community group. Community engagement then became a very big 
driver” (Respondent, 10067, October, 2009). 
 
7.6. Transport Department (Roads Division) 1990 - 96 
This era of community confrontation with roads planning also coincided with 
important administrative reforms to the system. The election of the Goss [Labor] 
Government in 1989 brought with it major rationalisations within government 
agencies. The new government reduced the number of Departments from 27 to 18 
(Queensland State Archives Agency ID2723, Public Works Department II), and 
included within these reforms, the functions of the Main Roads Department were 
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amalgamated with Transport, forming a Transport Infrastructure Division within the 
Transport Department. This division later changed its name to the Roads Division.  
The merger included the former Departments of Transport, Harbours and Marine, 
and Main Roads.  The South-East Queensland Transit Authority (SEQTA) which was 
responsible for the co-ordination of transport in South-East Queensland114 also came 
under the control of the Transport Department (Queensland State Archives Agency 
ID121, Transport Department II).  Queensland Rail was included as part of the 
Department's structure until 30 June 1991, after this time it was restructured on a 
commercial basis as a separate organisation.   
These reforms posed important implications for roads management, but, like 
the case of Qld rail discussed in chapter 5, core elements of institutional knowledge 
and power survived into the new structures.  As respondents observed, 
“There was a big wave of neoliberalism and road reform [in the early 1990s].  
Neither side of politics here particularly wanted it.  Neither side wanted to get rid of 
Main Roads technical capability.  We did however have to put our specialists into 
technical (consulting style) units.  Because of this Queensland is now the strongest 
state in road capability” (Respondent 10077, December 2009).   
“I'm unsure where the agenda came from in the 1990’s.  With 
commercialisation of the Districts you were allowed to buy in your own technical 
services. There were no common standards and this led to chaos.  Reform was part 
of the agenda.  It was a sense of de-engineering they wanted people more focused 
on outcomes.  During this time RoadTek (respondent used this name but at the time 
it was Commercial Operations) was successful at maintaining an in-house capability. 
Technical specialists were forced to act like consultants and to accept a brief.  They 
removed the engineering authority role (Respondent 10087, December 2009).  
“The early 90s was the time economic rationalism you had to be commercial.  
Under Alan McLennan the Transport Technology Division was commercialised at 
this time.  Alan had a constant battle to demonstrate value.  All the funding was on a 
project basis.  This led to some angst in the Districts because they seemed to have 
to pay for staff that they didn't have to pay for before.  Districts got the position of 
power.  Main Roads was expected to act like a business” (Respondent 10097, 
December 2009). 
                                            
114 Transport Planning and Co-ordination Amendment Act, 1995 
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The commercialisation imperative within the new Transport Department also 
occurred in line with changes to the character of government decision-making under 
the Labor administration. As one respondent observed: 
 “Goss came to power and was determined to change in the way Qld was 
governed... .  He was driven by the Fitzgerald Inquiry [into corruption during the 
previous government] and wanted to implement transparency and accountability 
across government. The only reason I survived was because I was a merit 
appointment.  In Goss’s first three years there were elements of economic 
rationalism: Making things more cost effective; Closing railway stations; Closing 
courts in rural areas where there was low demand [etc]...  Under a Labor 
Government there is a totally different idea of the role of a senior public servant. 
Under a [conservative] government there will be a minister and an office with three or 
four staff (press officer and typist). The Premier will have maybe six staff. Under a 
Labor government there is a whole range of advisers and people who form another 
level of scrutiny on anything that goes to the Minister.  The role of the senior public 
servant is still to provide advice but it is scrutinised by advisors and overlaid in a 
formal way by political and social considerations.  The process becomes protracted 
and it becomes increasingly difficult to operate. ” (Respondent 10013, October 
2009). 
The key changes in this era for the Roads Division have been described by 
Golding (2000: 20 – 22) as:  replacement of the line and staff organisation with a 
matrix structure; the reorganisation of regional directors reporting to the Director 
General; increased variety of programs for regions to deliver; and greatly reduced 
powers for head office.   Golding has also described the loss of technical skill at this 
time, the reduced staff training and the large number of customer service reforms 
that stretched the ability of the organisation to cope with the level of change.  He 
specifically notes the standard micro-economic reform tool-box and principles of 
commercialisation that were applied and resulted in the separation of owner and 
deliverer; the separation of corporate and commercial activities; the development of 
road network strategies by link and associated investment strategies. 
These moves at the state level which impacted activity in roads were 
reinforced by changes at the local government level in Brisbane.  Jim Soorley was 
elected Mayor in 1991 and did not favour road building.  Initially, he wanted to run a 
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traffic management and public transport agenda.  It was only later in his turn that he 
became a significant supported of a more pro-roads policy in Brisbane.  As several 
respondents noted, 
“Soorley came in as an ant- roads man and he left as the biggest roads man 
after Clem Jones” (Respondent 10077, December 2009). 
 “Jim Soorley was a no roads man.  However he came back from the US and 
put an inner-city bypass on the agenda” (Respondent 10097, December 2009). 
“In the 1990s Jim Soorley was Lord Mayor and he wanted out of roads in the 
city.  In Brisbane he wanted to get back to the strategic roads and a strategic 
network” (Respondent 10057, December 2009). 
 
7.7. Main Roads Resurrected 1996 – 2000 
The Main Roads Department was resurrected again on 26 February 1996,115 
exactly seven days after the conservative (National-Liberal coalition) Government of 
Premier Rob Borbridge took office. As noted earlier, community protest over 
motorway construction in south-east Qld played a key role in the demise of the 
previous Goss Labor administration. Under the new government, the road 
construction and management functions of the Transport Department were carved 
off, although the latter retained responsibility for overall transport planning and 
coordination. 'Queensland Transport' was adopted as the trading name for the 
Transport Department and the Main Roads Department was the name of the State 
roads agency (Queensland State Archives Agency ID193, Main Roads Department 
II).   The charter of the newly re-established Department was to provide and maintain 
a road network as part of the state's transport system. 
                                            
115  “On 26 February 1996, under the Public Service Management and Employment (Departmental Changes) 
Order (No. 2), Main Roads Department II was established and all functions relating to roads then held by 
Transport Department II were transferred to the new Department” (Queensland State Archives Agency ID193, 
Main Roads Department II).  
243 
 
However, beyond these changes, the most significant change in this year was 
the reinvigoration of the relationship with local government which had become 
somewhat disconnected in the previous decade.  As one respondent noted, 
 “In 1996 the coalition came back with a view that government had taken out 
its eye off roads, off working with local government and that it had failed. Local 
government is seen as a significant lobby group this goes back to Joh Bjelke 
Petersen days when the constituents were councils.  Very strong connections at 
local government level.  This shifted in 1989 when Labor came in and amalgamated 
transport into a centralised function.  It was a disconnection from local government 
for five years until it shifted back with the roads alliance in the late 90s.  The alliance 
reconnected the department strongly with local government...Regions enable local 
government and road agency to be in touch.  The role of the districts was [also] 
revived in the mid-90s. It provided significant employment and it's untenable for 
government to shift.  For example, in places like Cloncurry the three employers are 
Main Roads the Railway and local government” (Respondent 10067, October 2009). 
The other major change which was an outcome of previous experience was 
that the state government had become very careful of endorsing ‘lines on maps’ that 
did not have broad community support.  This played out at least partly in how the 
Integrated Regional Transport Plan (IRTP) for South East Queensland was 
developed in 1997.  It was a 25 year plan for the region that had involved 
consultation with over 50,000 people.  The approach of the plan is notable for the 
following key shifts:  the change from moving vehicles to moving people; the aim to 
moderate traffic growth (accessibility over volume); and capacity expansion to 
support public transport and higher capacity freight vehicles.   Apart from public 
opinion the other driver for more efficient use of road space was a continued funding 
shortage which characterised the 1990s (Krosch, 2010:  20 – 24). 
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The final significant shift in the late 1990s also emerged from Brisbane City 
Council and that was a sophisticated approach to planning Brisbane in transport and 
land use terms.  As one respondent explained, 
“Brisbane has your classic radial transport system in the CBD with major rail 
and roads serving the CBD. Key parts of the growth corridors however were not well 
served by Rail for example the Southeast and the north. Jim Soorly [Mayor] had a 
reform agenda and was determined to change the city. He was building a better 
Brisbane, ferries on the river, outdoor living, some bushland. He engaged with the 
community and to identify outcomes and to do it. David Hamil was an important 
transport minister he always had time for meetings. Maureen Hayes was the 
transport chair at Council and was influential, dominant and well-connected 
politically. The City Council had a significantly bigger and better transport planning 
capacity. This led to the city setting the agenda and leading the transport and land 
use planning in Brisbane” (Respondent 10057, December 2009). 
Queensland then closed out the twentieth century with an intact large and 
technically competent Main Roads Department that had both re-establish and 
revitalised its links with the community and with local government.  Planning and 
thinking in Brisbane for the future was in terms of liveability and connectivity with the 
community firmly in place as a strategic and at times very powerful partner and 
player. 
 
7.8. Conclusion 
The institutional-inspired analysis of the history of roads in Qld brings to the 
fore several key points.   
 The road transport policy arena is particularly strong and its resources 
are reinforced by extensive networks.   
 Resistance to the implementation of road transport policy agendas 
have had short-term and limited success.  The impact of resistance by 
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local groups has really been one of delay not one of serious disruption 
to the implementation of long-term policy goals.  
 Local governance arrangements have important implications for the 
ability of cities to implement policy change.  Single governance units for 
cities seem to lead to faster and more even policy implementation then 
multiple overlapping jurisdictions. 
 Change can only be understood in relation to the impact of global 
capital regime. 
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8. Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 
 “The restructuring of Australian cities – and of cities in general – is not purely 
the product of market processes.  It reflects complex changes in relationships 
between market, state, class and ideology as interacting determinants of economic 
and social order.  ‘Globalisation’ involves greater emphasis on market relationships 
transcending national and regional boundaries, extending the scope for capital 
accumulation by transnational institutions…What is happening in the cities can be 
interpreted, in part at least, as the product of this changed balance in the institutional 
structure of contemporary capitalism”  (Stilwell, 1998: 23).  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has been about institutional regimes in land transport.  It has 
focused on how these institutional regimes mould local economic outcomes in 
different local spaces at different scales and at different points in time.  The 
prevailing argument here has been that institutional arrangements determine social 
and economic outcomes for places within the context of globally connected 
economic regimes Jessop (2001).   Case studies of road and rail transport from 1850 
to 2000 in NSW and Qld were used to add to our understanding of the relationship 
between ideas and policy changes, the role of individuals as agents of policy 
change, and the role of institutions. 
Returning to the themes identified in the opening chapter, the thesis sought to 
identify:  the main themes of change in institutional arrangements in the 
management of land transport between 1850 and 2000; the drivers of these 
changes; and, policy responses and the outcomes of these changes for 
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infrastructure governance, service delivery and special economic development.  Four 
hypotheses were constructed to guide the research.   
 First, that policy changes as a result of the emergence of ideas that 
capture advocacy within policy networks which are themselves part of 
the institutional structure.   
 Second, the speed, and extent of the implementation of these ideas 
depends on the relative strength of individual actors as agents of policy 
change.   
 Third, that the actual nature of the implementation is modified by the 
relative strength of the policy arena and of the key institutions within it.   
 And fourth that the policy, even if it is heavily linked to global trends, 
can be significantly modified by the “local” through the advocacy of 
interest groups.  
This chapter details the main findings in relation to the research questions. 
 
8.2. Themes of Change in Institutional Arrangements 
The period covered by the thesis allowed a reinterpretation of history using an 
institutional perspective.  There were five major themes of change during period that 
impacted both road and rail policies.  First from 1850 through to the 1920s the notion 
that the railway was the engine of growth which led directly to the construction of the 
heavy rail networks in both NSW and Qld.  It was this set of ideas that embedded the 
first set of institutional forces which shaped settlement patterns, developed the 
economic base of regions and locked in technologies further embedding a range of 
related social relations and networked economic forces.   The second significant 
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theme related to the rise of motorised transport and the associated demand for 
increased personal mobility that followed the First World War. This development 
directly impacted the earlier investments in rail creating a competitive environment 
requiring adjustments and divestments which resulted in the reconstruction of the 
prevailing institutional arrangements.  
 This reconstruction took place over a 30 year period and it was not until the 
1950s that the transition to the new institutional arrangements was achieved.  The 
modernisation phase of the 1950s, which is the third theme of change during the 
period, served to both align institutional arrangements with the new economic and 
technological requirements of global economy after the Second World War and to 
provide an engine which enabled the dynamics of regional change to be immersed 
into the new regime.  The fourth theme of change is one of urban growth and 
commercialisation.  Urban growth led directly to a need for improved city planning 
and mobility.  This demand for mobility found its expression in improved roads which 
further generated demand for roads indirectly contributing to a financial crisis for the 
railway.  These crises provided the context for commercialisation to become 
embedded in existing institutional arrangements.  The final theme of change that had 
significant impact was the implementation of the neoliberal agenda that lead to 
significant transformations in road and rail investments and institutional 
arrangements.   
These themes need to be understood in relation to the global economic 
institutional regimes and their transition over the same period of time.  Each of these 
major themes resulted in spatial fixes that themselves embedded social relations and 
processes in regions and cities.  The results for regional places, cities and 
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communities were path dependent activities that were further locked in by the 
technology associated with the large investment choices. 
 
8.3. Drivers of Policy Change and Policy Response 
A key finding was that policy changes as result of the emergence of ideas that 
capture advocacy within policy networks which are themselves part of the 
institutional structure.   The policy responses varied in NSW and Qld in relation to the 
implementation of the same idea due to the impact of locally embedded economic, 
social and cultural forces shaped by the prior economic histories and the respected 
geographies of jurisdictions.  Intergenerational learning described by North is a 
powerful force that can be observed to be operating within the cultural dynamic in 
both NSW and Qld.  Strategies that were successful were copied and embellished by 
future generations of policy decision makers. 
In all cases a precondition for a change in policy was the emergence of a 
policy window created by a disruption in the prevailing stability caused by an event or 
crises that punctuated that equilibrium.   The ability to implement change was limited 
by the lock in effects of prior policy decisions.  This is especially the case in the 
transport investments because the technologies embed institutional connections at 
all scales.  So communities, cities and regions created or at least constrain their own 
futures by their past decisions and the associated created economic history. 
In relation to the case study analysis five sets of ideas serve to exemplifying 
this finding.   First the idea that rail investment was essential to support the emerging 
industrial development in the mid 19th-century and that it led directly to social and 
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economic prosperity of communities, towns, cities, regions and nations.  Second the 
notion that motorised transport would solve both the financial problem of the railways 
and the perceived need for seamless transportation.   This idea gained currency 
after the First World War.  Thirdly, the idea that took hold from the 1960s that 
freeway development was intricately and intimately associated with the development 
of successful global cities.   Fourth, the rail rationalisation ideas of the 1960s that 
were associated with Beeching and led directly to the commercialisation of railway 
investments and government railway organisations as well as the rationalisation of 
the associated railway assets.  And finally, the neo liberal ideas that took hold from 
the mid 1980s and drove massive restructuring and rationalisation in road and rail 
sectors in both the case study jurisdictions.   
All of these ideas originated in powerful policy arenas and were transferred 
and transmitted through a range of networked policy communities that are 
themselves globally connected to educational, political, industrial, commercial and 
financial networks that are global.   What they had in common was that they all 
addressed a need or a gap that emerged in the institutional fabric and required some 
form of fix to enable the regime to continue to operate effectively.  In the case of 
transport infrastructure the fix had significant spatial implications. Rail lines spread 
out across regions connecting them to remote markets across the globe through 
aligned connectivity in port and shipping transport infrastructure.   
At the local level agricultural and mining enterprises flourished as rail 
transport reduced transaction costs and shrank the distance between places by 
reducing the transit times.  Towns and cities grew up around railheads, fleet 
construction and maintenance depots, rail facilities and the location of aligned 
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industries.  Road developments had similar economic and social impacts with 
equally significant physical manifestations visible in the built environment.  Road 
investment simultaneously connects and cuts off communities at all levels of 
geographic scale. Roads act as connective and access nodes while at the same time 
creating physical barriers that reduce and distort social and economic interactions.  
 In essence the ideas provided a correction within the prevailing institutional 
regime, extending its life and allowing it to continue to function.  In two instances, it 
could be argued that the sets of ideas themselves signalled the emergence of a new 
institutional regime.  These ideas were the railway ideas of the mid 1800s that 
signalled the hegemonic phase of the industrial revolution and the motorised 
transports ideas of the early 20th century that signalled the emergence of the Fordist 
regime.  This is because the mode of transport itself was central to the success of 
the prevailing institutional regime.   The economics of rail and road transport were 
central to the efficient functioning of institutional regimes that were in place at the 
time.  The relative dominance of the transport modes were part of the economics of 
the regime and the ideas that took hold to support and reinforce it.  The transport 
mode itself unleashed forces which had spatial elements that were transformative for 
places and for place making.  This is because they were key mechanisms in the 
spatial fixes that were associated with the regime. 
The initial investment in rail NSW in from the 1850s and Qld from the 1860s 
was itself a physical expression of the notion that rail transport was central to 
successful industrial economic growth.  This notion had currency in industrial, 
intellectual, scientific and political circles throughout much of the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  The strength of the idea was reinforced in a broad range of policy arenas 
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by its alignment with the commercial needs of the hegemonic industrial regime.  
Institutional forces within the regime further reinforced the strength of the rail 
development ideas and their physical articulation in the built environment through 
massive infrastructure investment decisions by governments.   
Rail development presented an ideal vehicle for the capital accumulated by 
European financiers who were accumulating wealth from the success of a range of 
imperialist colonial investments.  From the establishment of the first railway in Britain 
in 1830 the industrialists quickly identified the positive impact of this transport mode 
on transaction costs and the resulting positive implications for their profits.   
Communities across the globe clambered for rail connectivity because they 
associated the investment with positive social and economic returns at the local 
level.  Hence, the rail era is characterised by the emergence and strength of 
numerous local advocacy coalitions feeding off ideas and discourse generated in 
globally connected issues networks and policy communities.  These local advocacy 
coalitions connected with local politicians who acted as policy brokers and in some 
key instances policy entrepreneurs. 
 The policy window that enabled the rail age to take hold in both NSW and Qld 
was created by a combination of an opportunity presented by demand in European 
markets to drive economic returns from relatively under developed hinterlands in the 
colonies of NSW and Qld through the successful transport of produce to overseas 
markets and the perceived crisis in the loss revenue to ports in competing states.   At 
the same time in Qld the geography, the limited available of finance and the almost 
non-existent road infrastructure reinforced the need for railways.  These factors were 
also important in NSW but were not as strong.  It is the strength of these factors in 
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Qld compared with NSW that explains the difference in infrastructure gauge choice.  
Qld had very limited financial resources, a very large state geographically with 
difficult terrains and emerging rural communities with limited and in some cases no 
road connectivity.  The competing port issue was very real in both NSW and Qld.  
Victorian ports caused angst for Sydney based capital interests and in the case  of 
Qld the ports on the north coast of NSW were better located for communities in the 
Darling Downs prior to the rail connection first to the river port at Ipswich and then to 
the port of Brisbane.   
It could also be argued that in the case of this particular set of rail 
development, the strength of ideas in themselves created their own policy window.  
Such was the strength of the advocacy networks across the globe that in less than 
50 years from the building of the first railway in 1830 this form of transportation 
dominated the globe.  Indeed by the 1880s railways had spawned across Europe, 
America, Australia, Asia, Africa, and India.  This was an idea that as central to the 
prevailing institutional regime and its spread and transmission was on track with the 
requirements of the regime. 
Experimentation with motorised transport began in the late 1860s in various 
European technical institutions.  It was not until after the First World War however 
that the idea gained currency of motorised transport as an effective mass transit and 
mass transportation mechanism.  As with the earlier rail idea, motorised transport, its 
utility and its application, became a dominant part of discourse in political, technical 
and industrial networks.   
From a policy perspective, in both Qld and NSW there was an initial 
resistance to a transition from heavy investment in rail to heavy investment inroads. 
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In part, this was due to the large sunk investment costs that railway investment 
represented and the need to maintain traffic on the railway to service the debt 
associated with the prior investment decisions.  This hesitancy was reinforced by a 
large number of advocacy coalitions who had a stake in continued rail investment.   
These coalitions ranged from trade and professional associations (commercial and 
union) to  communities dependent on employment related to the railway and 
associated industries to the railway supply industries (including educational 
institutions)  themselves.   
It was not until the late 1950s that the policy pendulum swung from rail to road 
transport in NSW and Qld.   The policy window that provided the opportunity for 
change was created by a series of circumstances.  These were: significantly 
increased levels of car ownership and therefore demand for roads; substantial 
growth in the power of the motor vehicle  advocacy groups;  transformations in the 
size of cities and the concomitant reduction in the relative size of rural communities; 
transformation in institutional regime itself towards production that favoured more 
highly concentrated populations in cities;  increased personal wealth that allowed the 
purchase of individual transportation vehicles;  and crippling  railway debt.   
It was the latter point that provided the true policy window because it created 
a financial crisis that enabled the railway policy equilibrium to be punctuated.  
Treasuries were looking for a solution to what was perceived to be the railway 
financial problem.  Investment by governments in road transport was not perceived 
to cause a debt problem in the same way that government investment in railways 
had done.  Road investment was the ‘new’ policy fix. 
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The prior investments in railways had lock ink effects that impacted the future 
investments in roads.  In Qld for example the initial road investment was limited to 
creating links to rail heads.  In both Qld and NSW significant state investment in 
roads did not really occur until the 1960s when state governments took over more 
responsibility for a larger proportion of the road network from councils after the 
switch from investing in rail to roads. 
The recent motorway building era began with the early US and German roads 
(autobahns in the case of Germany).  Britain was later (1958).  Significant freeway 
development in the United States throughout the 1960s and 70s which still continues 
today had a major influence on Australian road agencies.  It was in this whole period 
that the idea of transport and land use planning being intricately related took hold in 
academic and intellectual circles.  Government agencies sent planning and transport 
bureaucrats to universities to study the emerging discipline of town and country 
planning.  It was in the universities that significant professional networks were 
formed that would be instrumental in the successful Implementation of these ideas 
through the planned development of cities and regions through the 60s, 70s and 80s 
in NSW and to a lesser extent in Qld.   
Notions of free-flowing sets of circumferential ring roads can be seen in the 
landscape of cities in the US and Britain which were copied and transplanted to both 
Brisbane and Sydney.  They were an integral part of attempts to provide a new 
spatial fix of this later stage of the Fordist regime.  Sydney was more successful 
copying the policy trend due to particular financial circumstances that applied in both 
Sydney and Brisbane in the 1960s and 70s.  The delayed development of the 
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Brisbane freeway system is an example of the power of the local which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.   
As with both sets of earlier ideas these city development ideas associated 
with the development of freeways were truly global in source and impact. The 
institutional regime had of evolved to where it required significantly urbanised 
populations to support the prevailing industrial organisation and this in turn 
supported the rise of the freeway dependent city.  It is interesting to note that in NSW 
it was the road agency that became instrument of state city development and not the 
planning agency.   The power position of the road agency stemmed from its superior 
relationship with local government and also it's intertwined networks to powerful 
stakeholder coalitions that themselves are globally connected and reinforced.   
The argument that the relative size of Brisbane City Council acted as a 
countervailing force to the power of the state and led to a planning and development 
outcome that was more closely connected to the community is difficult to sustain.  
What is clear is that decision making processes related to major policy shifts are 
different in Sydney and Brisbane because of the different constructions of local 
government and the different embedded norms, cultures and behaviours that are 
associated with policy decisions.    
The policy window was created by the growth in the size of the city and the 
relative decline in the populations of rural areas.  This growth led to a significantly 
increased need to service sprawling suburbanised development on the outskirts of 
the cities which were well served at their centres by older established public 
transport systems.  The growth of car dependent suburbs from the 1960s onwards 
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and the need to efficiently and quickly connect disparate parts of the city reinforced 
the perceived need for urban freeway development.   
At the same time that freeway and motorway development was taking off 
around the Western world to accommodate growth in motor vehicle use the 
investment in railways was effectively being retrenched.  The policy change 
associated with the Beeching ideas and reforms of the 1960s can only be 
understood in relation to what was happening with investments in roads and the 
changing nature of the demands associated with the change in the institutional 
regime.   Maintenance costs associated with the upkeep of the branch rail lines 
which had in a main been constructed to lower standards were increasing and were 
not being covered by freight charges.  In addition the returns for primary products 
were now much lower compared with what they had been in the past and more 
efficient industries with higher returns and concentrated in urban areas were the 
focus of policy activity.   
 The policy emphasis moved from enabling the transport of primary products 
to markets to support economic activity and growth in rural areas to one of the 
rationalisation of rural rail infrastructure in line with use and returns for the cost of 
provision.  The introduction of commercial business principles and their application 
was a feature of this era.  Urban rail policy was also impacted by the closure or 
reduced service to low-volume stations, the rationalisation of timetabling of services 
and a reduction in staffing across the board.  The monolith of the railway institutions 
was broken as commercial principles were applied to the consideration of what was 
appropriately core railway business and therefore what should be within the direct 
ownership of the rail organisations.  The notion of the commercial railway took hold 
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in the 1960s and remains central to an understanding of rail policy.   The concept 
that railway development is essential for social economic and cultural growth of 
communities, cities and economies that drove railway development was effectively 
replaced by the concept that railways were a business like any other and should 
operate on a commercial basis.   
The Beeching ideas emerged in the policy networks in Britain found political 
favour and were implemented.  These ideas were copied and transplanted in both 
NSW and Qld.  NSW pursued the ideas more vigorously and went to the extent of 
importing one of the Chief Architects of the implementation.  The implementation in 
Qld was moderated by community backlash and the regionally dispersed nature of 
political power which tended to favour the maintenance of rural infrastructure.    The 
policy window that allowed the transfer of these ideas was created by the financial 
crisis confronting railways and the need to accommodate the funding demands of the 
road lobby.  It could be argued that the demise of railway investment needs to be 
seen as part of the broader dismantling of the state that began with these 
commercialisation ideas in the 1960s.   
From the mid-1980s whole slabs of government policy in service provision 
was impacted by the neoliberal agenda.  These ideas with their origins in British 
policy networks first implemented in the electricity industries and later in railways in 
Britain were transferred via intellectual, political and commercial policy communities 
around the English-speaking world.  They found their way into railway policy in NSW 
via two key mechanisms.   Firstly, they were a direct outcome of the Federal 
government's policies on competition and competitive neutrality.   And second, they 
were a policy response on the part of the NSW government in particular to the debt 
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situation of the NSW railway and its need for substantial government budget funding 
to cover both capital and recurrent expenditure.   
The reforms were meant to free up markets, increase competition, increase 
the number of players, reduce costs and prices for consumers and improve service 
through exposure to the rigours of the free market.  The policy equilibrium in railways 
had been badly punctured by a serious rail accident in the late 1970s and this had 
highlighted the need for substantial reinvestment further compounding the drain on 
State finances.  The drive to find a solution to the railway debt problem was a 
pressing issue for the NSW Treasury.   
Again in Qld the reforms came later and the implementation was muted by the 
lack of desire on the part of local politicians and the associated advocacy networks 
to adopt them.  Qld policymakers moved more slowly protected as they were in part 
by the narrow gauge which effectively acted as a significant barrier to entry for 
additional players.  They were also influenced by the mood of the Qld community 
which did not favour the reforms.  The dispersed nature of the population in Qld as 
compared with NSW also lent support to continuing with existing policies for longer 
so that related developments in rural areas were sustained for longer.  Qld effectively 
maintained the spatial fixity associated with earlier institutional regime for longer than 
NSW.  
 
8.4. The Role of Critical Actors as Agent s of Change 
The major policy shifts that occurred over the 150 year period examined in the 
case studies came from major ideas that entered the discourse of the leading policy 
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communities and then found their way across the globe, transmitted through the 
networks of the key individuals in these policy communities.  It was a case of ideas 
riding on the back of influential individuals who acted as policy entrepreneurs taking 
opportunistic advantage of punctuations in the institutional economic equilibrium to 
achieve significant change.  In all cases critical actors were important to the 
implementation of the major policy shifts.  Key politicians, especially premiers and 
ministers, with close ties to senior public servants who were themselves key actors 
have been important in both NSW and Qld in the modes of rail and road transport.  
At times key decisions driven by individual politicians and /or bureaucrats were 
critical to spatial and economic impacts.   
 These actors possessed the ability to stand in the middle of the system and 
had the authority to shape outcomes through the alignment of important coalitions of 
stakeholders.  They acted as key change agents shaping, directing and aligning the 
discourse to the goals implied by the policy shifts.  As Yeung (2002) noted, it is the 
actor networks and their relations that are important not the individuals as agents in 
themselves. 
  In all instances it is possible to identify the temporary constellations of goal 
directed networks of social relations that were fundamentally important.  These 
networks also have spatial dimensions.  There is a relational geometry comprised of 
local and non-local actors (Yeung, 2005) who are connected to the local via 
networks and formal and informal institutional structures.  These networks act as 
resources for places and enable them to plug into the institutional portals which grant 
access to global economic flows of ideas, capital and assets.  Critical individuals 
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then who are powerful actors with extensive networks to policy communities that are 
globally connected are important assets for places.   
At the micro level the ability of regions to effectively organise and co 
constitute the local institutional arrangements to maximise the utility of local networks 
Is important as both a power bargaining and policy broking mechanism in relation to 
the management of the impact of global forces.  Connection with extra regional 
networks is important (MacKinnon, 2010).  This is especially well demonstrated by 
the case study of Qld.   That jurisdiction exhibited ability to shape and direct global 
forces over a long period of time which was above its power position in the network 
of global places.  As Amin and Thrift (1994, 1994a and 1995) argue, local 
institutional conditions are a key asset for regions and local economies in the context 
of global economic processes.  The case studies demonstrate that the economic 
performance of regions is influenced by the strength of the local institutional 
presence and its links with and the nature of these links with broader institutional 
networks. 
 
8.5. Infrastructure and Spatial Economic Development 
Policy shifts even if they are heavily linked to global trends can be significantly 
modified by the local through the advocacy of coalitions of interest groups working as 
power broking networked communities.  As Martin (2004) argues, specific 
institutional regimes develop in different places and interact with local economic 
activity in a mutually reinforcing way. The critical differences between NSW and Qld 
in relation to road and rail decision-making demonstrate this proposition.   Qld 
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constrained as it was by both geography and finance modified the development of 
railway infrastructure to suit these conditions.  Choices about the gauge, the strength 
of infrastructure assets, the infrastructure standards, the level of investment in 
related railway assets such as buildings facilities and depots are all reflective of local 
constraints.  These decisions enabled a level of regional connectivity and 
development in Qld which would not have been possible had Qld followed the gauge 
and standards decisions of NSW.  Interestingly, these decisions, reflective of local 
conditions, afforded a level of protection in the face of later changes (especially the 
neo liberal agenda).  This protection allowed time for Qld to mould a response that 
was aligned to their interests. 
As important the location decisions in Qld influenced by the geography,  the 
nature of the coastal shipping and the location of port assets as well as by the pre-
existing settlement pattern and the advocacy of local communities demonstrates how 
an entire railway system and the related set of institutional arrangements can be 
influenced by the local.   This influence however is strongest prior to the initial 
investment decision at the start of the institutional regime.  Once the key asset and 
location decisions are made the lock in features associated with both the technology 
and the location set in motion path dependent processes which themselves heavily 
predetermine futures.  In this way regional economies inherit legacies of the past and 
future outcomes depend on past events and their outcomes (Martin and Sunley, 
2006).    
Once made, decisions about the location of critical infrastructure generate a 
range of connected economic forces through related economic location decisions 
that create a particular economy base in places.  This spatial fixity becomes self-
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reinforcing and enduring for the life of the institutional regime.  The economic history 
of regions is reflective of the critical economic decisions about the location of the 
major investments and the resulting economic decisions about the organisation of 
the associated production.   
Whole regions and communities in NSW and Qld grow up around rail 
infrastructure and then declined in relation to the transition in the institutional regime 
that required these investments.  The inbuilt agility of regions to adjust to change is 
limited by the local institutions that lock in a range of norms, behaviours and 
expectations which limit flexibility in response and therefore future changes.  As 
David (191985, 1986) has noted this is especially so where technology is important.  
Hence the rail case studies demonstrate higher levels of lock in, spatial fixity and 
path dependence then did the road case studies because of the level of technology 
associated with the investment decisions.  Early colonial investments in roads did not 
preclude later heavy investments in rail.  Whereas significant rail investments led to 
an entire suite of institutional arrangements including legislative supports and 
prohibitions to prop up the artefacts of rail investment in the face of competition from 
road investments.  This is because of the importance and the impact of the sunk 
costs as well as the embedded Interests that are associated with technologically 
intense lumpy investments. 
The case studies of road investment in NSW and Qld also reflect the impact 
of local institutional forces.  For example the freeway development that occurred in 
Sydney from the 1960s was delayed in the case of Brisbane by funding issues 
combined with significant community backlash.  In Qld, powerful advocacy coalitions 
were formed which were able to block road development projects.  This power has 
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not been as well demonstrated in the case of NSW.  Despite this however, the 
lesson of history is that the spatial fixity required by the institutional regime in relation 
to road investments to support the densification of cities required by the regime was 
delayed in Brisbane but not entirely removed from the economic landscape.  It can 
be argued then that the nature of the policy shift can be modified by the strength of 
the policy arena and the key local institutions but it will not be able to be ignored 
because of the strength of the global economic forces associated with the 
institutional regime itself. 
The experience of the implementation of the neoliberal agenda in road and 
rail in NSW and Qld illustrates that the implementation can be modified by the 
relative strength of the policy arena and the associated institutions.   The road policy 
arena is incredibly strong, highly adaptive and resilient with embedded structures 
and processes for attaining knowledge and reproducing itself that ensures its ability 
to remain relevant regardless of policy context.  The arena is supported by extensive 
connected networks that can be activated at all scales from the neighbourhood to the 
global.  These networks are extensive in their coverage and include health, 
education, commerce, banking, legal, industry, universities, research organisations, 
unions, the military, professional and industry associations as well as global non-
government organisations.   
This arena has demonstrated the ability to extend its policy reach into a large 
number of adjacent and overlapping policy arenas.  These arenas include land-use 
and urban form, local, regional and national planning and economic development.  
The case study of roads in NSW and Qld demonstrates the impact of road planning 
on city form and the power of the road arena to control the nature, function and 
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global productivity of the global city.  The neoliberal agenda did not interrupt the 
ability of the local institutional arrangements which included the road agencies to 
deliver the agenda of the policy arena.  They interpreted and articulated the 
neoliberal changes in a manner which actually strengthened their network links with 
industry and local government in a manner that augmented the power base.   
This can be compared with the relatively weak rail policy arena where the 
neoliberal agenda was able to re-organise restructure and rationalise institutional 
arrangements to the point where the asset network itself was in danger as a 
functioning entity.   Rail at the time of the implementation of the neoliberal agenda 
was not hegemonic therefore it was poorly able to interact with the forces unleashed 
by that agenda in a way that was constructive to the intrinsic purposes of the railway.  
Unlike road, railway lacked powerful advocacy coalitions that were intimately 
connected with its purposes.  This meant that neoliberal forces were able to impact 
directly on the local institutional arrangements and there was not sufficient strength 
in the local institutional networks to modify these forces. It was not until there were a 
series of crises themselves in part related to the implementation of neoliberal agenda 
that local communities and advocacy coalitions were able to exert any modifying 
influence on rail institutional arrangements.  The critical lesson is that the strength of 
local institutional arrangements and the level of their connectedness to active 
advocacy coalitions in the local place is important in shaping and articulating the 
interests of the local. 
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8.6. Conclusion 
The case studies demonstrate that the investments associated with large rail 
and road infrastructure developments are of a scale that results in the associated 
forms of economic activity being embedded in the social relations of a particular 
place.  The embedded relations and the related economic activity has reach over a 
particular geographic area over which the associated institutional arrangements are 
constituted and has influence.  For places this can provide them with sources of both 
advantage and disadvantage which is to some extent dependent on the temporal 
context and what is happening elsewhere.  These findings support the recent work of 
Niedzielski and Malecki (2012) who found that global competitiveness of world cities 
is a function of both networks of capital and people and place-based quality of life.   
They also found that transport infrastructure decisions can privilege cities as nodes 
and are as important as other variables in relation to cities’ competitiveness.   
More specifically, the selected case studies of NSW and Qld present a view of 
relatively isolated regions where the outcomes of the major transport investment 
decisions can be viewed almost in exaggerated focus because of the size of the 
investment in these relatively small (in global terms) economies.  The related lock-in 
effects, the unleashed path dependent processes, the associated networks, the 
resulting spatial fixity is all more embedded, sharper and clearer because of the 
absence of competing developments.  This isolation in no way minimises the impact 
of multi scalar global forces but again heightens it.  Small (in economic terms) 
isolated regions have fewer development options and opportunities.  They also have 
limited internal institutional mechanisms to mitigate the effects of changes in global 
institutional regimes that inevitably connect them to innovations which have 
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transformative impacts on the global markets of which they are a part.   These 
processes that are critical to the dynamic of institutional regimes occur on all scales, 
involve complex dynamic and iterative relationships that vary within sub systems and 
are themselves altered by the place specific social relations.  Hence, they can only 
be understood in ‘their place’. 
This study then used the transport sector in these two isolated regions as a 
laboratory in which to understand the ways in which institutions promote broad 
changes and have long-ranging implications.  The critical significance of the major 
investments in transport infrastructure for environmental, social and economic 
outcomes is highlighted.  This is especially important because in the case of 
transport, the associated embedded social relations of production are locked in for 
the life of the asset (in rail up to 100 years) and limit future decisions.  Hence, long 
run economic evolution is crucially shaped by single, large and long-lasting 
decisions.  Viewed in these terms, transport investment can be understood as having 
critically important path-dependent implications for the spatial dynamics of economic 
growth and change.  The table below (8.6.1) summaries the major findings in relation 
to key theoretical constructs. 
 
Table 8.6.1 Theoretical Constructs and Case Study Findings 
Theoretical Construct Case Study Finding 
Actors and Networks – 
especially ensembles of 
actors  
Relational depth, in terms of the power and 
density of actor networks are important 
explanatory variables in relation to the ability of 
places to access and adopt new ideas and then 
in relation to their resilience and adaptability to 
changes.  This is illustrated in NSW and Qld 
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railways and roads – relationships between: 
politicians and key bureaucrats; relationship 
among bureaucrats; relationship between 
politicians, bureaucrats and sources of capital; 
relationships between regional power brokers 
and politicians and key bureaucrats; 
relationships between critical institutions (for 
example, unions, professional associations, 
churches, chambers of commerce) and 
politicians and key bureaucrats 
The hegemonic positioning of discourse is 
important in explaining all instances of major 
policy change.  The ideas which drove change 
in road and rail in NSW and Qld were 
transmitted into Australia from broader themes 
implemented in various times primarily in the 
United Kingdom and United States, and 
modified by the activities and policy influence of 
local advocacy networks 
A comparison of the case studies shows that 
policy in both case studies changed as result of 
the emergence of ideas that captured advocacy 
within policy networks which are themselves 
part of the institutional structure 
The economic, social and political reach of the 
road agency in both NSW and Qld is reinforced 
by a range of established formal and informal 
networks that are closely managed at all levels 
of geographic scale and result in significant 
advantages through the sophisticated 
management and application of knowledge  
The road transport policy community and its 
connections are arguably the most powerful 
and strongest of any policy community.  They 
include important actors in academic, 
government, industrial, financial, educational, 
health and social networks.   This relational 
depth provides the road transport policy 
community with a level of resilience and 
adaptability which further reinforces it’s not  
insignificant power-base 
The road networks have supported the 
development of a powerful, highly agile, 
hegemonic road policy arena with a reach from 
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the local to the global that easily moulds its 
policies to accommodate trends.  Thus, it 
ensures its continued relevance  
The railway age gripped Qld in much the same 
way as it did NSW.  This innovation, the 
associated discourse, networks, industries and 
institutional structures transferred swiftly 
through established political and administrative 
networks support by the same capital that 
funded the NSW railways 
Advocacy coalitions NSW and Qld rail and road investments 
decisions were heavily impacted by the role of 
advocacy coalitions in local and regional areas 
In NSW railway policy was driven by global 
trends but the spatial allocation of capital was a 
result of local interest groups forming advocacy 
coalitions brokering policy through a series of 
multi arena (commercial, political, social) 
games and the prevailing economic and 
political culture which had a specific geographic 
focal intent.   Local actors became policy 
entrepreneurs and thus built or reinforced 
power positions linked to ideas that drove policy 
changes 
The dispersed nature of the rail investment in 
Qld and the associated locational decisions are 
reflective of the strong regional advocacy 
coalitions 
In relation to all key investment decisions in 
NSW and Qld road and rail advocacy coalitions 
controlled the policy debate and supported 
critical actors (politicians and senior 
bureaucrats) who were charged with 
implementing the ideas 
In both NSW and Qld strong advocacy 
coalitions with global networks grew up around 
the railway industry to broker policy choices 
that favoured further rail development 
Embeddedness Social relations in railways and roads in NSW 
and Qld are influenced by processes in road 
and rail investment decisions in NSW and Qld  
that reinforce and maintain specific global 
institutional regimes that are embedded 
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socially, politically cognitively and culturally 
Embedded relations in production networks at 
different spatial scales in rail and road in NSW 
and Qld are critical and have significant impacts 
on regional economic and social development 
opportunities 
The embedded nature of path dependent 
processes is heightened by the size and 
lumpiness of the investment decisions in rail 
and roads in NSW and Qld 
Processes of embeddedness manifest in 
complex networks that reinforcing path 
dependency  
The institutional environment in road and rail in 
NSW and Qld is characterised by a set of social 
relations and embedded interpretations where 
accepted stories affirm organisations’ 
legitimacy and power 
Learning is embedded and passed on 
intergenerationally in rail and road in NSW and 
Qld and in the supporting institutional 
framework 
Rail and Road institutions in NSW and Qld 
display embedded dynamic systems of rules, 
norms and values that reflexively influence, 
constrain and shape actors’ choices and 
behaviours and limit agility and responsiveness 
to external shocks 
Regions in NSW and Qld are advantaged and 
disadvantaged by their economic history and 
their embedded social relations associated with 
road and rail investments.  The relatively small 
size of the economies and the absence of 
alternate economic options heightens this 
positioning 
Institutional Evolution The history of the institutional development in 
railways and roads in NSW and Qld provides 
an example where the interactions between 
institutions and organisations have shaped the 
institutional evolution of economies and where  
the organisations that came into existence 
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reflected the opportunities provided by the 
institutional framework 
Lock-in – (economic path 
dependence; technological 
lock in; and institutional 
hysteresis) 
The key sources of lock-in for both road and rail 
in NSW and Qld were – technology choice, 
ownership arrangements, workforce 
organisation and sourcing and route selection.  
Local organisations, industries and institutions 
developed dependencies and linkages that 
were further locked-in by technology choice,  
history and networks creating a series of path 
dependent processes that shape and bound 
future choice 
All three forms of lock-in - functional (relating to 
the nature of relations between firms), cognitive 
(reflecting world views) and political (relating to 
social relations and power) – are illustrated in 
NSW and Qld road and rail institutional 
arrangements and most especially investment 
decision making 
The settlement pattern in NSW and Qld heavily 
related to the technology choice in road and rail 
investments and is illustrative of the spatial 
fixity associated with these investments 
The narrow gauge in Qld an example of a 
technological lock-in with positive network 
externalities (that is technical interrelatedness, 
economies of scale and the inertia created by 
sunk costs) that  still dominates the investment 
choices available today 
Rail and road investments in both NSW and 
Qld have locked-in self-reinforcing and self-
reproducing processes that lead to gradual and 
increasing rigidity 
Industrial lock-in in both NSW and Qld has 
included institutionalised path dependent 
processes which have circumscribed and 
limited future investment, and urban and 
regional development decisions 
The embedded nature of the path dependent 
processes acted as significant inhibitors to 
change in both case study areas    
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The lock-in effect was most acute and lengthier 
for railway investments where the investments 
are more ‘lumpy’ and the life of the resulting 
asset can be extended for at least three 
generations 
Large investments and high sunk costs lock-in 
prior decisions reinforcing ingrained institutional 
bias towards incremental change in railways in 
NSW and Qld 
Path dependency (also 
reinforced by associated 
economies of scale and sunk 
costs)  
The colonial networks created the conduits 
which enabled the flow of capital to the railway 
in NSW and Qld to further advantage the 
prevailing global regime.   This in turned 
reinforced the locked-in and path dependent 
processes associated with colonial commerce 
The nature of the investment decisions locked-
in a broad range of path dependent processes 
related to railway investment and these 
moulded the development options and timings 
available in these places.   In this way the 
economies of NSW and QLD inherited the 
history of their own past 
In both NSW and Qld, once the key asset and 
location decisions were made the lock-in 
features associated with both the technology 
and the location choice set in motion path 
dependent processes which themselves heavily 
predetermined futures.  In this way regional 
economies inherit legacies of the past and 
future outcomes depend on past events and 
their outcomes 
Path dependence was stronger due to the size 
and lumpiness of investments in roads and 
railways in NSW and Qld; the impact of the 
choice of rail gauge in NSW and Qld;  and the 
impact of technology choice in railways 
especially in relation to signalling, electrification 
and level of specification  
In road and rail in NSW and Qld important 
actors are anchored in different places and 
multiple scales.  This highlights the role of local 
governance structures including the role of 
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state policies and institutional conditions in 
shaping outcomes 
The evolution of the economic landscape in 
NSW and Qld was heavily impacted by the role 
of social actors and how they were constrained 
and influenced by institutional factors 
emanating from different scales which are 
themselves contingent and bounded.  Effects 
are ongoing, complex and multi-dimensional 
and cannot be seen as simply responses to 
singular institutional forces at any particular 
level 
Spatial fixity Transport investments have significant spatial 
fixity.  This results from their linear size, the life 
of the assets and the scale of the investments 
Spatial fixity can be seen in the economic 
landscape of sunk investments in transport 
investments in railway lines in NSW and Qld 
(railway lines, stations, yards, rolling stock) the 
built environment, (whole regions and cities 
developing and then decaying around the 
activity generated by the rail investment), the 
network of local institutions (schools, technical 
colleges, universities, trade associations, trade 
unions, government agencies) and the 
embedded industrial base which is itself 
globally connected 
The rail lines in Qld were isolated lines and 
were not connected until the north coast line 
was built in the mid-1920s.  This had a major 
impact on the settlement pattern and on the 
spatial fixity associated with railway 
development in Qld 
The industrial guilds that were associated with 
the railway developed institutional structures 
around path dependent processes that were 
locked-in with technological choices further 
reinforcing rigidity and industrial fixity 
Related investments in ‘places’ (communities, 
towns, regional cities) in NSW and Qld further 
heightened the spatial fixity of road and rail 
investment decisions 
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The PPP road projects in NSW are the most 
visible sign of neo liberalism on the landscape 
and are the key characteristic of the road 
infrastructure spatial fixity associated with the 
neo liberal agenda 
The level of spatial fixity associated with the 
growth of motorised transport is unmatched in 
its impact at every scale from the 
neighbourhood to the organisation of towns, 
cities and the flows between them.  This is 
illustrated in the case studies of NSW and Qld 
road development 
Scale The global structural relational organisation of 
rail and road investments allowed an analysis 
of the impact of multi scalar forces in NSW and 
Qld.  It became clear that outcomes in regions 
were the result of multi scalar forces emanating 
from an array of linked economic and political 
institutional forms associated with the global 
institutional capital regimes 
Large transport investments in NSW and Qld 
locked-in and out a range of related industries 
at all levels of scale (local, regional and global) 
 
 It is especially clear from the case studies of rail in both NSW and Qld that 
the multi scalar interactions that exist between institutional spaces from the global to 
the state to the regional to the local are repeated instituted practices encompassed 
within interpersonal relations, complex networks, markets and supporting 
regulations.  Regions then evolve as an explicit outcome of institutional practices that 
relate to critical decisions large enough to connect them to global regimes.  Such an 
understanding underlines the relevance of the application of a Paasian framework 
that incorporates social, cultural, governance and institutional structures from the 
micro to the macro to understanding economic outcomes in the local.   This is 
because places are a result of their past as much as of their present and the 
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spatialised whole can only be understood as complex relations connected to global 
institutional forces. 
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9. Conclusion 
”…evolutionary concepts like place and path dependence help us to 
understand the deep historical and spatial processes that lead to the creation of 
particular rural places as bundles of ‘space/time’..” (Tonts, et al., 2012:300). 
 
 
In concluding this thesis, several larger points deserve reiteration. 
Firstly, in transport, but in other sectors as well, struggles over the character 
and power of particular institutional arrangements, at specific moments in time, are 
often simplistically interpreted within the frames of their contemporary contexts. 
However, as this thesis has strongly argued, the institutional arrangements which 
exist at any point in time, in fact, represent evolved vessels from past social, political, 
economic and geographical interactions. History matters. Thus, in the specific 
context of this thesis, struggles over the implementation of neoliberal reform 
agendas in rail (particularly) differed markedly between the two states of NSW and 
Qld precisely because of the differing inherited composition of transport authorities in 
both states. 
Secondly, institutional analyses must take into account the historical 
geographies of human settlement and wealth creation.  The present and what is 
possible in the present is a reflection of past decisions and how they have played out 
through interactions with other processes which are themselves contingently 
structured and related to processes which are global and impacted by events at a 
range of geographic scales.  These impacts from prior decisions are reinforced by 
functional, political and cognitive lock-in effects that mould even considerations of 
possible futures for places.  Narratives generated about past, present and future 
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possibilities become locked in discourse which in turn impacts the time horizon of the 
policy window for change.   
Thirdly, transport infrastructure assets are important vehicles of wealth 
creation in themselves and their impact on the development116 and positioning of 
places needs to be considered.  The location of these assets has implications in 
terms of the global competitive positioning of cities and regions and therefore on 
their ability to generate wealth.  This in turn sets up linkages with global capital 
regimes which in themselves have effects that reinforce the established global 
positioning with which they are aligned. 
Fourth, transport investments have significant spatial fixity.  This results from 
their linear size, the life of the assets and the scale of the investments.   The lock-in 
effects associated with this scale of investment generate a path dependency which is 
almost independent of other forces that may be operating.  This exposes places to 
risk associated with shifts in global regimes and resulting from new (especially 
competing) innovations for example railway investments were impacted by increased 
use of motorised vehicles.   This highlights the criticality of these investment 
decisions. 
Fifth, key actors are significant relational assets linking ideas, places and 
institutions.   Relational depth, in terms of the power and density of actor networks 
are important explanatory variables in relation to the ability of places to access and 
adopt new ideas and then in relation to their resilience and adaptability to changes.  
Intergenerational learning and culture are central to the resource fabric of places. 
                                            
116 The term development here is used in its broader sense to encompass social, ecological, political and 
economic variables (see Pike, et al., 2009: 1259 - 1260). 
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Finally, language, that most basic of all institutions117 is vital to understanding 
the transmission of ideas and change in policy.  In the case studies all ideas that had 
significant impact were translations from places with a shared language and history.  
Ideas from non-English speaking places were, it seems, locked out. 
  
                                            
117 See Pike, et al., 2009: 178 – 179. 
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Appendix A: Background to the Electrification of the Sydney 
Suburban Railway and the Harbour Crossing (Bridge) 
The Commissions recommended a subway link to the northern and western 
suburbs and an electrified city railway.  It was not however, until the election of the 
Labour government in 1910 that these urban issues were actioned.  The government 
in 1912 commissioned a London expert (Mr David Hay of Mott and Hay) to visit 
Sydney and report on the whole question of passenger transport in the city and 
suburbs.  He developed an elaborate scheme which met with objection from the 
Railways and the Department of Public Works.  The government adopted a 
modification of Mr Hay’s proposal developed by the Railway that included a bridge 
connection to North Sydney.   
The issues of the railway electrification and the harbour crossing were 
referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Public Works.  It was to this Committee 
that Dr John Bradfield then of the Public Works Department made his 
recommendations initially in 1913.   This exhaustive process indicates the size and 
the importance of the investment.  It is also instructive of public process around 
railway investment in the city of Sydney.  It has always been and remains vexed, 
complex and lengthy.118   
Bradfield later (1916) developed his detailed plan after visiting the US and 
Europe to study railways.  His plan (“Report on the Proposed Electric Railways for 
the City of Sydney”) called for the electrification of the suburban railway; the harbour 
bridge and the construction of the city underground rail network (refer to Figure 4.4.2 
                                            
118 A detailed treatment of the history of the electrification of the Sydney network can be found in Moss, 2009. 
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for details of Bradfield’s plan for the city underground network).   Much of Bradfield’s 
plan for the extension of the suburban network was never completed.  However, the 
suburban lines were electrified in 1926 and the city underground network as he 
envisioned it was largely completed by 1932 with the opening of the harbour bridge.  
Circular Quay Station was not completed and opened until 1956 and the Eastern 
Suburbs line was not operational until 1979.  Two additional lines were opened in the 
1930s to East Hills and Cronulla.  The last major extension was the airport line in 
2000.  
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Appendix B: The Passing of the Queensland Railway Bill 1863 
The Bill was introduced by the Secretary for Lands and Works, Sir Arthur 
Macalister, on the request of the Premier, Sir Robert Herbert.  The railways Bill (like 
all other major policies at the time) was driven by Premier Herbert.  He was known 
as a well-educated pragmatic thinker who had a close relationship with the Governor 
(Bowen) who played an active role in critical decisions.  They agreed on the needs of 
Qld and generally regarded the colony as a “...property to be developed along good 
sound business lines for the benefit of the colonists and prosperity” (Farnfield, 
1974:12).     
Macalister informed the House that a private investor (Robert Tooth and 
Company) had proposed to build a light railway linking Ipswich, Toowoomba, Dalby 
and Warwick.   At this time, Ipswich had substantial political influence.  It was a river 
port that had experienced early commercial development and linked the Darling 
Downs with external markets.  In the early rivalry between Ipswich and Brisbane, 
Ipswich was the winner until at least the late 1870s.   Ministries depended on the 
support of the political representatives from this region.  They were called the 
‘Ipswich Bunch” (Meston, 1891:25).  Hence, local communities forming advocacy 
coalitions were an early and enduring feature of the rail policy debate in Qld.  The 
Railways Bill passed on the Speakers vote, but the involvement of Tooth was 
rejected (Qld State Archives Item ID 611071 Legislative Assembly).   Given the 
narrowness of the result the government went to an election on the issue of 
government construction of a railway to the Darling Downs and increased its 
majority.  The Bill was reintroduced (Knowles, 1983:114).  
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The gauge question119 had not yet been considered.  Robert Tooth had 
engaged a railway engineer (Abraham Fitzgibbon) to visit Qld and recommend an 
approach to railway development.  Fitzgibbon’s report in July 1863 recommended a 
narrow gauge120 (three foot six inches) to save on construction costs.  He noted that 
such railways existed in India as feeder railways, in the mines in Wales and in 
Sweden, Norway and Belgium (Kerr, 1998:5).   
The proposal for a cheap railway suited the situation of the colony and the 
financial position of the government.  The Opposition also wanted railways and they 
wanted the Bill extended to apply to the whole of Qld so that a railway could be built 
from Rockhampton.  The population of central and north Qld had increased 
significantly since the Colony’s separation from NSW and there was pressure for a 
proportionate length of railway to be constructed in these areas to support 
development (Bond, 1965: 525).  The Bill was amended to include these 
requirements and after its third reading went to the Legislative Council on 18 August 
(Refer to Cole, 1945: 294-7). 
The Opposition and the press (principally the Moreton Bay Courier) were 
concerned about the narrow gauge.  The Legislative Council decided to ...“examine 
all knowledgeable persons” before making its decision.  Expert views differed but the 
Council returned the Bill to the Assembly after a motion was lost which would have 
inserted a clause requiring the use of the standard gauge.  The Council also 
recommended that the Assembly give more consideration to the issue of the gauge 
from the perspectives of safety, and the current and future needs of the colony.  After 
                                            
119 For a detailed discussion of the gauge issue refer to Knowles, 1981. 
120 Fitzgibbon recommended a light railway on which locomotives of 10 – 11 tons could haul 160 tons on the 
level at 15 – 20 mph, 65 tons on a gradient of 1:100 and 35 tons on 1:40 (Knowles, 1981:115). 
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further debate (the presentation of much of the same arguments)121 and two walk 
outs by the opposition, the Premier used a procedural device to finally pass the 
motion (Knowles, 1983: 118; Kerr, 1998: 5; Cole, 1945: 297).   
 
 
 
                                            
121 The main arguments were:  the gauge had not been used elsewhere for passengers; possible failure; small 
savings; inability to support locomotives required for the grades; government rushing the idea on the public; 
advice had not been sort from NSW and Victoria (Knowles, 1983:117). 
312 
 
 
Appendix C: Agencies established by the Transport Administration 
(Rail Corporatisation and Restructuring) Act, 1996 
 
 
The Rail Access Corporation (RAC) commenced business on 1 July, 1996.  
Its main functions were to “hold, manage and establish rail infrastructure facilities on 
behalf of the state” and “to provide persons with access as rail operators to the NSW 
rail network”.  The activities of RAC were to be consistent with the Rail Access 
Regime, a policy established by the Minister and approved by the Premier, to ensure 
competition principles for third party operators applying for access to infrastructure.   
The legislation also made RAC responsible for the: development and maintenance of 
an access pricing policy; compilation of the master timetable for the allocation of train 
paths. The Transport Administration Amendment (Rail Management) Act, 2000 
abolished RAC by amalgamating it with RSA to form the Rail Infrastructure 
Corporation.  This was a direct outcome of the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Glenbrook rail accident. 
The Railway Services Authority (RSA) was established as a corporation under 
the Transport Administration Amendment (Rail Corporatisation and Restructuring) 
Act, 1996 (Act No. 56, 1996).  RSA began as a "fragmented collection of the track 
and rolling stock maintenance sections of the former State Rail Authority of New 
South Wales."122  RSA supplied the rail industry with signals and tracks, maintained 
and reconditioned rolling stock, monitored the condition of rail infrastructure, and 
provided technical consultancy advice. Although it’s principal function under the Act 
                                            
122 See the 1997 Annual Report for detail. 
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was to be a safe and reliable supplier to the rail industry in NSW it did not limit its 
operations to NSW.  RSA was involved in rail asset management projects in other 
states and Hong Kong.123  
RSA was managed by a Chief Executive, subject to the control and direction 
of the Minister for Transport. The Chief Executive was assisted in the corporate 
governance by the Senior Executive team. RSA was a Government Trading 
Enterprise, and the principal stakeholder was the NSW Government, with the 
portfolio minister being the Minister for Transport. RSA was comprised of 
interdependent operating business units with a head office policy co-ordination.   The 
business units were: Business Development; Infrastructure Maintenance; Major 
Works; Consulting; Technical Services; and Workshops and Supply. RSA operated 
along geographic lines with the state divided into three administrative regions: North, 
West/South, and Metropolitan. 
RSA was dissolved on 30 June 1998 by the Transport Administration 
Amendment (Railway Services Authority Corporatisation) Act, No. 8, 1998. The 
successor, Rail Services Australia (RSA2) was established under the Act as a State 
Owned Corporation (SOC).  The new agency assumed the assets, liabilities, and 
work in progress of the former agency.  The aim with RSA2 was to move to 
competitive business operation as an asset management contractor.   RSA2 had to 
compete in the open market for work that had previously been guaranteed.  The 
organisation was restructured and included a Board with business experience to 
align it with a commercial operating environment.   Principle functions remained 
unchanged from the former agency.  
                                            
123 See the 1998 Annual Report for detail. 
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On 6 June 2000 an administrative change led to the Co-ordinator- General of 
Rail being given the oversight of the rail infrastructure organisations (RAC and RSA 
2).  RSA 2 and RAC were amalgamated on 1 January 2001 to form the Rail 
Infrastructure Corporation (RIC).  RAC2 remained as a Division of RIC. 
The new SRA was responsible for the operation of passenger services and it 
continued to operate those services which its predecessor had operated.  SRA was 
managed by a Board which consisted of the Chief Executive of the SRA and 
between four to seven persons appointed by the Minister.  The Board was 
responsible for determining the policies of the SRA. 
SRA consisted of four major divisions: corporate Head Office, Operations 
(City Rail and network Control), CountryLink and Passenger fleet maintenance.  In 
February, 1998 SRA was restructured to operating divisions: CityRail Stations; 
CountryLink; Passenger Fleet Maintenance and Operations.  These divisions were 
supported by corporate units responsible for:  policy and planning; corporate 
services; employee relations; organisational development and rail development. 
Freight Rail Corporation (FreightCorp) was established by the Transport 
Administration Amendment (Rail Corporatisation and Restructuring) Act, 1996, which 
divided the former SRA into four new independent businesses.  FreightCorp became 
a SOC and operated under the State Owned Corporations Act, 1989.   
The principal function of the FreightCorp was to operate rail freight services. Its 
objectives were to be a successful business and operate as efficiently as any 
comparable business, maximise the net worth of assets and exhibit a sense of 
responsible towards, regions, decentralisation and the environment.   FreightCorp 
paid a fee to RAC for access.  It transported a range of bulk commodities including 
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coal, grain, minerals, cement, petroleum and shipping containers.  On 24 August, 
2001 the NSW, Victorian and Commonwealth Governments jointly announced the 
combined sale of National Rail Corporation (NRC) and FreightCorp to a single 
purchaser.  The Freight Rail Corporation (Sale) Act 2001 (Act No 35, 2001) 
regulated the sale, dissolution, continuing business, distribution of assets and the 
rights of clients and staff after the sale. 
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Appendix D: Administrative arrangements for Qld railways during 
the nineteenth century 
 
Fitzgibbon was appointed Engineer-in-Chief of Railways on 30 September 
1863124 and was gazetted as the first Commissioner of Railways on 23 December 
1863.  The Commissioner was responsible for the provision of passenger and freight 
service and related engineering activities to improve and maintain the state’s railway 
(Queensland State Archives Agency ID366, Railway Department).  Henry Plwes was 
appointed Chief Engineer for the Northern Railway in 1864 and was charged with 
constructing a railway from Rockhampton to Westwood.  The Commissioner for 
Railways was responsible to the Under Secretary for Lands and Works from 1863 
until 1866 when the Department of Lands and Works was divided into two and the 
Department of Public Works was formed (Queensland State Archives Agency ID108, 
Lands and Works Department).  The Secretary for Public Works assumed 
responsibility for Railways until December 1887 (Queensland State Archives Agency 
ID108, Lands and Works Department).  
With the appointment of the second Commissioner (Arthur Herbert) in 1864 
the management of both rail systems was centralised to provide for uniform policy 
and to reduce overheads. However, there remained a large amount of local 
autonomy provided through a decentralised, regional approach to operation.  The 
Commissioner for Railways was supported by three Chief Engineers, (for the 
                                            
124 “Two dates are documented as the first appointment of Abraham Fitzgibbon as Commissioner for Railways. 
In the Queensland Government Gazette 1863, there is a notice of Fitzgibbon's appointment as Engineer-in-
Chief for Railways on 30 Sep 1863, and on 23 Dec 1863, a notice of his appointment as Commissioner of 
Railways. In the Queensland Blue Book 1863, 30 Sep 1863 is given as the date of Fitzgibbon's appointment as 
Commissioner of Railways and Chief Engineer, Southern and Western Railway“(Queensland State Archives 
Agency ID2730, Commissioner For Railways) 
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Southern and Western Railway, the Northern Railway and the Eastern Railway).  
The Departmental policy at the time aimed at the decentralisation of different offices. 
The position of Chief Engineer was responsible for the civil engineering of all 
railways together with the associated technical agencies of signalling, electrical 
power and light, communications and architecture (Queensland State Archives 
Agency ID1496, Railway Department, Chief Engineer's Branch).  The Locomotive125 
Branch was responsible for all rolling stock and the Traffic Branch126 for the 
operation of trains.  These delivery branches were supported by a Stores Branch, an 
Audit Branch127 and an Administrative Branch (Kerr, 1998:26-7).   Local Branch 
Heads of the isolated railways (at one time there were 11 operating) referred policy 
matters and major administrative decisions to the central administration in Brisbane.    
  
                                            
125 The head of the Locomotive Branch had several titles throughout the history of the branch but the 
functions remained the same. The various titles used were Locomotive Engineer, Locomotive Superintendent, 
Chief Mechanical Engineer, Works Manager, and Chief Mechanical Engineer and Workshops Superintendent. 
“The Branch was restructured in 1991.  (Queensland State Archives Agency ID1497, Railway Department, Chief 
Mechanical Engineer's Branch). 
126 “John Kennedy Donald was appointed as the Chief Traffic Manager on 10 March 1865. The position was 
gazetted on 13 July 1865. Throughout the duration of this office, the Manager's position was retitled as: 
General Traffic Manager, General Traffic Superintendent, Traffic Manager and Chief Traffic Manager”.  The 
Branch was restructured in 1991 (Queensland State Archives Agency ID1680, Railway Department, Assistant 
Commissioner (Traffic Operations) 
127“Thomas Battershill was first appointed as the Chief Accountant for the Southern and Western line on 7 
March 1865. The appointment, however was not gazetted until 13 July 1865.  
Throughout the duration of this Agency, the chief office has changed its name without any change to the 
functions.”  The Branch was restructured in 1991 (Queensland State Archives Agency ID1678, Railway 
Department, Chief Accountant's Office) 
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Appendix E: Motivations for railway construction in Qld during the 
nineteenth century 
 
Bundaberg Railway to Mt Perry 
The Mt Perry mine had investment from the Premier and a Minister when the 
line was approved in 1884. “Copper was discovered in the Mount Perry area in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Mining activities led to agitation for a link 
between the mines of the Mount Perry region and a port. In 1872 proposals of a 
private railway line were considered, and both Maryborough and Bundaberg vied to 
secure the line. These plans were never executed however. Rather, it was decided a 
state-owned line would be constructed... At the completion of the line the Mount 
Perry copper mines closed due to the financial failure of the mines. The copper 
mines reopened around the turn of the century and with the construction of a 
smelter, operated until the period of the First World War.” "Boolboonda Railway 
Tunnel (entry CHIMS16279 )". Queensland Heritage Register. Queensland 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
Emu Park to Rockhampton (1888) 
When Brisbane residents achieved a railway to Sandgate Rockhampton 
residents felt they should also get one to their beach.  The government provided 
funds for the project in the 1884 railway program and the line opened in 1888.  It 
operated for 75 years (Kerr, 1998: 50). 
Cairns Railway to Redlynch (1887) 
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This railway built during the gold rush to the alluvial field at Palmer was meant 
to make reef mining profitable but it never reached Palmer.  It always had very light 
traffic and had several periods of non operation before closing in 1961 (Kerr, 1998: 
51: Knowles, 1958). 
Normanton Railway to Haydon (1889) 
The town of Normanton is located on the Norman River and served as a port 
for gold and cattle.  The line has been described as a train from ‘nowhere to 
nowhere’ and has never been connected to the rest of the Queensland rail network 
(Knowles, 1983). 
Bowen Railway to Wangaratta (1891) 
The initial idea was to build a railway from the port of Bowen to Ayr to serve 
the sugar districts and rival Charters Towers as a Port.  The original plans never 
came to fruition and the line was never well utilised (Kerr, 1998: 55). 
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Appendix F: Newspaper report of the appointment of Qld Rail 
Commissioners, 1889 
““At a special Cabinet meeting yesterday the following gentlemen were 
appointed the new Railway Commissioners: Chief Commissioner, Mr. John 
Mathieson; first assistant, Mr. Robert Gray; second assistant, Mr. Andrew Johnston. 
Mr. Mathieson, who has been selected as the Chief Commissioner, is 43 years of 
age, having been born at Cumnock in l846. He has been in the employment of the 
Glasgow and South-western Railway for a period of twenty-eight years, having 
entered the service of that company as a boy, and worked his way up through the 
various grades connected with the Traffic Department. For the past thirteen years he 
has occupied the position of superintendent of the line. In addition to his practical 
experience he has a knowledge of the procedure in Scotland for the promotion of 
now lines, and has frequently been a witness before committees of both Houses of 
Parliament. For the past fourteen years he has acted as one of the company's 
representatives at the Railway Clearing-house, London. Mr. Mathieson states in his 
application that he has a general knowledge of the requirements of the locomotive 
and permanent, ways departments, of the construction and maintenance of railways, 
and he has frequently been brought into contact with engineers and contractors with 
respect to their operations and progress of works. The approved appliances as 
recommended by the Board of Trade for the working of railways in Scotland on both 
single and double lines, such as inter- locking, block telegraph, electric telegraph, 
train staff, train tablets, etc., are familiar subjects to him, as the Glasgow and South- 
western system, including general lines, consists of 282 miles of double and 171 
miles of single line, and these railways are all worked under regulations in 
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accordance with the Board of Trade requirements. Mr. Mathieson was strongly 
recommended for the position by Mr. Speight, the Chief Commissioner of the 
Victorian Railways. 
Mr. R. J. Gray, the able and popular Under Colonial Secretary, was born in 
Port Macquarie, New South Wales, in 1840, and received his early education there. 
He arrived in this portion of the colony in 1865, and entered the public service in 
1865 as a clerk in the Colonial Secretary's office. He was subsequently promoted to 
the position of chief clerk, and later on as acting Under Colonial Secretary. When the 
Under Colonial Secretary (Sir. Manning) retired, and pending the appointment of his 
successor in 1870, Mr. Gray was appointed Immigration Agent, which position he 
held until the end of 1879. On the 1st January, 1880, he was appointed Under 
Colonial Secretary, which position he has held with credit both to himself and to the 
public service.  Mr. Johnston, who is 37 years of age, is a member of the Institute of 
Civil Engineers. He has had considerable experience in the construction and 
maintenance of heavy and light railways, inspection, alteration, and repairs to 
existing lines, and the making of permanent and temporary roadways, also the 
drawing up and carrying out of contracts. His special qualification is in laying out the 
construction and maintenance of railways and the drawing up of contracts 
appertaining thereto. He also claims to have a good knowledge of railway work in 
general. From 1869 to 1877 he was engaged in the construction of the Settle Carlisle 
and the Shipley-Guiseley railways. From 1877 to 1881 he was engaged as agent 
and engineer for a contractor, and had sole charge of the staff, locomotives, plant, 
and the entire supervision of the following works : Ely and Haddenham and St. Ives 
Railway, the Máchynileth and Corris Railway, and the Gottenburg tramways in 
322 
 
Sweden. In 1881 he was appointed engineer of the eastern division of the Great 
Eastern Railway, and now has the entire charge of 300 miles of railway, together 
with large docks and quays at Harwich and Parkeston. He has also carried out many 
large works, among them being the conversion from single to double line of the 
Manningtree aud Harwich branch, the Tendering Hundred Railway, while he has half 
completed the Bury and Newmarket Hall- way, which will be open for traffic in June 
next. Mr. Johnston refers the Government by permission to Major-General 
Hutchinson, R.E., Board of Trade Inspector of Railways. The Government have 
cabled to the successful applicants notifying their appointment. 
There were in all 134 applications received from England and America, and 
twenty-six from the various Australian colonies.” (The Brisbane Courier, 11 May 
1889, Page 6). 
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Appendix G: Functions of the NSW Mains Road Board, 1920s 
Under the Main Roads Act (1924128), there were two types of Main Roads: 
Metropolitan and Country Main Roads.  Roads which previously had been declared 
Main Roads remained so and councils could make representation to the Board129 to 
have a road declared a Main Road or a Secondary Main Road and attract funds. The 
Board could also provide financial assistance to councils for the Country Roads130.  
The Board could recommend the proclamation of Developmental Roads. These were 
roads that would assist in the development of a district or of Crown or private land by 
improving access to a railway station or a wharf131.   
In general, the Board decided which roads would be constructed or 
maintained and who would carry out the work.   The Main Roads Board managed 
three funds that provided for the development, management and upkeep of roads:  
the County of Cumberland Main Roads Fund132; the Country Main Roads Fund133; 
and the Development Roads Fund134.   
                                            
128 Note: this legislation came into effect in 1925. 
129 In recommending the proclamation of a main road, the Board was to consider: any representations from 
relevant local government authorities;  the availability of funds for its construction and maintenance; whether 
the road would be a main trunk road between business, population or production centres; whether the road 
formed a major link between the various parts of the county of Cumberland (or the state if in a country 
location); whether most of the traffic will be local or is through traffic whether the road would develop tourist 
traffic; and the value of the road for possible defence purposes (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703). 
130 Normally the Board paid at least half of the cost of country main roads, and could advance the full cost the 
Council or Councils’ portion to be repaid over a nominated period (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703). 
131 The Board determined, following application of the Council for a Developmental Road, the proportion of 
the cost that will be supplied from the Developmental Roads Fund. The Board could elect to meet the whole 
cost with the council repaying the interest.  Councils were responsible for the maintenance of Developmental 
Roads to standards set by the Board. If such a road fell into disrepair, the Board cold repair the road at Council 
expense (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
132 The following was paid into the Fund:  half of the proceeds from motor vehicle and motor traffic taxation in 
New South Wales (minus the costs of collection); the income derived from the licensing of drivers and fines for 
traffic offences in the Metropolitan area (minus the cost of administration); a levy (based upon the 
unimproved capital value of land in the Metropolitan Councils); and monies from the sale of equipment of 
main road building and the income from the lease or hire of equipment belonging to the Board .  The Fund was 
to be used for the maintenance of the roads, re-payment of loans taken out for road building, a proportion of 
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Road Ferries were added to the Board’s responsibilities in 1928135.  The 
Board was organised into a Metropolitan and a Country structure.  The Metropolitan 
Highway Division was established on 1 January 1928.   It was headed by an 
Engineer-in-Chief who oversaw all of the survey, design, construction and 
maintenance functions of the Board in the Metropolitan area136.  The Country area of 
NSW was divided into six Divisions:  Upper Northern (office at Glen Innes); Lower 
Northern Division (Tamworth); Outer Metropolitan (Sydney); Central Western 
(Parkes); Southern (Queanbeyan); Riverina (Wagga Wagga).  Bridge Design and 
Property remained Head Office functions. 
                                                                                                                                       
the salaries and expenses of the staff attributable to Road construction,  purchase of equipment for use on 
metropolitan main roads and purchase, maintenance and stocking of facilities necessary for the construction 
of main roads.  Improvements to the secondary main roads could at the Board’s discretion be financed from 
the County of Cumberland Main Roads Fund (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
 
133 The following was paid into the Fund :  Half of the proceeds from motor vehicle and motor traffic taxation 
in New South Wales (minus the costs of collection); The income derived from the licensing of drivers and fines 
for traffic offences outside the Metropolitan area (minus the cost of administration);  a sum voted annually by 
Parliament;  other revenues directed by legislation to be paid into the account;  any money appropriated by 
the Commonwealth Government for the construction or maintenance of Country Main Roads;  contributions 
by Councils;  loans raised for the construction of country main roads; proceeds of the sale of equipment or 
income from leasing and hiring the Board’s equipment.  The Fund could be used for the construction and 
maintenance of country main roads, the repayment of loans raised for the construction of country main roads, 
a proportion of the Board’s staff costs, purchase of equipment for use on country main roads and purchase, 
maintenance and stocking of facilities necessary for the construction of main roads (State Archives, 
Investigator Agency 703).  
 
134 The Fund comprised:  money appropriated by Parliament for this purpose; money granted by the 
Commonwealth government for Developmental roads; Loans raised under the Loan act for construction of 
roads of this type.  The Developmental Roads Fund could be used by the Board for the construction of 
developmental roads, the payment of interest on loans and a proportion of the salaries and expenses of staff 
(State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
 
135 On 1 May 1928 a number of bridges and ferries situated in the County of Cumberland that had been 
previously classified as ‘National Works’ were deproclaimed as such and responsibility for them was 
transferred to the Main Roads Board. The cost for the maintenance of these was drawn from the County of 
Cumberland Main Roads Fund (State Archives, Investigator Agency 703).  
 
136 The Branch took responsibility for the management of the Sydney Harbour Bridge (apart from the railways 
and tramways) on or shortly after 29 December 1932. In this regard the branch was responsible for:  managing 
the bridge finances; maintaining and lighting the bridge; administering the toll; monitoring traffic; and initially 
was responsible for the disposal of surplus land acquired during the construction of the Bridge (State Archives, 
Investigator Agency 4022).  
 
